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Introduction
We live in a highly integrated and strongly interdependent world. The development of 
market integration among national economies is matched by the higher degree of 
interdependence among national economies that has emerged dramatically in the recent 
years. What creates this interdependence is not only the integration of markets but also 
the presence of remarkable spill-over effects from one economy to others '. A special 
kind of interdependence is "policy interdependence", which arises when an economic 
policy decision in one country also affects a foreign country and vice-versa.
It is interesting, therefore, to analyse the new problems that such a high degree of 
interdependence poses for economists and policy-makers.
The first thing to note is that policy-making in an interdependent world becomes 
strategic, in the sense that when a country chooses its optimal policy, it must take into 
account how foreign countries will react. A country can no longer look at its policy- 
formation problem in isolation without considering what is happening in the rest of the 
world. From a theoretical point of view, it is evident that awareness of the strategic 
content of a policy in the modem world entails the use of the analytical tools of game 
theory.
The main question to answer is whether the decentralised process of purely 
national economic policy-formation is the best solution in an interdependent world. In 
other words, is there benefit to be drawn from coordinating national economic policies? 
In the last ten years, a good deal of research has been conducted in an attempt to answer 
this question.
Before proceeding, however, we should clarify the meaning of the closely 
related concepts of "coordination" and "cooperation", which are often used interchange­
ably in the literature. The taxonomy proposed by Home and Masson (1988) can be 
effectively used for this purpose. They define policy coordination in a very narrow sense, 
imported from the game-theoretic literature, as the decision making that maximises joint
1 By spill-over effect we mean, in the present context, the effect that a change in a 
macroeconomic variable (due to a change in policy, or to a shock etc.) of one country has on the 
macroeconomic variables of other countries. However, it should be pointed out that externalities 
other than macroeconomic spillovers also exist and can be quite important. An example is the 
pollution produced by the manufacturing sectors of one country, which affects the environment 
in another country.
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welfare and thereby enables international interdependencies to be positively exploited. 
On the other hand, cooperation is defined in a broader sense to encompass all kinds of 
interchange between countries; interchange which can take different forms, including the 
exchange of information and opinions on economic affairs and agreement on the "rules of 
the game".2 Moreover, it is worth noting that there are numerous possible uncoordinated 
policies according to the different hypotheses on the degree of cooperation that they 
embody. In a broader sense, we may say that the very first step of cooperation is 
acknowledgement and the awareness of the interdependencies between countries. It is 
generally thought that this first step of cooperation can be very rewarding in terms of 
welfare.
A higher degree of international coordination among the economic policies 
would seem the obvious response to the new problems posed by such a high degree of 
interdependence. The advantage of cooperation is clearly represented by the 
internalisation of the externalities of national policy making decisions. The debate on the 
desirability of this economic policy coordination is, however, still open on both 
theoretical and political grounds 3. Rogoffs seminal paper (Rogoff, 1985) shows that the 
counter-intuitive result of the superiority of Nash policy over cooperative policy may 
occur when policy makers lack credibility. Rogoff maintains that since the coordination 
of monetary policies increases the incentive to renege on the announced policy, it 
exacerbates the credibility problem. Rogoffs point is quite straightforward. In the 
absence of coordination, reneging entails a surprise increase in monetary growth, which 
in turn leads to a depreciation of the currency: the associated inflation costs act as a 
disincentive to cheating. By contrast, under cooperation this disincentive disappears as 
the exchange rate is unaffected when both countries renege simultaneously. In this case 
the cooperative equilibrium seems to provide for a form of collusive behaviour between 
the national governments at the expense of the private sector.
2 The most popular and widely discussed "rule of the game’-based form of coordination is the target 
zone proposal (see Williamson and Miller, 1987). The suggestion is to assign domestic monetary 
policy to stabilizing exchange rates at their equilibrium level, able to ensure long-run current account 
equilibrium, domestic fiscal policy to control domestic nominal demand growth, and some 
combination of aggregate monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize global nominal demand. The proposal 
contains some elements of coordination (first of all the agreement on a consistent set of exchange rates, 
and the control of global nominal demand) but some aspects of policy may be left to the national 
Government to determine independently.
3 Comprehensive surveys of the academic literature on international macroeconomic policy 
coordination may be found in Home and Masson, 1988, Currie and Levine, 1991
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Therefore, if policy makers were not able to make binding commitments to their 
ex ante optimal policy because of the absence of some institutional arrangements which 
effectively deter any change in the announced policy, the time inconsistent problem may 
render cooperation undesirable. In other words, it is thus evident that a correct 
comparison between cooperative and non-cooperative policy can be done only once a 
solution to the time consistent problem has been provided.
One can find in the literature different and quite distinct responses to the time 
inconsistent problem. One approach is to limit the analysis to only credible policies, i. e. 
policies which are constrained to the time consistent (see next chapter for details of the 
way in which these policies are obtained).
A mayor problem with this solution is that time consistent policies can be 
severely sub-optimal. Some alternatives were, therefore, proposed. Among them, the 
option most widely used in the literature on international economic policy coordination is 
to consider reputational equilibria in which the optimal policy, or more generally a policy 
superior to the time consistent policy, can be sustained by trigger mechanism 4. There is 
a large literature which adopts this approach (Currie and Levine (1993) contains most of 
applications of this approach to international economic policy cooperation). This interest 
is also motivated by the consideration that a trigger mechanism can sustain also the 
cooperative agreements between the two governments. Trigger mechanisms may enforce 
efficient outcome when the cost of reneging, i. e. the enforcement, exceeds the gains from 
reneging, i. e. the temptation. Both enforcement and temptation depend on the 
punishment scheme and mainly on the length of the punishment period. Therefore the 
mayor shortcoming of the trigger strategy approach is that the choice of the punishment 
period is indeterminate and there is a multiplicity of efficient solutions which can be 
supported (Rogoff, 1987).
This is particularly serious for the private sector trigger mechanism when the 
game is between policy makers and the private sector and we assume that private agents 
are atomistic (Currie and Levine, 1993). In this case there is no prospect for a strategic 
choice of punishment period and it must be arbitrarily chosen. On the other hand, when
4 Another option is to relax the assumption of complete information. In the present context, this 
means to relax the assumption that private sector has perfect information both of the true 
structure of the model and of policy maker preferences. Backus and Driffil, 1985, among the 




the game involves large players such as the two policy makers, it can be assumed that 
they choose the punishment period strategically. Therefore while the reputational 
approach can solve the problem of sustainability of cooperative policy among 
governments, it does not seem a sound way of solving the time consistent problem.
Because of the high degree of arbitrariness contained in the reputational 
approach, in the present work I limit the analysis to time consistent policy.
It is clear that when comparing time consistent policies, the result of the 
superiority of cooperation cannot be taken for granted. A cooperative solution will have a 
positive effect determined by the internalisation of policy externalities and a negative 
effect given by the worsening of the credibility problem. The net result will depend on 
the weights given to these two opposite effects. Other researchers have explored the 
dynamic aspects of policy coordination which were originally raised by Rogoffs 
example. Miller and Salmon (1985) and Levine and Currie (1987) give examples in 
which coordination reduces welfare because of time consistency problems. Kehoe (1989) 
and van der Ploeg (1988), moreover, show that this results could also arise in models 
with optimising microfoundations. Miller and Salmon (1990) and Miller Salmon and 
Sutherland (1991) show that the key factor in determining the merits of cooperation is the 
nature of the shocks affecting the economy. The more asymmetric the initial inflation 
displacements (the only kind of shocks considered by Miller and Salmon), or, in a 
stochastic environment, the less correlated the shocks, the less likely it is that 
coordination will pay.
In conclusion, when there are rational and forward looking private agents the 
desirability of a higher degree of international economic policy is far from being 
generally accepted.
Space and time constraints prevent me from following all the various strands of 
the international economic policy literature. Therefore, it is right and proper to stress all 
the points that are not to be covered in the thesis.
In what follows, we are going to analyse the international economic policy game; 
interdependencies, in our framework, will be characterised in terms of a three(four)- 
person game whose players consist of the two (three) policy makers and a homogeneous 
forward looking private sector. Therefore there are two different sets of bilateral 
(multilateral) relationships to consider. Firstly, there are those between governments and 
private sector. As we have seen, the outcome of the same announced policy may be 
different according to the hypothesis on the credibility of the policy makers; the lack of
4
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credibility may affect the issue of the desirability of international economic policy 
cooperation. Secondly, there are the relationships between governments to consider: in 
this case too, a time consistent problem emerge since a policy maker may have the 
incentive to cheat on the other policy makers. This is the well known issue of the 
sustainability of a cooperative agreement.
Only the first issue will be addressed in the thesis. There are some important 
reasons that justify this choice besides the time and space constraint. The first is a logical 
one: the issue of the desirability of international economic policy cooperation comes first 
than the issue of the sustainability of an eventually reached agreement. Were the Rogoff s 
scepticism supported by our analysis, no need would be to analyse the topic of the 
sustainability of an undesirable and so unachievable cooperative agreement. In addition, 
as I already mentioned, the sustainability problem can be solved using some form of 
trigger mechanism; since the assumption of a strategic behaviour of policy makers is 
plainly acceptable, this approach does not raise the same doubts that it does in addressing 
the relationship between policy maker and atomistic private sector. Finally even without 
considering trigger strategies, one has to note that reneging on an international agreement 
is much more costly on political terms than a simple change in monetary policy 5. This 
can be better understood if we realise that often the monetary table is just of the table on 
which the international political game is played. Along with it, a trade policy game can 
be played, for example.
As seen before, I concentrate on time consistent solutions of the policy game and 
do not follow that branch of the literature which, instead, suggests reputational 
mechanisms as a way of sustain ex ante optimal policy. A treatment of this approach can 
be found in Canzoneri and Henderson (1991) and Currie and Levine (1993). Neither I 
treat the more recent and interesting work on the interdependence between politically 
motivated - by a desire to be re-appointed or to implement a partisan policy platform - 
policy makers. In this case, the analysis of the international policy interactions is 
enriched by taking the incentive of the domestic policy process into account. An up-to- 
date survey of the literature is found in Persson and Tabellini (199S). Another interesting 
strand of the literature studies the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on international
5 This assumption is implicitly present in much of the literature which interprets the EMS as an 
instrument with which to apply inflationary discipline (see for example, Giavazzi and Pagano, 
1988 these issues are also treated hereafter in chapter 4).
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economic policy coordination. I do not treat these issues which are well summarised in a 
recent book by Gosh and Masson (1994).
Instead, the focus of the thesis is really on the issue of the desirability of 
economic cooperation when credible policies are considered. The aim of this thesis is to 
investigate more deeply the issue of desirability of international economic policy 
coordination in order to verify the robustness of the result that coordination may not pay. 
Is it as general as many of the researchers seem to argue? Does it depend on the model 
used to analyse the topic? A particular attention will be posed to the use of this apparatus 
in studying the economic cooperation in an European perspective.
The plan of the work is as follows.
The thesis is divided in two parts: the first analyses the theoretical issue of the 
existence of the benefits from coordination, the second part investigates more specifically 
the issue of the economic policy cooperation within Europe. The first part consists of 
three chapters; in the first of which critical analysis of the literature on policy 
coordination is conduced; in this section the main drawbacks to the traditional approach 
are identified.
In the second chapter, I take the Miller and Salmon model and investigate 
whether Rogoffs paradox is confirmed when some of the assumptions employed are 
relaxed or modified. This chapter provides some interesting evidence in confirmation of 
Rogoffs: coordination reduces welfare even when a conservative central banker is 
appointed, although cooperation in the first stage of the two stage delegation game is 
desirable; cooperation is counterproductive when policy instruments are costly, and when 
the exchange rate is taken as a policy target. Nevertheless, evidence more favourable to 
cooperation emerges as well: interestingly enough, when even a mild element of 
irrationality affects the foreign exchange markets cooperation response is clearly superior 
to Nash policy; furthermore when cooperative solution is defined as a result of a 
bargaining process, cooperation is again found to be desirable.
In the last chapter of the Part one, the Miller and Salmon model is abandoned 
and the issue of desirability of international policy coordination is reconsidered within a 
context of a two-country model with micro-foundations, intertemporal budget 
constraints, wealth effects and current-account dynamics. The result is rather favourable 
towards cooperation: it is shown that cooperation pays even in the case in which initial 
shocks are asymmetrically distributed and time consistent policies are considered. It is 
worth noting that the bias induced by the lack of credibility of policy makers appears
6
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more substantial in the case of Nash policy than in the cooperative case, as testified also 
by the finding that gains from coordination are higher when time consistent policies are 
considered. Although a general rejection of the Rogoff paradox cannot be justified, a 
more careful attention should be posed to the analysis of cooperation using the time 
consistent policies in a context in which intertemporal budget constraints play an 
important role.
The second part of the thesis is dedicated to analysis of the issue within a context 
of European monetary integration. The principal focus of analysis is exchange rate 
targeting as a surrogate for more explicit forms of cooperation. This procedure has been 
proposed since it allows to save transaction costs, information costs and political 
difficulty with respect to full cooperation.
Two different lines of enquiry are followed: chapter four addresses the issue 
from an historical perspective, by analysing the EMS record in order to verify whether 
the European fixed rate arrangement worked well enough as a surrogate for a more 
complete form of cooperation and as viable route towards a monetary unification; chapter
5 instead approaches the issue theoretically using a three country version of the Miller 
and Salmon model proposed in chapter 2.
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Does any benefit accrue from coordinating national economic policies?
1. Does any benefit accrue from coordinating national economic policies?
It is possible to distinguish different stages in the evolution of the literature on policy 
coordination. Analysis was initially conducted within a static framework. The policy­
making problem in an interdependent world was described as a static game involving two 
players - the two policy-makers - in which the .pay-off was represented by a social 
welfare function and the strategy sets consisted of the available economic policy 
measures. In this framework, it was easy to prove that a coordinated economic policy 
yields an outcome that is Pareto superior to that obtained by decentralized policy, al­
though in some studies the empirically estimated gains from coordination were found to 
be negligible 7. The policy implication of this result was quite straightforward: a higher 
degree of policy coordination was recommended. Subsequently, analysis was 
incorporated into a dynamic framework. The game now involved three players (two 
policy-makers and a private sector) since it was assumed that private agents have 
forward-looking expectations. It was shown that international policy coordination may in 
fact be counterproductive since coordination may exacerbate the time consistency 
problem created by the private sector’s forward-looking expectations. The existence of 
cases in which cooperation does not pay clearly undermines trust in moving towards a 
higher degree of cooperation. More recently, this pessimistic result has been generalized, 
with the policy implication that policy coordinationn should not be the main issue on the 
political agenda but, rather, that more effort should be devoted to overcoming the time 
consistency problem.
The aim of this first chapter of the thesis is to conduct a critical analysis of the 
literature on policy coordination. The theoretical literature on this issue has grown 
rapidly in sophistication and complexity as well as in volume. My intention is not to 
provide a detailed and comprehensive review of all work produced. Instead I wish to 
extrapolate the core of the debate by identifying one of the most interesting questions
6 For a discussion of the Bonn Summit see Holtham (1988) and Putnam and Henning (1988).
7 In their pioneering study Oudiz and Sachs (1984) estimated that the gains from cooperation among 
G3 countries in the mid 1970s would be worth no more than 1/2 % of the GNP of each country, 
compared to the best non-cooperative outcome. Later studies have confirmed that the gains from 
coordination arc likely to be small (Hughes Hallet (1986), Canzoneri and Minford (1986 and 1987). 
Other studies, however, have suggested that such gains improve considerably when either the 
exchange rate is considered a target of policy (Holtham and Hughes Hallet, 1987) or when 
"reputation" or persistent shocks are considered (Cunie, Levine and Vidalis, 1987).
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discussed by this literature: the social desirability of a higher degree of coordination 8. At 
the end of the second millennium, decentralized policy-making process may be no longer 
able to handle the dramatic problems facing the entire world. Although the academic 
literature remains at a high level of abstraction, it can be used to evaluate the demand for 
a more centralized decision-making process at the international level.
1.2. International economic policy coordination
The pioneering work on the game theoty approach to policy-making in an interdependent 
world was by Hamada (1974, 1976), who used a static analysis to study the strategic 
content of monetary policy in a system of fixed exchange rates. Oudiz and Sachs (1984) 
and Canzoneri and Gray (1985) have extended the analysis to a framework of flexible 
exchange rates. They show that competitive Nash behaviour yields an inefficient 
outcome since it fails to account for the externalities of economic policy decisions 
(spillover effects). A superior outcome can be obtained by setting a cooperative policy - 
through maximization of a weighted welfare function - that internalizes the economic 
policy externalities. The problem seems to be essentially the same as the standard 
problem of the ’’prisoner’s dilemma" in textbook game theory. To the extent that it can be 
enforced, cooperative behaviour provides a superior outcome.
The literature on policy coordination within a static framework displays two 
major shortcomings. On the one hand, it considers the interplay between policy-makers 
in different countries without accounting for the interaction between the policy-maker 
and forward looking private agents. The game structure of the policy-making problem in 
an interdependent world is in effect a game with three, rather than two, players, even if 
the private sector does not behave strategically. On the other hand, it neglects the 
dynamic nature of the interdependence between national economies. To overcome these 
problems, the second generation of studies on policy coordination (see papers in Buiter 
and Marston (1985) and Bryant and Portes (1987) among others) has extended the 
analysis to consider dynamic strategic interactions.
As is widely acknowledged, several theoretical problems emerge when more 
complicated dynamic interactions are taken into account. As far as our topic here is 
concerned, for example, dynamic game theory must replace the simpler static game
8 Those interested in a complete overview of the policy coordination literature are advised to read 
Home and Masson (1988), Currie, Holtham and Hughes Hallet (1988), Cunie and Levine (1993) 
and Persson and Tabellini (1995).
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approach.9 Moreover, when the policy-maker considers more than one period in choosing 
his optimal policy in the presence of forward-looking expectations, the so-called "time 
inconsistency" or "dynamic inconsistency" problem arises (Kydland and Prescott, 1977). 
This means that a policy, optimally set at a given period, can become sub-optimal by the 
mere passing of time. This inconsistency may be recognized by rational economic agents, 
and thus policy will lose its credibility and private agents may be expected to react 
differently. In other words, the existence of an incentive to reoptimise in the future 
renders the policy non-credible in the present, and it will not be optimal even if adhered 
to. Barro and Gordon (1983) show that a lack of credibility leads to an inefficient 
outcome represented in their model by a rate of inflation different from zero. This issue is 
currently known in the literature as the "credibility problem" and it has brought a new 
perspective to the rules versus discretion debate (Barro 1987, Alesina 1988).
The time consistency problem has important implications for the issue of 
international policy coordination. In particular, it can be shown that international policy 
coordination may be counterproductive. In a famous paper, Rogoff (Rogoff, 1985) 
maintained that since the coordination of monetary policies increases the incentive to 
renege on the announced policy, it therefore exacerbates the credibility problem. Rogoff s 
point is quite straightforward. In the absence of coordination, reneging implies a surprise 
increase in monetary growth, which in turn leads to a depreciation of the currency: the 
associated inflation costs act as a disincentive to cheating. On the contrary, under 
cooperation this disincentive disappears, since the exchange rate is unaffected when both 
countries renege simultaneously. In this case the cooperative equilibrium seems to 
provide a form of collusive behaviour between the national governments at the expense 
of the private sector. Rogoffs major contribution was to stress that the cooperative 
solution of the policy-making problem in an interdependent world has costs in terms of 
higher credibility that must be taken into account when evaluating the merits of 
cooperation.
In more general terms, the central question regarding the existence of gains from 
coordinating national economic policies must be considered empirically by trying to 
estimate the benefits (or costs) to be derived from the coordination of national policies, 
and on theoretical grounds by incorporating the credibility effect into a more complete 
model of strategic behaviour.
9 This explains why most of the authors use numerical simulations to solve their model.
11
Does any benefit accrue from coordinating national economic policies?
1.3.When does cooperation pay?
As already poineted out my intention is not to orderly review all the literature om policy 
coordination, both because I am interested in a more specific topic, the welfare benefit of 
coordination, and because I prefer to present a simple model and to use it as a guide to 
the literature on policy coordination.
The model proposed by Miller and Salmon seems best to exemplify the main 
conclusions reached by the literature in this field. The main features of this model - an 
extension of the one country model developed by Buiter and Miller (1982) • are the 
presence of temporarily sticky goods prices and "demand” determined output that ensures 
the substantial non-neutrality of money in the short run. Note that the model describes 
two identical countries with symmetric economic structure.
The model can be summarized as follows:
1.3.1) y = -Yr + 5c + T|y* and y = -yr* -5c + r|y
1.3.2) i = <(>y + a c + 7i and * m * ■ *l =<py - oc + 7C
1.3.3) 7t = Ç<t>z + £oc and Jt* = £<|>z* -  £ac
1.3.4) z = y and .* *z =y
1.3.5) E(c) = r-r*
Equation 1.3.1) displays the behaviour of output (y), defined as a deviation from the 
natural rate level, which depends on the interest rate (r), the level of competitiveness (c), 
and on foreign output. The inflationary process (i) is described in equation 1.3.2) by a 
Phillips curve augmented by a term representing backward looking core inflation (n) and 
movements in the real exchange rate, which is taken to be a forward-looking variable. 
Equation 1.3.3) in turn shows core inflation derived from the integration of the equation 
of core inflation motion: 7C=£(i—Jl)10. Equation 1.3.4) states that the variable z is the
measure of cumulated past excess of demand. Equation 1.3.5) is a standard arbitrage 
condition stating that the real exchange rate is a forward-looking integral of future 
expected real interest differentials.
The authors assume the following economic policy loss functions:
w - f l M ’ + y2] and w = f [ p , ^ + / !]
10 For a discussion of different core inflation representation see Buiter and Miller (1985).
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The real interest rate is assumed to be the policy instrument.11
Using this model I can begin to answer the above question on the merits of 
coordination. In particular I will show that the crucial factor in determining the 
desirability of cooperation is the degree of credibility of governments (Miller and 
Salmon, 1985 and 1990, Miller, Salmon and Sutherland, 1991 and Levine and Currie, 
1987). If governments have sufficient credibility to commit themselves to the full 
optimal policy then coordination is beneficial. Otherwise, if governments lack credibility 
vis-à-vis their private sectors, international cooperation may be damaging.^ Comparing 
time consistent policies, that is, sub-optimal but credible policies, Miller and Salmon find 
that a crucial role may be attributed to the degree of correlation between external shocks. 
When shocks are symmetric or highly correlated, coordination appears to be beneficial, 
otherwise when shocks are asymmetric or negatively correlated coordination appears to 
be damaging.
The way in which the optimal policy and the dynamics of the full system are 
derived, is quite straightforward. The first order conditions of the Hamiltonian, along 
with dynamic equations of the economy form the adjoint system whose solutions give the 
path of state and output variables (see appendix to this chapter). The state dimension of 
the system does not allow an analytical solution, and the route followed by the authors 
and by myself has been to simulate the system numerically. The policy problem 
envisaged is inherited inflation pressure represented by a high initial value of z, that is, 
previous cumulated excess demand.
Note first that in a model like the one above, given the relative weights attached 
to output and inflation costs, it pays to achieve a rapid response to the initial inflation 
situation. The less "lethargic" the policy response, the less cumulated welfare cost will be 
obtained. This arises because output is supposed to adjust frictionlessly to the new 
demand so there are no costs in imposing a "cold turkey" measure instead of a more 
gradualist policy.
1.3.1. Comparing optimal policies with precommitment
My main aim will be to compare the decentralized policy, that is a Nash policy, with the 
coordinated policy response to the initial shocks. Whereas in the Nash case the problem
11 It can be easily replaced by y.
12 It is worth noting that the following situation is proved to be true as well. Levine and Currie (1987) 
and Levine et al. (1987) show that in the absence of co-ordination, reputational (time consistent) policy 
may be undesirable.
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for each country will be to minimize L (L*) with respect to r (r*), in the case of 
cooperative policy the objective, assuming the implicit existence of a central planner, 
will be to minimize a weighted sum of the two loss functions using both policy 
instruments. In this section I compare full optimal policy. In other words, I assume that 
for some reason, each government can credibly precommit itself not to cheat the private 
sector the time consistency problem does not arise. The experiments are pursued using 
the same parameters values used by Miller and Salmon (pj =&2 = <t> = £, = 1, y = 6 = 1/2,
o  = 0.1 and T| = 1/3) and the same initial displacement z(0)=10, z*(0)=0.
Figure 1.3.1.
O Coop + Nash
The differences between the two policies are evident from figure 1.3.1. 
Obviously, the cooperative reaction to the initial inflationary shock is faster than in the 
competitive case. The reason for this is straightforward: in the Nash case each 
government considers the positive effect on inflation obtained by the revaluation induced 
by the monetary contraction, so that it reduces its money supply - increases the real 
interest rate - less quickly than in the cooperative case. This positive effect disappears in 
equilibrium since both countries want to exploit it. Then the competitive reaction to the 
initial inflation shocks is more "lethargic" than the coordinated reaction. The advantage 
of cooperating is that it makes clear that no gains in terms of inflation can be obtained via 
a change in the real exchange rate and that a stronger monetary contraction is needed. A 
cooperative policy, in other words, averts the danger of a competitive revaluation.
14
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In conclusion, we can say that when a government is able to precommit itself in 
order to make ex-ante optimal policy credible then cooperation will pay, in this highly 
simplified world. It is interesting to note, however, that from this result does not 
necessarily follow that the cooperative solution will be achievable; it can be in fact not 
incentive compatible for both countries. Table 1.3.1. shows the welfare costs at the 
national level distinguishing between output and inflation costs. While for the domestic 
country the cooperative solution assures less output and inflation losses, for the foreign 
country the opposite is true: therefore the latter has no incentive to enter a cooperative 
agreement with the other country. This result is easily explained by taking into account 
that, although we assume that the two countries are perfectly symmetric as far as 
economic structure and welfare preferences are concerned, they are hit by a dramatically 
asymmetric shock. Consequently a cooperative solution can be achieved only when a 
bargaining weight different from 0.5 is used in order to render the cooperative solution 
incentive compatible for both countries. This issue is extensively addressed in section
2.5.
Table 1 .3.1
Home country costs 
Output Inflation Total




Full optimal policy 
Nash 24.256 21.482 45.739 0.027 0.118 0.145 22.942
Coop 24.199 21.447 45.646 0.051 0.139 0.189 22.918
Time consistent policy
Nash 23.223 22.591 45.814 0.023 0.113 0.136 22.975
Coop 22.941 22.942 45.882 0.085 0.085 0.170 23.026
1-3.2. Comparing time consistent policies.
In the absence of precommitment the optimal policy obtained by standard dynamic 
optimization is time inconsistent and thus not credible. This is evident from figure 1.3.2. 
which shows the behaviour of the shadow price of the real exchange rate, that is, the 
costate variable associated with the only non-predetermined variable in the model. After 
the initial period (t=0), when obviously pc is zero, the shadow price of the real exchange 
rate turns negative, suggesting that an increase in the real exchange rate i.e. a decrease in 
our policy instrument r, will reduce welfare costs. As soon as the first period has passed,
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the previously optimal policy will lose its "optimality" and will provide a strong 
incentive for reneging on the announced path of the policy instrument.
Figure 1.3.2.
Time
□  pc Coop c pc Nash
It worth noticing that the behaviour of pc differs according to the nature of 
solution: it is larger, in absolute terms, when a Nash policy is implemented. This means 
that the policy trade-off faced by a competitive policy-maker is more favourable. Since 
both policy-makers (Nash and cooperative) share the same welfare weights, the latter will 
force a more rapid exchange rate devaluation. This already suggests the main conclusion 
of this section. Rational agents will anticipate this behaviour and this will in turn bring 
about a higher inflation bias. The reasoning here is the mirror image of that proposed 
when the advantage of cooperation in a solution with precommitment was explained.
The last rows of table 1.3.1. show welfare losses in the case of a time consistent 
policy. Now the decentralised Nash policy yields a superior outcome with respect to the 
cooperative policy. An important result has to be stressed: the cooperative solution in this 
case produces higher welfare costs for both countries. Therefore, the welfare rank would 
not seem to depend on the weight assigned by the central planner to the national welfare 
functions 13. This allows us to infer that the counterproductvity result depends on the
13 In section 2.5. we will see that it is not completely true, since it affects the inflation bias.
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increase in the inflation bias induced by the lack of credibility of the policy makers rather 
than on incentive incompatibility. This issue will be more deeply analysed in section 2.5.
What the time consistent policy consists of has still to be made clear. An early 
proposal for resolving the policy-making problem in the absence of precommitment is 
the "loss of leadership" solution (Buiter, 1986). The policy-maker is assumed to forgo 
any attempt to manipulate private sector expectations. This solution is equivalent to the 
policy-maker reoptimizing at each instant of time so that the marginal contribution of the 
non-predetermined state variable to welfare is equal to zero at every point of time. In our 
case, this means that pc will be zero at every period. A major objection can be raised 
against this solution. Since the loss of leadership outcome implies continuous cheating, it 
also means that expectations are never fulfilled and they are therefore not rational; thus 
such an outcome cannot be credible. In other words, the solution proposed by Buiter 
represents a different solution concept, a return to an open-loop Nash solution where the 
policy-maker refuses to exercise its leadership with respect to the private sector. In other 
words, we may say that while this proposal eludes the problem by solving a different 
problem, it does not "resolve" it.
A more convincing solution is that proposed by Cohen and Michel (Cohen and 
Michel, 1988). Originally put forward to analyse time consistent solutions in Stackelberg 
leader-follower games, it has been used in many studies to find a time consistent solution 
for optimal government policy in models with rational expectations of future events (e.g. 
Oudiz and Sachs, 1985,, Miller and Salmon, 1985,1989). The core of this procedure is to 
impose a new constraint on the policy-maker optimization problem - the non­
predetermined variables must follow a path obtained as a linear combination of the state 
variables (in Miller and Salmon's model this constraint would be: c = 6 ]Z + 62 z*) - and 
to drop the equation concerning the costate variable of the real exchange rate. The 
solution is obtained using dynamic programming, which avoids by construction any 
potential time consistency problem. The way in which the 0s are computed is thus 
crucial; they are computed in accordance with Bellman's principle of optimality, ensuring 
that the solution will be time consistent and that private sector expectations are rational. 
Using this technique, it is possible to obtain time consistent solutions assuming either 
cooperative or competitive behaviour. It has been shown that an iterative procedure using 
the maximum principle (see Miller and Salmon, 1985 and Cohen Michel, 1988) can yield 
the appropriate 6s. As a consequence of the iterative process the resulting path of the 
non-predetermined variable will be the same for the policy-makers and the private
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sectors: it will be the result of the interplay between the need for the economic agents to 
forecast the value of non-predetermined variables, accounting for the incentive of the 
policy-maker to renege and the activity of policy-makers to maximise welfare taking this 
private behaviour into account. Cohen and Michel (1988) show that if we use a quadratic 
welfare function, the solution they derive is the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium 14.
From what has been said, it is clear that when comparing time consistent 
policies, the result of the superiority of cooperation cannot be taken for granted. A 
cooperative solution will have a positive effect determined by the internalization of the 
policy externalities and a negative effect given by the worsening of the credibility 
problem. The net result will depend on the weights given to these two opposite effects. 
1 3 3 . Coordination is likely to be counterproductive
Miller and Salmon in a paper (Miller and Salmon, 1989) considered what is in effect one 
such weighting system. They show that the key factor in determining the benefit of 
cooperation will be the nature of the shocks affecting the economy. The more asymmetric 
the initial inflation displacements (the only kind of shocks considered by Miller and 
Salmon), or, in a stochastic environment, the less correlated the shocks, the less likely is 
it that coordination will pay. The reason, shown by the authors with great elegance of 
analysis, can be grasped intuitively. An asymmetric initial inflation, in fact, increases the 
requirement of an optimal variation in exchange rate, which in turn enhances the 
credibility bias. When the initial inflation differential is high, or when the correlation 
between shocks is lower than a critical value, this negative effect will overcompensate 
the positive effect. Figure 1.3.3. shows the difference between non-cooperative and 
cooperative welfare losses for different values of initial inflation shocks. 13 In the central 
area, showing a situation where shocks are symmetric, cooperation appears to be paying, 
while in the tails, when shocks are asymmetric, decentralized policies are to be preferred.
14 It should be stressed, however, that if we assume a more general form for the welfare 
function, we cannot have an unique solution. This is a well-known problem in classical game 
theory: the concept of perfect equilibrium does not necessarily yield a unique equilibrium 
solution (Rogoff, 1987) and there is as yet no reliable way of choosing among alternative perfect 
solutions.
15 1 have used the same parameter values as the original Miller and Salmon model.
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The major merit of the paper by Miller and Salmon is that they have generalized 
the Rogoff result to show that, rather than being merely an intellectual curiosity the 
counteiproductivity of coordination may be taken to be a general result. Gains from 
coordination can accrue, according to Miller and Salmon's argument, only in the case 
where symmetric countries face highly correlated shocks. Since such an occurrence 
appears to be rather unlikely, they reasonably conclude that the case in which 
coordination pays is rather unlikely too. This is quite important and in some sense con­
clusive: the results obtained by other authors (e.g. Oudiz and Sachs, 1985) are 
determined by the specific nature of the initial shock analysed l6. The general result, 
Miller and Salmon argue, is that the net result of the two effects is that cooperation will 
not in general pay. Hence the policy implication that they draw is that the main effort 
must be devoted to ameliorating the credibility problem, rather than proposing 
experiments of cooperation.
13.4. Obstacles to international economic policy coordination
Obviously, there are potential obstacles to policy coordination other than credibility. 
Most of them relate to the bargaining process needed to define the coordinated policy. If
16 They analyse symmetric shocks.
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we relax, in fact, the simplifying assumption of the existence of a central planner which 
implements the coordinated policy, the latter must be the result of some bargaining 
process. The bargaining process can be so costly as to discourage coordination 
(Feldestein, 1988). Moreover, coordinated policy must be sustainable in order to prevent 
governments from cheating each other. Levine and Currie (1987) show that, under some 
circumstances, a threat strategy can be implemented in order to sustain coordinated 
policy. In addition, there may be uncertainty over government objectives and preferences. 
In this context an incentive may emerge to misrepresent preferences. Hughes Hallet 
(1987) tries to estimate the gains accruing to the misleading countries and the losses paid 
by the misled countries using the MCM macro-model. He concludes that there is no 
incentive to misrepresent preferences and that, moreover, coordination reduces the 
dangers of such deceptions or specification errors.
Another source of error likely to reduce the incentive to, and the benefit from, 
coordination is model uncertainty. In order to cooperate, countries have to agree on the 
correct model to use for policy design. But there may be uncertainty about the features of 
the true model, and countries may also disagree about the model to use, or they may 
agree on a model when some other model is the correct one. The consequences of model 
uncertainty have been explored in some papers. The first (Frankel and Rockett, 1988), 
uses ten of the international models participating in the Brookings model comparison 
exercise (Bryant ed al., 1988), to show that when the two policy-makers subscribe to 
different models and the true model is a third one, the cooperative solution has the same 
probability of being superior as it has of being inferior to the Nash solution. This result 
seems to depend crucially on the assumption that policy-makers are pigheaded and do 
not explicitly account for divergences of model view. Frankel shows that the probability 
of welfare gains accruing from coordination increases when policy-makers use a 
compromise model in the case of disagreement (see Frankel, 1987).
More recently, Ghosh and Masson (1994) systematically reconsider the issue of 
international economic policy cooperation in a uncertain world. They find that 
uncertainty far form reducing the benefits from coordination, actually provides additional 
incentives to coordinate policies. If for example policy makers are assumed to update 
their beliefs about the correct structure of the world economy, then coordinated policies 
may again be superior to uncoordinated policies and to fixed rules even if the exact 
structural parameters of the model remains uncertain. It cannot be denied, however, that 
Gosh and Massson also stress the ironic result "that uncertainty, though making
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coordination more desirable, probably makes it more difficult to achieve and to sustain" 
since "governments may attempts to misrepresent their beliefs over the effects of macro- 
economic policies during negotiation with a view to improving their bargaining position 
in a repeated game context.
Further considerations arise when the analysis is extented to a stochastic setting. 
Note first that the credibility problem, and the inefficiency involved in it, are less 
important in a stochastic environment. In the deterministic case, in effect, the incentive to 
renege derives from the fact that, at some point in the future, it pays the policy-maker to 
change policy in order to deal more favourably with the inherited state of the system. 
Whereas in the stochastic case the policy-maker must also consider the inferior 
performance that will be obtained with respect to future, currently unknown, disturbances 
as a consequence of reneging. Provided that the discount rate is not too high, the cost of 
this inferior performance can outweigh the gains in respect of past disturbances. In this 
case, the incentive to renege may disappear. Since rational agents realize this, the 
credibility problem may also disappear. Levine and Currie (1987), for example, show 
that even the full optimal policy may be credible and thus sustainable in a stochastic 
world, provided that the rate of discounting is not too high (see also Currie, Levine and 
Vidalis, 1988). It is interesting to note, however, that this result depends on the nature 
and on the length of the "punishment" or, in other words, on the structure of the 
reputational game involving economic agents and policy-makers. Since assumptions on 
this structure are, to some degree, arbitrary, the result cannot be taken as general.
There are different ways in which uncertainty can be introduced into these 
models. Tabellini (1988) applies uncertainty to the strictly political content of the game. 
He explores the case where a domestic political distortion induced by the uncertainty of 
the election outcome leads to an inefficient fiscal policy, biased toward budget deficit. 
The central result of his paper is that international policy coordination can exacerbate the 
deficit bias, reducing welfare at home and abroad and thus becoming socially 
undesirable. Lohmann (1993) examines the interaction between domestic policies and 
international co-operation. She finds that domestic politics matter for international 
relations: the intenity of domestical political competition affects the benefits and 
sustainability of international cooperation. Interesting insights on this issue can be found 
in Persson and Tabellini (1995)
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1.3.5. Empirical estimates of the gains from coordination
Empirical studies which assess the potential gain from policy coordination have generally 
found the benefits to be significant but not large. In their pioneering study Oudiz and 
Sachs (1984) estimated that the gains from cooperation among G3 countries in the mid 
1970s would be worth no more than 1/2 % of the GNP of each country, compared to the 
best non-cooperative outcome. Later studies have confirmed that the gains from 
coordination are likely to be small but somewhat larger (Hughes Hallet (1986a), 
Canzoneri and Minford (1986 and 1987). Other studies, however, have suggested that 
such gains improve considerably when either the exchange rate is considered a target of 
policy (Holtham and Hughes Hallet, 1987 and Hughes Hallet, 1987c ) or when 
"reputation" or persistent shocks are considered (Currie, Levine and Vidalis, 1987).
Few authors have examined the likely distribution of cooperation gains among 
countries. Hughes Hallett's (1986b) study of the USA and EEC using a wide range of 
bargaining model suggests gains distributed 2:1 in favour of Europe. Hughes Hallett, 
Holtham and Hutson (1989) found a very asymmetric distribution of gains among GS 
countries, when examining surrogate cooperation in form of agreed exchange rate paths.
The gains from coordination relative to non-coordination may well be smaller 
than those obtainable by taking explicitly into account the strategic content of policy 
making in an interdependent world. Canzoneri and Minford (1987) empirically 
investigate whether strategic behaviour really offers any advantage. They show that the 
move from "insular" behaviour, in which it is assumed that other players do not react to 
changing circumstances, to strategic behaviour interpreted as Nash non-cooperative 
equilibrium, indeed yields gains, and that they are larger than those obtainable by further 
moving from strategic Nash to cooperative behaviour. In addition Hughes Hallett (1987b) 
shows that the gains from information exchanges can hold even when the information 
exchanged contains prediction errors.
1.4. Can cooperation really be counterproductive?
As is the case of many results in economics, the Miller and Salmon assertion can be 
challenged on two different grounds. The first is its internal consistency, i.e. the logical 
coherence of the model, and the second its external consistency, i.e. the plausibility of the 
assumptions and simplifications used. Nowadays, while a great deal of weight is rightly 
given to the first requirement, unfortunately the second seems to be increasingly over­
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looked. In my opinion this is rather misleading, especially when policy implications are 
to be drawn from theoretical analysis.
While the Miller and Salmon analysis is, in my view, fairly indisputable as far as 
its internal consistency is concerned, it is far less convincing when its external 
consistency is assessed. In support of this verdict, the reader is invited to compare the 
idealized world depicted by Miller and Salmon with their own idea of the real world. The 
latter is the world seeking an answer to the question of the desirability of a higher degree 
of cooperation, while the economy represented in the Miller and Salmon model appears 
too simplfied. In what remains of the present chapter I will discuss in more detail the 
shortcomings of the model employed by Miller and Salmon.
1.4.1. Limitations of the Miller and Salmon model
If we accept the Miller and Salmon conclusion, we must say that, generally, cooperation 
is not to be recommended to policy-makers. But how robust are these conclusions? Does 
their result depend on the particular model they used? In this section I try to answer these 
questions.
Three major weaknesses can be cited in the analysis carried out by Miller and 
Salmon; weaknesses which cast doubt on the robustness of the result of the 
counterproductivity of cooperation: the lack of any long-term policy trade-off, the simple 
way in which the exchange rate is modelled and the lack of any stock-flow interactions.
With regard to the first point, in this framework economic policy displays effects 
only in the short-term, while in the long-term every disturbance is efficiently absorbed. In 
very general terms, the quoted assumptions imply that there is no difference between the 
final equilibrium in the case of cooperative and non-cooperative solutions. Both in the 
cooperative and in the non-cooperative case, the long-run equilibrium of the output level 
is determined by the vertical long-run Phillips curve. Welfare comparisons must be based 
on evaluation of the different time paths of the target variables. In this context, 
international policy coordination is merely a disequilibrium problem, concerned with 
efficient adjustment towards given long-run values. 17
As far as the third point is concerned, there is a marked contradiction between 
the characteristics of the model proposed and the features of the real-world economic 
situation. Important phenomena - such as the role played by the huge government deficits
17 However, results qualitatively similar to Rogoffs have been obtained in a model with genuine long 
run trade-off between inflation and output and with microfoundations (Van der Ploeg 1987).
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and accumulations of public debt or the persistent current account disequilibria of some 
countries and their consequent accumulations of foreign debt • cannot be studied with 
such a simplified model. It is curious that, even though most of the political debate 
provoked by the G3 and G7 summits is concerned with the imbalances in current 
accounts and the threats to monetary stability arising from an excessively loose fiscal 
stance in the US and perhaps an excessively tight fiscal stance in Europe and Japan, the 
academic literature on international policy coordination almost entirely ignores the 
dynamic effects of current accounts and public sector deficits. It is hence vital to have 
reliable models which allow for wealth effects and intertemporal budget constraints for 
governments, private sector agents and the economy as whole.
Even more illuminating is the way in which Miller and Salmon and almost all 
other authors have modelled exchange rate behaviour. Uncovered interest parity is 
assumed to hold continuously. This means that the rate of change in the exchange rate is 
only determined by the interest rates differential. The use of this assumption - whose 
empirical evidence has been seriously questioned 18 - means that account cannot be taken 
of two of the main features of foreign exchange markets. This framework precludes any 
form of misalignment of exchange rates and any volatility of exchange rates greater than 
the volatility of fundamentals: in this case, interest rates. Nevertheless, even in this very 
simplified and highly unrealistic framework, a result of major importance has been 
obtained, although it appears to have passed unnoticed. When countries do not coordinate 
their economic policies, exchange rates fluctuate more than they do in the case of inter­
national cooperation. Miller and Salmon demonstrate that when there are asymmetric 
shocks and policy-makers coordinate their policies, the real exchange rate does not move 
as much as it does in the non- cooperative case. It is precisely this slower response of the 
exchange rate to shocks that drives greater welfare loss in the cooperative case.
This result hinges on two different assumptions which warrant attention. In the 
first place, the negative effect on welfare of a slower response by the real exchange rate 
crucially depends on the assumption that no positive weight is attached by policy-makers 
to exchange rate stability. The arguments for the welfare function are the deviation of 
output from its natural level and the inflation rate. Recent analyses seem to suggest, on 
the contrary, that a trade-off can be identified between the advantage of moving the 
exchange rate into an asymmetric framework and the cost of excessive exchange rate
18 See Mac Donald and Taylor (1992) among others. 1 will further disccuss this issue in sec 2.3.4.
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variability. In a different context, Laskar (1986) has shown that exchange rate 
stabilization can be viewed as an intermediate public good. When no country is willing to 
engage independently in an exchange rate stabilization process, Laskar finds that 
exchange rates fluctuate more at the Nash equilibrium than they do at the cooperative 
equilibrium. Secondly, it should be added that the existence of a time-consistent problem 
in these models depends on the assumption that the exchange rate is a forward-looking 
variable, non-predetermined and therefore free to jump. However, jumps in exchange 
rates are rarely observed in the real world where monetary authorities (by their own will 
or perhaps because of international arrangements like EMS) often intervene to smooth 
exchange rates fluctuations.
1.5. Concluding remarks
The main aim of this introductory chapter has been to survey and evaluate part of the 
literature on policy coordination and to verify whether it is a convincing and satisfactory 
response by academic economists to the new problem posed by the high degree of 
economic interdependence.
The answer can be only partially positive. While the final lesson drawn from the 
papers surveyed here - that gains from coordination can be obtained only in special cases 
- has a strong policy implication, the assumptions employed in the analysis do not seem 
appropriate. By neglecting the key elements of recent policy debate on policy 
coordination (exchange rate volatility and misalignment, fiscal policy and public deficits, 
current account imbalances), the scope for policy coordination has been reduced ex-ante. 
It is not surprising that the cost of cooperation in terms of enhancing the time- 
inconsistency problem has been found to be greater than the benefit from coordination in 
terms of the internalization of the externalities of economic policies.
Our initial question concerning the efficiency of a decentralized process of 
policy-making in an integrated world is still unanswered. The aim of the next chapters 
will be to develop a less simplified model which can account for at least some of the 
features of the real world at the centre of the policy debate on international economic 
policy coordination.
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1.A The adjoint systems
The Hamiltonian in the case of the cooperative policy is




ßjc * +y ' l + pzz + pz.z + pcc
and in the case of Nash policy:
H = -i(pjc2 + y2 ) + p2z + pz.z * +pcc
H * = ~ ( p It *2 + y  *2 ) + p  *z ¿ + p * z* z * + p * c c
The first order conditions of the Hamiltonian, along with dynamic equations of the 
economy form the adjoint system whose solutions give the path of state and output 
variables.
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Cooperative Policy
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Time Consistent Optimal policy 
In order to obtain the time consistent solution, a further constraint has been added: 
c= 0(z-z*) and the value of 0 is obtained iteratively during the numerical simulation l9.
Cooperative policy
z '0 0 0 -2 0 ' 'z
z* 0 0 0 0 -2 z*
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.Pz*. .62 El 0 0 0 .Pz*.
where gj = ^-[(<t» + O0)2 +(<?0)2] and g2 = ß£2<J0(<t> + O0 )
19 To simplify the presentation we have assumed that 0(=-02. Moreover this assumption is 
necessary in order to decompose this system in averages and differences.
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Open loop Nash
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Moreover in the case of the closed loop Nash equilibrium, the foreign authority acts as if: 
r = P12 z + P22 z* and domestic policy maker acts as if r = pu z + p i2 z*. For a 
complete description of the way in which ps are computed, see Miller and Salmon 1985, 
page 207-09.
By forming averages, that is ya j  ^  differences, yd = y -  y *, the
system, in the case of time consistent policy, can be decomposed into two separate blocks 
each involving but a single stable root.
Coordinated policy



























Miller and Salmon's model: variations on theme
2. Miller and Salmon's model: variations on theme
The previous chapter presented and discussed the model that Miller and Salmon (1985, 
1989) and Miller, Salmon and Sutherland (1991) used to demonstrate the counter- 
productivity of cooperation. The present chapter verifies the robustness of their results by 
carrying out a of sensitivity analysis of the underlining model.
The first section addresses the issue of the preference structure. Two points 
deserve specific attention. The first concerns the relationship between the credibility bias 
and the preferences of the policy maker. In other words, it is interesting to verify whether 
the cost of cooperation can be reduced by assuming, following Rogoff (1985), that it 
takes place between countries which have elected conservative policy makers. If the 
policy maker has the incentive to delegate the monetary policy to an independent central 
bank, a delegation game arises together with the international economic policy game. The 
second issue regards the introduction of a certain degree of asymmetry in the model 
through asymmetry in the preference structure. Allowing for inter-country differences in 
policy preferences - more specifically in the coefficients for inflation in the welfare 
function, - the assumption is that one of the two countries attaches more weight to 
inflation than the other.
The second section relaxes the assumption that the implementation of the desired 
policy is a costless operation. It is of interest to verify whether the same qualitative result 
concerning the welfare ranking of Nash and cooperative policies can be confirmed once 
the existence of some cost on the use of policy instruments is taken into account.
Section 3 examines an important point: the role of exchange rate stabilisation in 
the analysis of policy coordination. From this point of view, the Miller and Salmon 
model appears rather unsatisfactory. On the one hand, it assumes that the foreign 
exchange market behaves properly and that the uncovered interest parity continuously 
holds; on the other, it denies the fact that one of the objectives of policy coordination is 
to stabilise exchange rates. In this section the Miller and Salmon's model is altered to 
take full account of the role played by the exchange rate. Analysed first is the merit of 
cooperation on the assumption that the stabilisation of the real exchange rate is one of the 
explicit targets of the policy maker. A mild form of irrationality is then introduced into 
the foreign exchange market.
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Finally, a further crucial issue is analysed: the way in which Miller and Salmon 
compute the cooperative solution. There is no single solution concept for cooperative 
games that has the central role that the Nash equilibrium occupies in non cooperative 
games. As a consequence, specific attention should be paid to the choice of the solution 
concept to use. A sort of prerequisite for cooperation to be possible is that players should 
be able to discuss the situation and agree on a rational joint plan of action.
In order to summarise the directions in which I pursue the investigation, I report 
in table 2.1.1. the assumptions I employed to modify the Miller and Salmon model.
Table 2.1.1.




two stage delegation game no Cooperation in the first stage pays
Asymmetric preferences no
Instrument costs no Cooperation pays if instruments are 
considered intermediate targets
Exchange rate as target of 
policy
no
Exchange rate market 
imperfection
yes A fad has been introduced in the UIPC
Policy miopia: discount rate 
in the welfare function
no
Nash Bargaining solution as 
cooperative solution
yes The negotiation set may be empty
2.1. Benefit from cooperation and the preference structure
In this section I will concentrate on role played by the preference structure. In particular 
two issues appear of some interest: first of all, it is interesting to verify whether the 
traditional Rogoffs suggestion of solving the time consistency problem by appointing 
conservative policy maker can be of any help in reducing the counter-productivity of 
cooperation; secondly, it is interesting to verify the effects of assuming asymmetry in the 
preferences structure on the desirability of cooperation.
2.1.1. Policy coordination and delegation game
We saw above that international policy coordination should be evaluated by comparing 
costs of cooperation in terms of higher credibility bias and the advantage of cooperation 
in terms of the internalisation of policy externalities. On the other hand, the literature on
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the credibility bias (Rogoff, 1985) suggests that the amount of the inefficiency caused by 
the impossibility of running credible anti-inflationary policies depends crucially on the 
preferences of the policy maker. The greater the weight on inflation in his loss function, 
the less incentive he has to run surprise inflation. This point becomes evident if one takes 
the extreme case in which the policy maker is only concerned with inflation: in this case 
the credibility bias, that is the costs determined by the lack of credibility of the full 
optimal policy, will disappear. This case has a straightforward economic interpretation: it 
is the case in which a conservative policy maker is appointed; that is, a policy maker 
whose anti-inflationary attitude is stronger than that of the median voter (Pm), (assumed 
to be the same in the two countries). In this framework, we can define the best 
conservative governor as the governor provided with the p - say Pg - that minimises 
welfare losses when evaluated by the median voter (that is, evaluated at Pm=l) . It goes 
without saying that this optimal P should be greater than that of the median voter in order 
to reduce the inflation costs, through the reduction of the inflationary bias, but not so 
high as to increase the output cost. The best conservative governor can be chosen either 
in a non-cooperatively or cooperatively by the two governments.
It is important to note that the nature of the policy game is now different and 
more complex. We have here a two-stage delegation game. In the first stage the national 
policy makers choose the governor's type, that is, its degree of conservativeness. In the 
second stage, the policy game takes place when the monetary policy is managed by the 
appointed governors. To play Nash in the first stage means choosing a governor whose 
preferences will maximise national welfare when assuming that the preferences of the 
other governor are given. It is interesting to stress that delegation arises because of 
monetary spillovers across countries in an international context, also in the absence of 
any inconsistency issue stemming from the lack of credibility of the monetary authorities 
(Dolado, Griffiths and Padilla, 1994). Both policy makers have the incentive to delegate 
the conduct of monetary policy to a more conservative governor when they expect the 
other policy maker not to do so. An inefficient outcome can obviously be the result of 
this symmetric behaviour because of the exchange rate externality. In this section the 
consequences of explicit consideration of the delegation game are analysed. In other 
words, it is of some interest to see whether the choice of a conservative governor 
improves welfare in the case in which an inflation stabilisation programme is pursued.
Accordingly I verify whether the appointment of a conservative central banker, 
rationally chosen to maximise welfare when evaluated by the median voter, may reduce
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or even eliminate the inefficiency brought about by the lack of credibility and whether 
this will have any effect on the desirability of cooperation. Retaining the initial condition 
analysed by Miller and Salmon - z(0)=10 and z*(0)=0 - 1 compare different scenarios.
Table 2.1.2
Home country costs Foreign country costs World
Output Inflation Total Output Inflation Total Average
Full Optimal policy 24.198 21.447 45.738 * 0.051 0.138 0.189 22.917
Coop - Nash 24.194 21.576 45.769 0.025 0.114 0.140 22.954
Nash - Nash 24.298 21.471 45.770 0.026 0.114 0.141 22.955
Coop - Coop 24.148 21.657 45.806 0.096 0.086 0.182 22.994
Nash time cons. 23.223 22.591 45.814 0.023 0.113 0.136 22.975
Table 2.1.2 shows welfare results of the different policies. The benchmark case 
(first row of the table) is that of the full optimal, but time inconsistent, policy which is 
obtainable only given pre-commitment. It obviously remains the best policy. When pre­
commitment is not available, the anti-inflationary policy is not credible and private 
agents expect more inflation and less output deviation. The welfare results yielded by the 
time consistent solution is shown in the last row. The second and third rows give the 
welfare results when two conservative policy makers are appointed and then play a Nash 
game against each other. In the Coop-Nash case it is assumed that the central bankers are 
chosen in a cooperative way: their degrees of inflation aversion is such as to maximise 
the world aggregate outcome of the second stage Nash game (in this case the optimal 
value of pg is equal to 1.09). The cooperative appointment of a conservative policy 
maker allows a marked reduction in the inefficiency caused by the lack of credibility and 
provides an outcome significantly closer to the full optimal policy. In the Nash-Nash 
case, on the contrary, it is assumed that the choice is decentralised: each country chooses 
a governor whose preferences will maximise the national welfare when assuming that the 
preferences of the other governor is given (the optimal value of pg is 1.11). The 
comparison with the full optimal policy highlights that the central banker chosen is over 
conservative, and induces too high output costs. Nevertheless, also in this case delegation 
has proved to be fruitful. Moreover, in the delegation game with non-cooperation in the 
second stage, cooperation in the first stage leads to a less conservative banker than for a 
non cooperative choice and to a superior outcome. This result relies on the existence of a 
component in the delegation game which is not determined by the time inconsistency and 
credibility problems but by the existence of monetary spillover effects. The cooperative
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choice of independent central bankers allows these effects to be internalized and thus 
yields a better result.
The Coop-Coop case, the welfare result of which is shown in the fourth row, 
shows that even when the cooperative time consistent policy takes place between, 
rationally chosen, conservative monetary authorities, the result of counterproductivity of 
cooperation is confirmed. However, when compared with cooperation between 
representative bankers, delegation appears desirable also when centralised policy making 
is assumed.
The results of this section can be summarized in the following welfare ranking:
a) cooperation in the first stage and Nash in the second stage, Pg=1.09, (W=22.954)
b) Nash in the first and second stage, Pg= l.l 1, (W=22.955);
c) competition between representative bankers, Pg=Pm=l, (W=22.977);
d) cooperation in the first and second stage pg= l.l 15, (W=22.994);
e) cooperation between representative bankers Pg=Pm=l (W=23.026).
2.1.2. Asymmetry in the preferences structure
Hitherto we have assumed that countries have the same preference structure: objective 
functions of the same quadratic form and equal relative weight attached to inflation. This 
assumption comes along with the perfect symmetry of the economic structure of the two 
countries. It is of obvious interest to verify whether the Miller and Salmon conclusions 
can be extended to the case in which countries are no longer symmetric. In this section, 
however, the assumption of symmetry in the economic structure is maintained while an 
asymmetry in the preference structure is introduced. In what follows I allow for inter­
country differences in policy preferences - more specifically in the coefficients for 
inflation in the welfare function. I therefore assume that one of the two countries attaches 
more weight to the inflation cost than the other.
Table 2.1.3. compares these cases. The first two columns refer to the case in 
which the domestic country, that is, the country hit by the inflation shock, attaches much 
greater weight than the foreign country to inflation in the welfare function. The last two 
columns refer to the case in which the opposite pattern of inflation preferences is 
assumed; that is, the country more adverse to inflation is not hit by the inflation shock.
As was to be expected, the asymmetry in the preference structure brings about an 
asymmetry in the policy responses. Whereas in the benchmark case both the Riccati 
coefficients and the reaction coefficients display symmetric behaviour, in the asymmetric
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cases both diverge. These values, on the other hand, display a similar but opposite form 
of asymmetry in the policy response and share the same dynamic structure, that is, the 
same eigenvalues. It is evident that the country with a greater weight attached to core 
inflation will show higher values for the reaction coefficients.
Table 2.1 J
Asymmetric preferences Asymmetric preferences
ßl=5,ßi*=l ß l« l.ß l* -5
Closed-loop Co-operative Closed-loop Co-operative
Nash Nash
Roots -1.987 -0.925 -1.979 -0.903 -1.986 -0.925 -1.979 -0.903
Riccati coefficients:
e, 62 -1.307 0.789 -1.243 0.768 -0.789 -1.307 -0.768 1.243
Reaction coefficients:
Pi 1 P|2 2.628 0.415 2.564 0.464 0.988 0.072 0.980 0.253
P21 P22 0.072 0.988 0.253 0.980 0.415 2.628 0.464 2.564
Initial values:
z z* 10.00 0 10.000 0 10.000 0 10.000 0
y y* -19.814 -0.427 -19.558 -1.565 -9.295 -1.224 -9.260 -1.565
n iz* 8.693 1.307 8.757 1.243 9.211 0.790 9.232 0.768
c -13.067 -12.430 -7.891 -7.676
r r* 26.278 0.724 25.644 2.534 9.883 4.148 9.801 4.638
Welfare costs:
W W* 97.084 0.194 45.784 0.454
Average 48.639 48.895 23.12 23.15
sains from coordinat. -0.52% -0.13%
Obviously, when considering initial shocks the results for the two asymmetric 
cases are quite different. In the first case the burden of the adjustment falls almost totally 
on the domestic country. This produces a sharp increase in domestic welfare costs, and a 
slight increase in the welfare costs of the foreign country with respect to the benchmark 
case. In the second case, by contrast, the asymmetry in preferences partially offsets the 
asymmetry in the shocks, and the domestic country shares some part of the adjustment 
costs with the foreign country. Since the foreign country policy maker is more adverse to 
inflation, he will use his policy instruments more actively than before: the reaction 
coefficient of the foreign country is higher than in the previous cases.
Figure 2.1.1 shows the behaviour of the domestic interest rate in the benchmark 
case, |J= p*=l, and when the domestic country has a stronger aversion to inflation, (J= 5 
and p*=l. It is evident that in the second case the policy reaction is far sharper than in the 
benchmark case. More manifest is the change in policy reaction that takes places in the 
foreign country; figure 2.1.2 compares the behaviour of the foreign interest rate in the
34
Miller and Salmon's model: variations on theme
benchmark case, when (3= 5 and fJ*=l and in the opposite case in which (J=l and P*=5. 
The highest policy reaction comes out when the foreign country displays a high anti- 
inflationry attitude, the lowest policy reaction arises when the domestic country displays 
stronger anti-inflationary preferences.
As far as the benefits of cooperation are concerned, the ranking of the benchmark case 
does not change in the cases analyzed in this section. It is evident, however, that the ratio 
between cooperative and Nash welfare losses will move in different directions in the two 
cases as well as the total welfare costs. When the pattern of preferences reinforces the 
asymmetric response to the initial shocks (columns three and four), the relative gains 
from decentralized policy are higher than in the benchmark case, while in the other case 
these gains tend to be less than in the benchmark case. The latter result depends on two 
different phenomena. From a strategic point of view, the domestic country, which knows
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that the foreign country will react relatively more than it does, has less incentive to 
implement a satisfactorily tight policy response and try to export some of the burden of 
adjustment (the reaction coefficient in the Nash case is less than it is in the symmetric 
case); and thus increases the cost of a decentralised policy compared with a coordinated 
one. In addition, since we are working with a quadratic welfare function, from a merely 
technical point of view total cost can be reduced by moving some of the cost from the 
country with higher cost (the domestic country hit by the initial shock) towards the 
country with lower cost. Since this cost reallocation takes place more noticeably in the 
case of cooperation, this explains why we have, in this case, a result more favourable to 
cooperation.
It is interesting to determine whether, in the case in which the same forms of 
asymmetries are assumed either in political preferences or in the economic structure, the 
Miller and Salmon result can be generalised in the presence of symmetric shocks. From a 
theoretical point of view, the presence of asymmetries in the political or economic 
structure renders it impossible to diagonalyze the original system in difference and 
average systems. Therefore the analytical approach used by Miller and Salmon can no 
longer be used, and we have to rely on the results from the numerical simulations. The 
results are similar to those obtained when asymmetric shocks and symmetric preferences 
were considered. When the preference structure is symmetric, coordinating the national 
economic policies pays off. The gains from coordination decrease when the asymmetric 
nature of preferences increases; when preferences are markedly different coordination is 
no longer beneficial. This result suggests that the Miller and Salmon conclusion can be 
extended to the case of asymmetric countries hit by symmetric shocks.
To conclude this section the Rogoff result can be generalised in the Miller and 
Salmon model: the cooperation of monetary policies increases the credibility bias and 
thus the inefficiency of the time consistent policy with respect to a decentralised policy. 
This negative result may be such to overcompensate the positive effect of cooperation 
when shocks are asymmetric and lead to the counter-productivity of international 
monetary policy coordination. This does not depend on the policy preferences of the 
policy maker i. e. on the value of the coefficient p. Even in the case in which two 
conservative policy makers decide to cooperate, the result of cooperation will be inferior 
with respect to the result of a decentralized policy, when shocks are asymetrically 
distributed to a sufficient extend.
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2.2. Instrument costs
So far we have assumed that the implementation of desired policy is a cost-less 
operation. It may be of some interest to verify whether the same qualitative result 
concerning the welfare ranking of Nash and cooperative policies can be confirmed once 
the existence of some cost in the use of policy instruments is taken into account.
It is widely argued that instrument costs represent policy-making inertia and 
costs of policy implementation not directly captured by the model itself. A first rationale 
for introducing instrument costs is that there are implicit constraints on the extent to 
which some or each of the available instruments can be adjusted from their current or 
desired position. An indirect but simpler way to account for these constraints is to 
penalise the deviations of instruments from their current or desired value. A second 
rationale is to view instrument costs as an indirect means of incorporating uncertainty 
into the model. In the case in which the effect of the instruments on the targets is not 
known with certainty, for example, then a conservative policy maker will be reluctant to 
change the current setting of his instruments to the full extent that would be appropriate 
in a world of complete certainty. Obviously, both rationales are not completely 
satisfactory in the present context. In the first case monetary policy is generally 
acknowledged to be the most flexible, and hence the less costly to change policy 
instrument. As for the second rationale, this is evidently a very indirect way of 
accounting for uncertainty.
A different justification relies on the fact that in this model lacks explicit 
consideration of the capital market. Since the policy instrument is the real interest rate, 
the cost incurred by a change in the interest rate can be interpreted as a proxy for the 
capita] account adjustment costs.
The welfare function is now:
where x indicates the weight that the policy maker assigns to the deviations of the 
instrument from their desired values (assumed to be zero).
From the foregoing argument it is quite clear what the main effect of this new 
formulation of the welfare function would be. Since the use of instruments is now costly, 
the optimal policy, both cooperative and non cooperative, will be less active and will 
involve a less rapid response to the initial inflation displacement. As already made clear,
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given the characteristics of the Miller and Salmon model, more inertia in the policy 
reaction brings about higher welfare costs.
Table 2.2.1.
Time inconsistent Time consistent
Closed-loop Nash Co-operative Closed-loop Co-operative
Nash
Roots -0.620 -0.620 -0.533 -0.694 -0.694 -0.600 -0.588 0.469 -0.600 -0.480
Riccati coefficients:
e, e2 (e3) -0-651 0.651 0.330 -0.637 0.637 "Ì.344 -0.606 0.606 -0.516 0.516
Reaction coefficients:
Pi i P12 (Pn) 0.461 0.147 -0.495 0.486 0.314 -1.168 0.491 0.134 0.524 0.276
P21 P22 (P23> 0.147 0.461 0.495 0.314 0.486 1.168 0.134 0.491 0.276 0.524
Initial values:
2 z* 10.000 0 10.000 0 10.000 0 10.000 0
y y* -5311 0.751 -5.711 0.287 -5.283 0.598 -5.400 -0.598
n it* 9.349 0.651 9.363 0.637 9.394 0.606 9.484 0.516
c -6.501 -6.372 -6.058 -0.517
r t* 4.612 1.469 5.361 4.859 4.906 1.343 5.240 2.761
Welfare loss:
W W* 65.065 2.142 67.293 2.130
Average 33.604 33.342 34.712 35.106
Gains from cooperation 0.785% -1.135%
Intermediate target loss 27.877 27.635
Table 2.2.1. summarizes the main results when assuming that x=l. Not 
surprisingly, in all cases welfare losses are higher than those reported in the standard 
Miller and Salmon case (in which x = 0). Two factors account for the increased welfare 
costs: the alleged slow-down in policy response and the new cost component itself 
represented by the deviation of the interest rate from its desired path. The value of the 
reaction coefficients reported in table 2.2.1. gives a measure of this slow-down. In order 
to isolate these two components, the second part of the table sets out the welfare costs in 
the case where the second component is neglected. The choice between these two 
different criteria evidently depends on which of the two alleged justifications for 
introducing instrument costs is preferable. If the first justification is assumed to 
dominate, the direct component must be considered, since this represents the cost that the 
policy-maker incurs in changing the policy instrument. In the second case, the policy 
instrument is not costly in itself; its cost is introduced in the welfare function as a proxy 
for something else, either the presence of uncertainty or not explicitly considered capital 
account costs, and can thus be regarded as an intermediate target.
As is evident from the table, the result of the counter-productivity of cooperation 
is re-confirmed when the minimisation of instrument costs is taken on to the welfare
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function. The reason for this is the same as was postulated in the discussion of the 
original Miller and Salmon model. The credibility bias involved in the cooperative policy 
brings about a slower response of the policy instrument which slackens the return of the 
target variables to their equilibrium values. The presence of instrument costs in the 
welfare function seem to have exacerbated the inefficiency of the time consistent policy 
more severely in the cooperative case than in the Nash one 20. Once private agents know 
that the policy-maker assigns a weight to the deviation of the interest rate, the 
announcement of a policy involving a strong reaction to the initial displacement would 
be less credible. This is more important in the case of a cooperative policy because the 
coordinator now has the instruments of both countries in the welfare function.
Table 222
Home country costs Foreign country costs World
Output Inflation Total Output Inflation Total Average
Closed loop Nash 13.123 42.341 55.465 0.085 0.754 0.839 28.152
Coop 13.419 41.641 55.059 0.083 0.128 0.211 27.635
Rather surprisingly, the welfare ranking is reversed when real interest is considered 
to be an intermediate target and the value of T is sufficiently high 21. Table 2.2.2. reports 
the inflation and output costs. Welfare costs are generally still higher than in standard 
case because of greater policy inertia. However, it is evident that most of the augmented 
cost can be ascribed to the instrument cost itself. I have already explained that the benefit 
from cooperation can be evaluated by comparing the average response and the differential 
response with the initial inflation displacement. The cooperative response is better in 
terms of average response - because it internalises the external effect - but it is worse in 
terms of difference response because of the lack of credibility. The balance between these 
two effects will depend on the asymmetric nature of the shocks. In the present case, a 
cooperative policy is still worse in terms of difference, but it is much better in terms of 
average response, and in this case the balance is in favour of cooperation 22. This
20 Whereas in the standard Miller and Salmon case (T = 0) the increase in welfare costs deriving 
from a lack of pre-commitment can be evaluated at the 0.15% for the Nash and at the 0.47% for 
the co-operative case, in the case in which t  =1 it is 0.35% for Nash and 6.04% for the co­
operative case.
21 The difference between the case in which the deviation of the instrument from the desired 
value is an intermediate target, with respect to the case in which it is a target in its own, does not 
regard the paths of the state and output variables. Both assumptions give rise to the same optimal 
policy; the difference lies in their welfare evaluation.
22 This can be appreciate by looking at the average and difference reaction coefficients:
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signifies that the initial inflation differential is not such as to produce the Miller and 
Salmon result of the counterproductivity of cooperation; a result which requires a higher 
initial inflation differential.
It cannot be denied, however, that this counter-example is rather peculiar. The 
introduction of instrument costs in this model is difficult to justify. We have seen that, in 
this case, the welfare costs are higher than in the case in which x=0. Thus either the 
policy-maker really incurs some costs in changing the interest rate, (costs which have to 
be made explicit), or it is not clear why the policy-maker should implement a sub- 
optimal policy by engaging in an overly conservative policy reaction.
13, The advantage of cooperation and the real exchange rate
One of the major criticisms that can be made of the Miller and Salmon conclusion 
concerns the role played by the exchange rate. It goes without saying that one of the main 
reasons why the international economic policy coordination issue moved to the top of the 
international agenda was (and partly still is) excessive variability, and the persistent 
misalignment of the nominal and real exchange rates among the more industrialised 
countries. By volatility is meant high frequency fluctuations, often inevitable, in the 
exchange rates around some norm or average value; by misalignment we mean the 
persistent and cumulative departure from anything which might be recognised as an 
equilibrium exchange rate, meaning either a rate consistent with purchasing power parity 
or a rate which would achieve trade balance. The economic consequences of these 
phenomena are quite different. The exchange rate risk associated with its volatility 
around some norm can be laid off or hedged against the range of financial instruments 
currently available. This is not the case of persistent misalignment, which can cause 
serious misallocations of resources. The latter, moreover, reveals that the foreign 
exchange market does not behave as efficiently as is too often argued.
From this point of view, the Miller and Salmon model appears rather 
unsatisfactory. On the one hand, it assumes that the forex market behaves properly and 
that uncovered interest parity continuously holds; on the other, it denies the fact that one 
of the objectives of policy coordination is to stabilise exchange rates. In what follows I 
modify the Miller and Salmon model in order to take full account of the role played by 
the exchange rate. First I analyse the benefit from cooperation on the assumption that the
pÿ =0.357, p{f = 0.254, p? =0.625, pÇ = 0.800
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stabilisation of the real exchange rate is one of the explicit targets of the policy maker. I 
then introduce a very mild form of irrationality in the forex market.
2-3.1. Exchange rate variability in the welfare function
I first begin with analysis of the case in which both policy makers are concerned about 
the rate of variability of the exchange rate, here proxied by the rate of change of the real 
exchange rate. The welfare function becomes:
(2.3.1.) W = I j t~[p7t2 + y 2 +(pc2 ]
Before studying the result of the policy exercise in this case it is interesting to note what 
can be inferred on a priori grounds. The above objective function yields the following 
Hamiltonian:
H= ^P7c2 + ^ y2 +-j<pc2 +pzz + pz.z*
Along the optimal time consistent path, however, we have c = 0(z —z). Given that 
z = y , the Hamiltonian can be rewritten as:
H= |-Pit2 + ^ y 2 +^(pe2( y - y * f + p zz + p2-z*
With respect to the case in which <p=0 (the Miller and Salmon original case) the 
difference is not only the greater weight given to y and y*, but also the presence of a term 
yy* (obtained from the development of the squared term). This new formulation of the 
welfare function therefore seems to involve a higher degree of interdependence owing to 
the fact that now both countries share a common target (c2). This higher degree of policy 
interdependence may, in principle, increase the returns from coordination.
The results, however, does not confirm this intuition. The closed loop Nash 
solution provides a superior outcome compared to the cooperative solution, and the 
welfare ranking does not change when we increase the weight given to the variability of 
the real exchange rate. The outcome of this experiment is shown in table 2.3.1. Note that 
the first stable root is equal to that of the benchmark case, while the second is rather 
lower 23. This clearly depends on the fact that the behaviour of the system of averages is
^  It can be shown that the roots obtained from the complete model are the same as those 
obtained by the average and difference system as long as the model is perfectly symmetric.
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not affected by the new formulation of the welfare function: the model is symmetric, so a 
symmetric shock does not cause the exchange rate to move. The opposite applies to (he 
differences system: the new constraint - that is, the positive cost incurred in varying the 
real exchange rate - forces the policy maker to implement a less reactive monetary 
response - the value of the reaction coefficient is noticeably less than in the benchmark 
case - which in turn brings about a less rapid return to equilibrium, i.e. a lower stable 
root.
Table 2.3.1.
Time inconsistent Time consistent
Closed-loop Co-operative Closed-loop Co-operative
Nash Nash
Roots -0.987 -0.987 -0.483 -1.000 -0.469 -0.469 -0.588 -0.469 -0.600 -0.480
Riccati coefficients:
-0.549 0.549 0.272 -0.506 0.506 0.657 -0.606 0.606 -0.516 0316
Reaction coefficients:
Pi 1 Pi2 (Pl3> 0.727 0.571 -1.032 0.705 0.629 -0.369 0.491 0.134 0324 0.276
P21 P22 (P23) 0.571 0.727 0.720 0.629 0.705 -0.369 0.134 0.491 0.276 0324
Initial values:
2 z* 10.000 0 10.000 0 10.000 0 10.000 0
y y* -7.216 -2.513 -7.040 -2.960 -6.975 -2.834 -6.605 -3395
It It* 9.451 0.549 9.494 0.506 9343 0.457 9.631 0.369
C -5.489 -6372 -4.573 -3.688
r r* 7.271 5.707 7.051 6.288 7.489 5 396 7.262 6.078
Welfare loss:
W W* 50.894 4.736 67.293 2.130
Average 27.816 27.783 29.715 32.298
Gains from cooperation 0.12% -8.693%
Intermediate target loss 27350 31.207
On the other hand, the difference between the two reaction coefficients is much 
smaller than in the case in which (p=0 : the less divergent the movement of real interest 
rates, the less variable the real exchange rate will be. Policy makers, on the other hand, 
must respond sharply to a change in the foreign state variable, since it affects the real 
exchange rate. A more lethargic policy response results in higher welfare costs, as 
repeatedly pointed out. The last but one column of table 2.3.1. shows that when the direct 
costs of the real exchange rate are also neglected, the exchange rate is considered solely 
as an intermediate target, the slowdown of the policy reaction itself determines an 
increase in the welfare costs. In this case too, the decentralised policy can be seen to 
provide a superior outcome.
The last column shows the negative gains from coordination in percentages. The 
closed-loop Nash decentralised policy accounts for an eight per cent lower loss than the
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cooperative policy, if exchange rate is considered as a final target, and thirteen per cent if 
the exchange rate is only an intermediate target. Thus the introduction of this new policy 
objective makes the decentralised policy relatively more attractive. Two other data 
explain why this happens: the credibility bias evidenced by the difference between the 
time consistent and the full optimal policy is higher for the cooperative than for the Nash 
solution (16.25% and 6.83% respectively). Finally, it is worth noting that, in the Nash 
case, the direct cost derived from deviations of the exchange rate variability from its 
equilibrium value is higher than in cooperative case (2.17 versus 1.09). This confirms our 
original intuition that the decentralised policy produces a higher variability of the 
exchange rate, although this variability seems necessary to reduce the total welfare costs.
2.3 .2. The exchange rate level in the welfare function
In this section it is assumed that instead of attending to the variability of the real 
exchange rate, the policy maker takes the exchange rate as a target in its own. The 
welfare function becomes:
w  = J7 [Pjc2 + y 2 +<pc2]
where 9  represents the weight given to the deviation of the exchange rate from the 
desired path (assumed to be zero at any time) in the welfare function.
Table 2.3.2. shows the main results when simulating the model on the 
assumption that the policy maker minimises the above loss function (imposing (p = 1). As 
in the case analysed in the previous section, the first stable eigenvalues can be referred to 
the average system, and the second to the difference system - for the time consistent 
model. It is evident that the stable root of the difference system is now much higher than 
in the benchmark case. The level of the real exchange rate is now the policy target, and 
we have seen that a rapid response to the initial disturbance pays in this model. It is 
optimal, therefore, to force a higher initial depreciation in order to reduce the initial cost. 
Unlike the case in which the exchange rate variability is included in the welfare function, 
now the reaction coefficients are highly divergent. This strong asymmetric response is 
necessary to minimise the effect of asymmetric shocks on the exchange rate - symmetric 
shocks, of course, do not have any effect. Note that in this case the effect of the 
introducing the time consistent constraint has the opposite effect with respect to the 
benchmark case. Whereas in the latter the full optimal policy was judged not to be
43
Miller and Salmon's model: variations on theme
credible because it was too tough - a depreciation was expected to follow - and thus the 
time consistent policy which discounts these expectations provides a less reactive policy, 
now the full optimal policy is judged as too mild - a surprise appreciation is expected • 
and thus the time consistent policy provides a more active response. This effect is clearly 
more important in the case of cooperative behaviour, since the single policy maker is 
now entirely able to manoeuvre the exchange rate as desired. One notes that when the ex 
ante optimal policy is considered, the proportional gains from coordination increase 
markedly with respect to the case in which the role of exchange rate is not considered. As
I have already pointed out, our results fit quite well with the results obtained by other 
researchers.
Table 23.2
Time inconsistent Time consistent
Closed-loop Nash Coo-operative Closed-loop
Nash
Co-operative
Roots -1.076 -1.076 -0.351 -1.000 -5.703 -0.351 -0.967 -1.497 -1.000 -3.434
Riccati coefficients:
e, e j <e3) -0.868 0.868 0.491 -0.853 0.853 2.135 -1.141 1.141 -1.685 1.685
Reaction coefficients:
Pi 1 Pl2 (Pl3> 1.557 -0.264 2.343 -1.009 1.499 -0.209 3.559 -2.225
P21 P22 (P23> -0.264 1.557 -1.009 2.343 -0.209 1.499 -2.225 3.559
Initial values:
z z• 10.000 0 10.000 0 10.000 0 10.000 0
y y* -11.520 1.826 -14.485 4.485 -12.32 2.647 -22.17 12.167
1C 1C* 9.132 0.868 9.147 0.853 8.859 1.141 8.315 1.685
c -8.681 -8.531 -11.411 -16.847
r r* 15.575 -2.642 23.427 -10.087 14.991 -2.087 35.593 -22.25
Welfare loss:
W W* 62.264 16.287 68.619 23.580
Average 39.276 36.213 46.099 55.421
Gains from coordination 7.799% -20.22%
In term, target loss 24.348 34.760
Finally, it would be of some interest to address a related issue: how the existence 
of a exchange rate target affects the bias derived from the lack of credibility of policy 
maker. By augmenting the costs of changing the exchange rate, we can expect that it 
reduces the incentive to run a surprise inflation 24. Therefore we will expect that there is a 
weight on the exchange rate target small enough not to increase policy inertia but high
24 It is necessary, however, that the exchange target will be credible. Note that this argument is 
different from the well known argument about the advantage of tying our own hands discussed in 
the literature on the EMS since in this case the preferences structure is perfectly symmetric.
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enough to reduce the credibility bias. Table 2.3.3 reports the welfare results in the case in 
which an optimal exchange rate targeting is appointed; this means that the weight on the 
exchange rate is chosen in order to minimise the aggregate welfare losses.
Table 23.3
Home country costs Foreign country costs World
<p Output Inflation Total Output Inflation Total Average
Full Optimal policy
Nash closed loop 0 24.256 21.482 45.739' '  0.027 0.118 0.145 22.942
Coop 0 24.199 21.447 45.645 0.051 0.139 0.189 22.917
Time consistent policy
Nash closed loop 0 23.222 22.591 45.814 0.023 0.112 0.136 22.975
Coop 0 22.941 22.941 45.881 0.084 0.084 0.169 23.025
Optimal exchange rate targeting
Nash closed loop 0.1 23.858 21.892 45.750 0.004 0.157 0.161 22.956
Coop 0.075 24.400 21.349 45.749 0.007 0.147 0.154 22.955
Two remarks are in order. The exchange rate targeting allows a reduction of the 
credibility bias, as was predicted 2S. Therefore it can be seen as one of the way in which 
the negative consequences of the lack of credibility can be reduced. Moreover, in the case 
in which a policy of optimal targeting is implemented, there is a slight advantage in 
running it cooperatively. In this case, in fact, it is possible to reduce the weight on the 
exchange rate.
23.4. Foreign exchange market imperfection and policy coordination
Hitherto I have subscribed to one of the Miller and Salmon's most important 
assumptions: that the foreign exchange market works efficiendy and that the open 
interest parity condition continuously holds. I have already pointed out, however, that 
this assumption is not completely satisfactory and has been extensively questioned from 
an empirical point of view. It would be beyond the scope of the present paper to analyse 
the reasons for this conclusion; suffice it to say that the above assumption encompasses 
three others: perfect capital mobility, perfect substitutability between domestic and 
foreign assets, and the hypothesis of rational expectations.
Given perfect capital mobility, rejection of the open interest parity condition can, 
therefore, in principle, result from the rejection of rational expectations hypothesis and/or 
from the rejection of the absence of a (time varying) risk premium. Looking at the more
^  This intuition is confirmed by the observation that no reduction of the welfare losses comes 
out when an exchange rate targeting is implemented by a policy maker able to run the full 
optimal policy.
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recent empirical literature a result clearly emerges: "the uncovered interest parity 
condition is resoundingly rejected for the recent experience with floating exchange rates" 
(Mac Donald and Taylor, 1992) 26. It is less clear whether this result is due a violation of 
risk neutrality or a failure of rational expectations. The recent availability of survey data 
allowed researchers to conduct tests separately on each component of this joint 
hypothesis. By and large, the conclusion of this new line of research is that the joint 
hypothesis fails both because agents are risk averse and because their expectations do not 
comply with rational expectations hypothesis 27. However, it has been argued that the 
explanation based on the expectations failure appears far more persuasive ( see, among 
the others, Frankel and Thaler, 1990).
The results of the empirical literature points to the conclusion that the uncovered 
interest rate condition is no longer a sound foundation for an exchange rate model and for 
a model of international economic interdependence. Although for some purposes this 
assumption can be retained for the sake of simplification, it must be discarded regarding 
the economic policy coordination issue since in this case the correct working of the 
exchange rate market is crucial in obtaining the counterproductivity result. Firstly, the 
market efficiency assumption allows the policy maker to neglect the exchange rate as a 
policy target, secondly the augmented credibility bias of the coordinated policy relies on 
the role played by the exchange rate as the forward-looking variable. Therefore analysis 
of the topic of policy coordination may prove interesting once the assumption of 
efficiency in the foreign exchange market has been relaxed.
This section introduces a very simple form of market inefficiency: namely a fad 
which induces the exchange rate to deviate from the value implied by the behaviour of 
fundamentals28. The exchange rate equation becomes:
c = r -  r * +f 
where f  represents the fad, whose dynamic is
f = a f  f(0)=fo with a  < 0 
where a  is a parameter measuring the speed of convergence or decay of the fad. We 
assume that fads are rational, in the sense that the role, indeed irrational, played by the
26 To whom the reader interested in more detail and in the appropriate references is referred.
27 See the literature surveyed in Takagi, 1991
28 Fads are mean reverting deviations from intrinsic value caused by social or psychological 
forces such as those that determine fashions in political beliefs and consumption goods, or like 
Keynes' animal spirits.
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fad is correctly anticipated by the private agents. This assumption can be justified by 
recalling the old Keynesian metaphor for investment activities as a beauty contest in 
which the winner is the person whose choice comes closest to the average choice (Keynes 
1936). Beauty contest fads may persist if there is some institutional or psychological 
incentive for traders to coordinate their actions. 29
The main difference from the original version of the model is that now the 
exchange rate is no longer a pure forward-looking variable, since the presence of the fad 
adds a backward component. The balance between the backward and the forward 
component of the real exchange rate depends on the value of a  and of fQ. The latter factor 
indicates the initial dimension of the fad phenomenon, while the former indicates its 
degree of persistence. Both tend to enhance the backward component of the dynamics of 
the real exchange rate.
The direct effect of the fad is to create a misalignment in the exchange rate, 
which in turn boosts aggregate demand and core inflation in the domestic country, while 
the effect on the foreign country is obviously the opposite. Moreover, it is interesting to 
note that the shock represented by the onset of the exchange rate fad, and in particular the 
consequent misalignment of the exchange rate, can be also interpreted as partially similar 
to a real shock. In fact, it affects the aggregate demand of both countries in a perfectly 
asymmetric way (see eq.1.3.1). It is generally suggested by the literature on policy 
coordination that while gains from coordination are doubtful in the presence of monetary 
shocks, they are more likely to emerge when real shocks are considered 30. However, it 
should be remembered that, as far as time consistent equilibria are concerned, the 
distribution of shocks is more important that their intrinsic nature in determining the 
existence of gains from cooperation.
Finally, it is worth stressing that the particular shock analysed here is similar but 
not fully equivalent to a more generic real shock. Its interesting feature is the fact that it 
originates from the exchange rate market, and this market plays a crucial role in causing 
the counterproductivity of cooperation. It is of some interest to investigate whether this 
result is robust in the presence of an imperfect foreign exchange market.
29 Portfolio managers are often fired if their short-run performance is worse than overall market 
performance, which dulls the incentive for speculation necessary to destroy fads (see Camerer 
1989).
30 See, among the others, Carraro and Giavazzi, 1987. They show that a co-operative policy is 
definitely counterproductive until a symmetric productivity shock is considered.
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As long as a form of irrationality is present in the exchange rate market, it is 
more difficult to justify the neglect by the policy authority of the behaviour of the 
exchange rate. The exchange rate is now partially governed by irrational factors which 
may drive it far out of equilibrium. We therefore assume that the policy maker is 
concerned with the value of the real exchange rate, and with its variability. The relevant 
welfare function is the following:
This new formulation of the welfare function allows us to consider both the
Both are evaluated as deviations from the optimal values - clearly zero in both cases.
In what follows, I focus on time consistent solutions computed using the Cohen 
and Michel procedure. In this case, the time consistent constraint should take into 
account the newly introduced state variable f. I have, in fact, assumed that the fad process 
is completely known to private agents, and they thus use it to anticipate the behaviour of 
the policy maker. The time consistent constraint becomes: c = 0 j z + 6 2 z*+ 8 3 f-
2.3.4.1 Policy coordination in the presence of a fad 
In this section I study the case in which the only shock affecting the two 
economies is the onset of a fad. As regards the fad, we assume that a=-0.25 and the 
initial value of the fad is 5 (fo=5). The value of the coefficient x, that is, the weight 
attached to the variability and the misalignment of the exchange rate, is set at O.S. Table
2.3.4. summarises the main findings.
The dynamic of the fad is, clearly, independent of the policy adopted: the third 
eigenvalue reported in table 2.3.4. refers to the fad. Differences between policies thus 
regard the different adjustment paths for the other variables given the behaviour of the 
fad. The table presents the value of the reaction coefficients which link the instruments r 
and r* to the state variables along the optimal feedback, time consistent path:
2.3.1)
volatility costs proxied by the term c2 and the misalignment costs proxied by the term c2.
2.3.2)
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Table 2.3.4.
Closed-loop Nash Cooperative
Roots -0.975 -0.652 -0.250 -1.000 -0.473 -0.250
Riccati coefficients:
01 ©2 ©3 -0.656 0.656 -0.460 -0.510 0.510 -0.444
Reaction coefficients:
P ll  P l2 P13 0.864 0.437 -0.437 0.787 0.546 -0.445
P21 P22 P23 0.437 0.864 0.437 0.546 0.787 0.445
Initial values:
z z* 0 o ' 0 0
y y* -0.045 0.045 0.0007 -0.0007
71 7C* -0.230 0.230 -0.222 0.222
c -2.302 -2.220
r r* 2.182 -2.182 -2.223 2.223
Welfare loss:
W W* 3.407 3.407
Average 3.407 2.672
Gains from coordination 21,6%
The optimal reaction for the domestic country to the initial real exchange rate 
depreciation is to implement a severe monetary policy, i.e. to raise the interest rate, while 
the foreign country which faces the opposite shock will reduce its real interest rate. The 
increase in the real interest rate will reduce both the initial depreciation of the real 
exchange rate, induced by the fad, and its consequences on core inflation and real 
income.
It is evident that, in this model as in the original Miller and Salmon one, a 
quicker response to the initial shock will pay. The cooperative solution allows a more 
rapid reaction to the onset of the fad. The explanation for the slower response in the Nash 
equilibrium is that the domestic country reckons that, by increasing the interest rate, it 
will pay a cost in terms of a temporarily high real exchange rate (loss of competitiveness) 
and consequently in terms of real income and core inflation. Therefore the domestic 
country will somewhat relax the severity of its policy. Symmetric reasoning applies to 
the foreign country. Both fail to consider the externalities of their policy. A cooperative 
policy maker is able to run a tighter policy, since it explicitly considers the cross- 
countryeffects of the monetary restriction and thus obtains a more rapid return to 
equilibrium.
Figure 2.3.1.a and 2 .3.l.b show the behaviour of the real income and compare 
Nash and cooperative policy, while figure 2.3.2a and 2.3.2.b compare the path of the core 
inflation. It is evident that the cooperative policy outperforms the decentralised one by 
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Figure 2.3.2b
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It is worth noting that the gains from coordination change when modifying some 
of the parameters of the model. First of all, it is evident that, if we assume that x=0 • that 
is, policy makers do not consider either exchange rate misalignment or exchange rate 
variability as a target of policy - no gains from coordination can emerge. This case would 
be equivalent to that in which the two economies are hit by an asymmetric demand 
shock. However, neglect of the exchange rate as a target of policy is not justified by the 
model assumption; and specifically by the imperfect nature of the exchange rate market. 
Moreover, even very little weight given to exchange rate stabilisation in the welfare 
function brings out the gains from coordination 31 and the gains from cooperation 
increase with the increase in x. Secondly, while the total cost, both in the Nash and 
cooperative case, are an increasing function of the initial dimension of the fad 
phenomenon (fg), gains from coordination remain constant with respect to the fad 
dimension. That is not surprising, since the model is linear and the onset of the fad is the 
only shock. Finally, gains from cooperation tend to increase with the increase in a; that 
is, the parameter measuring the speed of convergence of the fad. The more the fad is a 
persistent phenomenon, the less gains from cooperation will emerge. This result can be 
explained as follows. The advantage of the cooperative response consists in a more rapid 
average response to the initial shock. Therefore the difference between the Nash and the 
cooperative solution emerges more conspicuously, the more concentrated the shock is in 
the first period. The level of both the Nash and the cooperative welfare cost, obviously, 
increases with the increase of a.
In conclusion to this section, one may say that in the presence of a fad in the 
foreign exchange market - that is, in the case in which this market displays some kind of 
disturbance which drives it far from efficiency - international policy coordination is the 
best way to cope with it. More importantly, this result is still true if one assumes that 
policy makers lack credibility and are forced to adopt a time consistent policy.
23.4.2. Policy coordination in the presence of an inflation shock 
In this section, an asymmetric inflation shock is introduced. This will enable my results 
to be compared with those obtained by Miller and Salmon. In order to facilitate this 
comparison, I choose the same numerical values: z(0) = 10, z*(0)=0. In other words, the 
domestic country faces a dramatic upsurge in inflation, due to past excess demand, while
31 The lowest level I assigned to x during the simulation was 0.001. In this case co-operative 
solution yields a superior outcome with respect to Nash policy.
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the foreign country is not directly affected by the inflation shock. Along with this initial 
shock, we still have our fad onset (f(0)=5)32. Table 2.3.5. shows the main findings of this 
experiment.
As previously noted, the fad dynamic follows a process independent of the 
policy adopted. The analysis of the reaction coefficients suggests that, in the cooperative 
solution case, they are larger on average with respect to the Nash case and more equally 
distributed among countries. In particular, the reaction coefficient with respect to the fad
- that is, the policy reaction to a backward component of the exchange rate dynamic - is 
higher under cooperation: this means that the policy coordinator is able to run a more 
severe policy since it internalises the external effects of national policies.
Table 2.3.5
Closed-loop Nash Cooperative
Roots -0.975 -0.652 -0.250 -1.000 -0.473 -0.250
Riccati coefficients:
8 i 0O ©3 -0.656 0.656 -0.461 -0.511 0.511 -0.441
Reaction coefficients:
Pi 1 Pl2 Pl3 0.864 0.437 -0.436 0.788 0.546 -0.445
P21 P22 P23 0.437 0.864 0.436 0.546 0.788 0.445
Initial values:
z z* 10 0 10 0
y y* -8.181 -1.569 -7.366 -2.633
n it* 9.114 0.885 9.268 0.732
c -8.858 -7.323
r r* 6.458 6.549 5.655 7.684
Welfare loss:
W W* 75.191 20.649
Average 47.919 44.577
Gains from coordination 7.50%
The main difference with respect to the original Miller and Salmon model is the 
fact that the cooperative response to initial shocks now pays. It should be noted, firstly, 
that the reversal of the welfare ranking and the return to productivity of cooperation 
depends on the introduction of the fad process. In fact, if we re-run the experiment 
without the fad, we once again obtain the Miller and Salmon result, even if we preserve
32 f |u  presence of a depreciation fad may be justified on the grounds that private agents do not 
completely believe the policy announcement of the authority and thus expect a much slower 
response to the initial shock.
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our welfare function specification33. It is of obvious interest to seek an explanation for 
this result.
As noted in the second section, in the presence of a fad the real exchange rate is 
no longer a pure forward-looking variable. The presence of the fad, in fact, introduces a 
backward-looking component into the dynamic of the real exchange rate. The importance 
of this backward-looking component is measured by the parameter a. The closer a  is to 
zero - that is, the slower the process of fad absorption - the more weight is given to the 
backward component of the real exchange rate dynamic. Table 2.3.6 shows the welfare 
losses, for cooperative and decentralised policies, assuming different values for the 
parameter measuring the speed of convergence of the fad. The total welfare cost 
decreases with the increase in a. Hie lower a  is - that is, the slower the absorption of the 
fad - the more lasting the consequences on the paths of the exchange rate, core inflation 
and real income will be.
Of more interest is the finding that the advantage deriving from coordinating 
national economic policies clearly increases with the decrease in the value of a. When 
the value of a  rises, the backward element in the dynamics of the real exchange rate loses 
its significance, and the cooperative response loses its appeal. Were the value of a  high 
enough, a reversal in the welfare ranking would appear and a result similar to that 
obtained by Miller and Salmon would appear.
Table 23.6
Value Welfare loss Gains
of a Nash Coop Coop
0.15 52.03 48,26 7.81%
0.25 47.91 44.57 7.50%
0.5 43.38 41.23 5.22%
1.0 39.79 38.81 2.53%
1.5 38.18 37.70 1,27%
2.5 36.65 36.63 0.06%
3.0 36.23 36.32 -0.25%
3.5 35.91 36.09 -0.50%
We may therefore conclude that the existence of gains from coordination 
depends on the value of a. Once we relax the hypothesis of the efficiency of the foreign
33 On the other hand, it cannot be denied that, as noted in the previous section, this result 
crucially depends on the positive weight given to exchange rate in the welfare function. 
However, even very low values of x are able to generate the superiority of co-operation: gains 
from coordination emerge when x is greater than 0.06.
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exchange market, the degree of imperfection of the foreign market is a crucial element in 
evaluating the merits of cooperation. The more imperfect the foreign exchange market, 
that is, the more persistent the fad process, the more likely it is that policy coordination 
will yield a superior outcome.
Our results partially modify those obtained by Miller and Salmon in an 
important respect. The degree of correlation of shocks is the only element to consider, 
only if we assume that the foreign exchange market behaves perfectly without any form 
of disturbance. On the contrary, if we, more realistically, introduce a form of 
imperfection in the foreign exchange market, and assume that policy makers care for 
exchange rate stabilization, the degree of correlation between shocks is no longer the 
only element to consider, since the degree of imperfection gains particular significance in 
discriminating between productive and counter-productive international economic policy 
cooperation.
2.4 Policy myopia and policy coordination
We have assumed that the policy maker does not display "myopic" behaviour and does 
not value future costs at less than current costs. In technical terms, we have assumed that 
the discount rate of future costs is zero, so that the discount factor is one. It is clearly of 
some interest to see what can happen to Miller and Salmon's model when we relax this 
hypothesis and assume that the discount rate is greater than zero. Under this assumption 
the welfare function becomes:
2.4.1. W = ^ e - l “ [ ^ + y2]d.
The most important consequence of introducing a positive discount rate is to 
induce a more lethargic policy response to the initial shock. If the policy maker values 
future costs less than the present ones, then it is optimal to shift some of the burden of 
adjustment towards the future by responding less sharply to an initial inflation 
displacement. Therefore, it can be said that discounting exacerbates the inefficiency of 
the time-consistent policy relative to the full optimal rule. It is to be verified, however, 
whether this worsing effect influences more Nash or cooperative solution. Miller, Salmon 
and Sutherland (1991) show that, when initial inflation rates differ, discounting increases 
policy lethargy relatively more for the Nash policy maker than for the coordinator. This 
would make coordination more attractive. However, when considering common inflation 
shocks, the inefficiency implied by the Nash policy, due to the presence of the 
externalities, decreases as discounting increases and this would make the Nash policy
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more acceptable. They find the balance between these two elements to move against 
policy coordination as discounting increases. In a stochastic framework, they find that the 
critical correlation coefficient - that is, the value of the correlation coefficient that can 
switch the welfare ranking in favour of cooperation - tends to increase with the increase 
in discounting.
Support for this thesis is provided by looking at figure 2.4.1., where the gains from 
coordination are plotted against the difference in initial inflation rates. Each curve is 
obtained using a different discount rate (p). It is evident that if time consistent policies 
are considered, for any given initial distribution of inflation shocks, coordination is less
likely to pay the higher the rate of discounting._____________________________
Figure 2.4.1.
Differences in initial inflation
It is worth pointing out that the temporal redistribution of loss allows a decrease 
in the total welfare loss when this is evaluated taking into account that the discount is 
now positive. In this framework, however, a slower response is no longer clearly 
inefficient because the discount rate is positive. Therefore the higher cost implied by a 
slower response must be balanced against gains in terms of welfare obtained by 
postponing part of the cost to the future. This positive effect immediately disappears 
when we evaluate the same policies assuming that policy myopia is absent: that is, if we 
revert to the case in which p is zero. In this case the more lethargic response brings about 
a higher welfare loss.
2.5. The form of the cooperative solution
Following Miller and Salmon, in the previous sections the cooperative welfare function 
was defined in a very standard and general form as the weighted average of the domestic 
and foreign welfare functions:
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2.5.1. W = to W + ( 1 - (o) W* c
This definition does not supply an unique cooperative solution, but rather a class 
of cooperative solution according to the value given to <o. In their papers Miller and 
Salmon arbitrarily assign © the value of 0.5, assuming therefore that the two countries 
have the same bargaining power. In this section J  shall verify whether this choice is 
adequate for the analysis that Miller and Salmon and myself cany out and whether the 
result of the counter-productivity of cooperation is affected by the value given to co.
A sort of prerequisite for cooperation to be possible is that players should be 
able to discuss the situation and agree on a rational joint plan of action. Eventually the 
agreement reached must be made binding and enforceable by the rules of the game 34. 
Two stages, thus, emerge. In the first, an agreement must be reached. However, many 
different agreements are in theory possible, and it is here that the problem of bargaining 
arises. In the second stage, whatever agreement has been reached should be made 
binding. In what follows I shall concentrate on the first stage, assuming that some kind of 
binding agreement already exists 35.
Two different approaches to bargaining have been proposed in the literature (Petit, 
1990):
a) the strategic approach, where a bargaining process is explicitly described and where 
the negotiation between the players takes place in the context of a non cooperative game 
(see Rubinstein, 1982).
b) The axiomatic approach where no bargaining process is considered (see Roth, 1979 for 
discussion of axiomatic models).
In these terms, the axiomatic approach may appear rather unsatisfactory, unless the 
existence of an arbitrator is assumed. Players submit their disputes to the arbitrator or 
coordinator who solves the bargaining problem and provides a solution. If this arbitrator 
exists, then an explicit description of the bargaining process is redundant. In the context 
of the international policy-making game, however, the assumption of the existence of an
34 The fundamental distinction between co-operative and non co-operative games is that co­
operative games allow binding agreements while non co-operative one do not (Friedman 1986, 
page. 148).
35 Although this convenient assumption allows us to devoie more attention to the main topic of 
our inquiry, it is not completely satisfactory.
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arbitrator would not seem as heroic as it would in a different context 36. in a context of a 
dynamic game, moreover, the problem of "cheating" - that is, unilateral deviation from 
the agreement - emerges, which makes the presence of an arbitrator essential for 
enforcement of the agreement 37.
The behaviour of the arbitrator, however, cannot be arbitrary, but should instead 
follow an "arbitration scheme". Different cooperative solution concepts can be 
distinguished on the basis of a set of axioms that arbitration schemes must fulfil.
One basic axiom that eveiy cooperative solution must satisfy is Pareto optimality - 
no country can improve its outcome without worsening the situation of the other - known 
in bargaining theory as group rationality - it would be irrational for the countries as a 
group to cooperate on a non-Pareto optimal policy. A Pareto optimal cooperative solution 
can be obtained by assuming that our arbitrator minimises the weighted sum welfare 
function 2.5.1.
This general approach has two majors shortcomings. It does not produce a unique 
cooperative solution: by varying the value of 0), a set of Pareto optimal solution may be 
obtained. It does not assure individual rationality; in other words, it does not guarantee 
that the welfare losses of the cooperative policy are less than those of the non cooperative 
one for each country. Miller and Salmon handle the first problem by giving co the value 
of 0.5, thus weighing the two countries in the same way. Since the two countries are 
perfectly symmetric, this assumption does not appear inappropriate on theoretical 
grounds. What is of more interest is that the lack of individual rationality makes a 
perverse outcome possible: for one of the two countries the welfare losses under 
cooperation may be greater than under the Nash solution thereby precluding cooperation 
on this basis. This arises an important question. Is it realistic to assume that two 
sovereign countries will implement a cooperative policy when this does not guarantee 
that both countries will obtain an outcome superior with respect to that achievable with a 
non-cooperative policy? A negative answer to this crucial question leads to the 
conclusion that the form of cooperation proposed by Miller and Salmon would not be the 
most appropriate, and that it should not be used to analyse the benefits from cooperation. 
Moreover, in this framework the issue of sustainability of cooperative regimes regains
36 What is the European Central Bank in the context of the European monetary union if not an 
arbitrator?
37 On the other hand, if we consider dynamic games with memory, sustainability can be 
achieved endogenously if players use trigger strategies.
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crucial importance since, in the case in which individual rationality is not ensured, one 
country has the incentive to renege on the joint plan and to revert to Nash policy.
In order to verify the importance of this aspect I run a simulation with a minimal 
variation with respect to that of the Miller and Salmon paper 38. The solution concept 
proposed by Miller and Salmon yields the welfare values shown in table 2.5.1.
Table 2.5.1
Time consistent Full optimal policy
Losses Closed- Cooperative Closed- Cooperative
Loop Nash Loop Nash
Domestic country 55.884 55.953 55.805 55.691
Foreign country 1.071 1.098 1.091 1.144
Average losses 28.478 28.526 28.448 28.418
In the case of the ex ante optimal policy, foreign country lacks any incentive to 
cooperate; the reason is, quite obviously, the asymmetrical initial distribution of shocks. 
The foreign country is hit only by a minor shock with respect to the shock affecting the 
domestic economy. It is well known that the advantage of cooperation consists in the 
internalisation of policy externalities. The two countries agree on a cooperation plan by 
mutually renouncing their attempts to export some of their adjustment costs: in other 
words, each country exchanges its own policy external effect for the external effect of the 
other country. In this case, however, the external effects of decentralised policies are not 
symmetric because initial shocks are not symmetric. Hence the exchange is unequal. The 
cooperative solution with (0=0.5 would simply mean for the foreign country to bear some 
of the other country adjustment costs.
In the case of time consistent solution, instead, both countries are worse off 
when they decide to cooperate by setting oo=0.5. Here none of the two countries would 
never enter this kind of agreement. Therefore, with strongly asymmetric shocks, both 
time inconsistent full optimal policy and time consistent policy are not sustainable 
Moreover, it is transparent that © must be changed in favour of the country hit by a 
smaller shock, that is the foreign country. Table 2.5.2. shows the value of the welfare 
losses with different values of to. In the case of ex ante full optimal policy the behaviour
38 por easier computation of the cost incurred by each country under co-operation, we assume 
that Z(0)=11 and Z (0)=1.
39 There are two aspects of the sustainability problem to be considered. The first is the familiar 
credibility problem deriving from the possibility of cheating the private sector and the second is 
whether the two countries will honour the cooperative agreement with each other.
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of the welfare losses is coherent with the expectations: the domestic losses monotonically 
decrease and the foreign losses monotonically increase with the increase in the weight 
assigned to the domestic welfare function. It is interesting to note that, on the contrary, in 
the case of the time consistent policy, the behaviour is different: both domestic and 
foreign losses decrease when (0 goes from 0.05 to 0.1 and foreign losses continue to 
decrease until (0 reaches 0.25. This behaviour that may appear counterintuitive, can be 
easily rationalise if we realise that the increase in the value of co yields two different 
effects: the first is the standard one, that is the welfare of the domestic country is more 
considered and then its welfare losses decrease; the second is peculiar to time consistent 
solution: to increase the value of (0 means to increase the aggregate credibility bias. The 
reduction of the credibility bias improves the welfare results for both countries. This 
result is rather important although it has not been noticed in previous studies (see Currie 
and Levine, 1987 for example), because it shows that cooperation with a lower value of 
co can been seen as a way of reducing the bias induced by the lack of credibility of the 
government.
Table 2.5.2
Time consistent Full Optimal policy
co Domestic country Foreign country Domestic Foreign country 
______________________________________country__________________
0.05 55.95138 1.08476 56.90712 1.04321
0.1 55.84973 1.07502 55.91173 1.06509
0.2 55.88204 1.06963 55.79699 1.08316
0.25 55.89701 1.06916 55.77483 1.91520
0.3 55.90980 1.06998 55.76077 1.09506
0.4 55.93166 1.07242 55.72960 1.11194
0.5 55.95336 1.09823 55.69138 1.14377
0.6 55.97926 1.15322 55.63632 1.21261
0.7 56.01690 1.30625 55.54605 1.38542
0.8 56.08739 1.84340 55.36817 1.94824
0.9 56.29166 5.29777 54.85042 5.30549
25.1 The rational bargaining solution
In this section I compute a different cooperative policy based on rational 
bargaining behaviour. The standard bargaining theory is based on the Nash bargaining 
model (Nash, 1953). In addition to Pareto optimality, it must also satisfy four axioms: 
individual rationality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, symmetry and 
independence with respect to utility (linear) transformation (see Friedman, 1986 chapter 
5 for details). Particularly relevant to our purposes here is the first axiom, which implies
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that a rational policy maker would never accept an agreement the outcome of which 
would be worse than he could obtain by acting competitively. This axiom restrict the 
domain of the solutions that satisfy group rationality to a smaller set called the 
negotiation set.
It has been shown that there is an unique solution that satisfies all the four 
axioms and is obtained when the Nash product - that is the product [(Wc -WN)(WC - 
WN)] of the cooperation gains from the treat point - is maximised.
In our example the Nash bargaining solution is obtained for a value of 0) equal to 
0.185. The results are presented in table 2.5.3. Firstly, one notes that a> is less than 0.5; 
this means that in order to take advantage of cooperation, the domestic policy-maker 
must renounce part of his policy sovereignty. In fact the coordinator must evaluate its 
welfare function less than the foreign one: only in this way can the arbitrator implement a 
rigorous policy which induces a return to equilibrium faster than that of the Nash 
decentralised case.
Table 2.5.3.
Closcd-Loop Nash Co-operative Nash bargaining
Roots -0.972 -8.882 -1.000 -0.842 -1.029 -0.824
Riccati coefficients:
6 ] e2 -0.820
Reaction coefficients:
0.820 -0.790 0.790 -0.813 0.707
Pi 1 Pl2 1.012 0.284 0.999 0.334 1.012 0.520
P21 P22 0.284 1.012 0.334 0.999 0.292 0.999
Initial values:
z z* 11.000 1 11.000 1 11.000 1
y y* -10.270 -1.388 -10.210 -1.790 -10.431 -1.461
Jt Jt* 10.180 1.820 10.210 1.790 10.177 1.823
c -8.199 -7.899 -8.235
r r* 11.416 4.134 11.329 4.679 11.655 4.208
Welfare costs:
W W* 55.884 1.071 55.953 1.098 55.877 1.069
Average # 28.478 28.525 28.473
Gains from coordination _____-0 50%_________0.02%____
Note: # The average welfare costs are computed with the original weights of 0.5
The table shows that the cooperative solution in this case provides a stronger
policy reaction with respect to both the cooperative policy outlined by Miller and Salmon
and, more importantly, the Nash decentralised solution. Inspection of the values of the
reaction coefficients shows that the Nash bargaining solution implies a response to
symmetric shocks higher than in the cooperative and Nash case, and a response to
asymmetric shocks far higher than in the cooperative case and a slightly lower than in the
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Nash case. Therefore, with the cooperative solution obtained using the Nash bargaining 
model, the superiority of cooperation would be stated.
Analogous result was obtained by Currie and Levine (Currie and Levine, 1987). 
However, they were interested in a different issue: they were interested in verifying 
whether the ex ante full optimal cooperative policy were sustainable in a deterministic 
setting. They concluded that there is no choice of to that makes the ex ante full optimal 
cooperative solution sustainable since there is no choice of © which sustain it against 
both the non-cooperative time consistent and non-cooperative ex ante full optimal policy. 
Their result relied on the assumption that both Nash time consistent and Nash ex ante full 
optimal, but time inconsistent, policy are regarded as possible non-cooperative 
alternatives or threats following a breakdown in the cooperative agreement.
My perspective is different. In a world in which policy makers lack credibility to 
implement the ex ante full optimal policy, both countries can improve their welfare by 
cooperating using a Nash Bargaining procedure and this cooperative solution is 
sustainable since there are no incentive in reneging vis a vis the private sector - we limit 
to time consistent solution - and both countries are the incentive to enter the agreement.
The advantage of this approach is that it introduces, at least indirectly, a form of 
bargaining 4®. The existence of a coordinator may be postulated, but since the players 
here are sovereign countries, participation in a joint accord can only be voluntary, and 
must therefore yield mutual advantage. If this accord is to be reached both countries must 
offer something, but because of the extreme asymmetry of shocks the foreign country has 
very little to offer in terms of external effects. Only a cooperative solution procedure that 
does not assume a priori the equality of welfare weights between the two countries can 
demonstrate the advantage of cooperation.
1 S 2  The benefit from cooperation
From what has been said there seem to be a number of advantages to cooperation, given 
that, when properly computed, the cooperative solution is superior to the Nash solution41.
40 A non co-operative or behavioural foundation, rather than an axiomatic one, has been 
recently been provided for the Nash bargaining solution (see papers collected in Binmore and 
Dasgupta, 1987), although it is not yet clear how it can be extended to a differential-game 
framework.
41 It must be stressed, however, that there is still the possibility that the negotiation set is empty 
and that a Nash bargaining solution does not exist. I found that this is the case if one country is 
hit by a remarkable shock while the shock affecting the other country is zero.
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From a logical point of view, however, the argument set out in the previous section 
may appear rather tautological. Two players are engaged in the policy game: in order to 
obtain the sub-optimality of cooperation, at least one of them must suffer a decrease in 
welfare by moving from the Nash to the cooperative solution. Ruling out this possibility 
means ruling out the sub-optimality of cooperation by assumption. The tautology, 
however, is only apparent. The perverse result on sub-optimality of cooperation has been 
justified on theoretical grounds by arguing that the cooperative solution is nothing but a 
coalition between the two policy-makers at the expense of the third implicit player: 
private agents. My point is the following: why should one country enter a coalition if it 
leads to a decrease in its welfare with respect to Nash decentralised equilibrium?
A second objection can be raised here. The argument is convincing only on the 
assumption that countries can decide whether to cooperate after they have gathered 
information on shocks. On the contrary, it loses its appeal if the decision whether to 
cooperate has to be taken before information on shocks is available. This well founded 
objection suggests that the Miller and Salmon conclusion should be amended. The Miller 
and Salmon analysis is important for determination of the critical value of the degree of 
correlation between shocks that can switch the welfare result from the productivity to the 
counter-productivity of cooperation. What matters is the probability of having highly 
correlated shocks, that is, shocks with a degree of correlation above the critical value. 
Therefore the optimal political strategy that can be deduced from the Miller and Salmon 
approach is this: cooperate if the probability of having closely correlated shocks is high 
enough to provide both countries with an incentive to cooperate and to ensure the 
productivity of cooperation; otherwise do not cooperate. We show that there is a strategy 
that clearly dominates that proposed by Miller and Salmon: namely cooperation using a 
Nash bargaining solution as cooperation procedure. In this framework, it is evident that 
the Nash bargaining solution - that is the value of (0 - will be different according to the 
difference in the initial inflation shocks. The higher the difference between the domestic 
and the foreign initial inflation disturbances, the lower the value of <o.
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In this chapter I have conducted a sensitivity analysis of the Miller and Salmon 
conclusion of the counter-productivity of cooperation. To a large extent, their statement 
has proved to be rather robust. Nevertheless, some flaws in their reasoning have been 
identified and some interesting findings, more favourable to cooperation, have been 
obtained.
Particularly relevant it is the result of the undesirability of cooperation even 
when it is assumed that the central planner is the best conservative policy maker. This 
assumption reduces the time consistent bias of the cooperative solution but not enough to 
render it preferable to the competitive decentralised policy in which policy makers share 
the same attitude against inflation as the median voter. This suggests that the way of 
reducing the time consistent bias proposed by Rogoff cannot be of any help in rendering 
cooperation more attractive 4Z. Nonetheless, it has been shown that a very mild form of 
cooperation represented by the cooperative choice of the conservative banker' preferences 
is desirable. Explicit consideration of the costs of changing the policy instruments and of 
the exchange rate as target of policy does not change the ranking between cooperative 
and Nash solutions; the counter-productivity argument is thus confirmed. Furthermore, if 
we assume that the policy maker displays myopic behaviour and then the rate of discount
42 In their paper Miller and Salmon (1989) suggest rendering the cooperative solution more 
attractive by "misrepresenting” coordinator preferences via the appointment of a secretariat 
within the coordinating authority with views that are not simply an average of the national 
countries. My analysis shows that this answer can ameliorate the situation without rendering 
cooperation preferable to decentralised policy.
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is greater than zero, coordination is less likely to pay the higher the rate of discounting. 
Also, if we consider the exchange rate to be one of the policy targets, assuming that the 
stabilization of the exchange rate may be one of the goal of international policy 
coordination, it proves impossible to reverse the welfare ranking obtained by Miller, 
Salmon and Sutherland.
However, two major points of attack of the counter-productivity argument have 
been identified. First of all, if we relax the assumption that the exchange rate market is 
perfectly efficient and we introduce, even a mild form of imperfection in the exchange 
rate market, we find that cooperation pays. Secondly, we have seen that when the simple 
definition of the cooperative solution proposed by Miller and Salmon is repiced by a 
rational bargaining approach to the cooperative solution, it turns out that the cooperative 
solution is preferable to Nash solution. These two results suggest that the counter­
productive argument is not as general as has been claimed.
Two different lines of research will be followed in the next chapters. First, 
analysis will be conducted of the question of the benefit deriving from cooperation using 
a less simplified model in which explicit consideration is made of welfare effects and of 
the current account dynamics, and in which private and governmental intertemporal 
budged constraints are imposed. Secondly, a three country model will be used. This 
framework will allow analysis that cannot be pursued with a two country model and will 
enable us to address, among other things, the issue of coalition and of exchange rate 
arrangements.
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3. A Model with current account dynamics and budget deficit
The main objective of this chapter is to reconsider the issue of desirability of 
international policy coordination within a context of a two-country model with micro- 
foundations, intertemporal budget constraints, wealth effects and current-account 
dynamics. An interesting feature of the following model is that it provides a consistent 
two-country model with micro foundations, whose short run properties correspond as 
closely as possible to the properties of the traditional two-country Mundell-Fleming 
analysis.43
As far as expectations formation is concerned, I will assume that while financial 
speculators have rational expectations, consumers/workers have naive ones. Both 
assumptions appear to be extreme, although quite standard. With this particular 
expectations mix, I will try not only to introduce a higher degree of realism, but, and 
mainly, to capture the different ways in which information is gathered and expectations 
are formed in financial and goods markets. More interestingly, this framework will 
enable us to avoid the case in which Ricardian equivalence holds, and to show that 
monetary and fiscal policy can have different effects on the exchange rate and on 
domestic variables, as well as different spill-over effects, according to the hypothesis on 
the way in which agents in the financial market expect intertemporal budget constraint to 
be satisfied.
3.1 Financial assets in an interdependent world
This section presents a two country Mundell-Fleming model, which has been extended 
to allow for sluggish wage-price dynamics and intertemporal budget constraints for the 
private sector, the government and the economy as a whole. The model can thus be seen 
as an extension of two-country real exchange rate overshooting models without wealth 
effects - e.g. Miller and Salmon (1985), Oudiz and Sachs (1985), Tumovsky (1986) and 
Van der Ploeg (1986) - which in turn extend the well known real exchange rate 
overshooting model of a small open economy - e.g. Dombusch (1976), Buiter and Miller 
(1982) - and full-employment models of a small open economy with current-account
43 Van der Klundert and Van der Ploeg (1989) work with a similar model. The main differences 
are that they assume perfect-foresight behaviour by the consumer and asymmetry in the degree 
of wage indexation in the two countries. We assume that consumers have naive behaviour, and I 
abstract from difference in the degree of wage indexation in order to focus on the role of 
expectations.
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dynamics - e.g. Dombusch and Fischer (1980). The model presented can also be viewed 
as an analytical version of the empirical multi-country model developed by McKibbin 
and Sachs (1986).
It is assumed that home and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes and that each 
country is wholly specialised in the production of its exportable good. The asset menu 
consists of home government bonds, foreign government bonds and home cash, so that 
there is no currency substitution or capital accumulation. Home and foreign government 
bonds are perfect substitutes. Labour is immobile, and nominal wages in each country are 
rigid in the short run. Financial speculators have rational expectations, but 
workers/households have naive expectations about future interest rates, taxes and income, 
and adaptive expectations about inflation. It is assumed that households expect future 
after-tax income and the interest rate to be equal to current after-tax income and the 
interest rate, respectively - which seems compatible with a sluggish adjustment of core 
inflation to CPI inflation. The resulting model is therefore a "story of smart speculators 
and naive workers". This is in sharp contrast with the story in which households have 
rational expectations when evaluating their human wealth (and naive expectations about 
expected inflation). In this case Ricardian debt neutrality holds, and current-account 
dynamics only play a trivial role. The repercussions of home policy on the rest of the 
world do not affect the home economy, and in this case the large-economy multipliers are 
the same as the small-economy multipliers (Van der Ploeg, 1989). This paper adopts a 
more Keynesian view and assumes that households have a myopic view of their human 
wealth. Alternatively, one could assume that a significant number of households in 
society are liquidity constrained.
The model is presented in the figure 3.1.1. Countries are symmetric: similar 
relationships hold for the foreign country. Foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. 
M, D, F, W, Cp, Cm, C and e denote the per-capita aggregates for home holdings of real 
money balances, government debt, net foreign assets, denominated in domestic currency, 
and financial wealth, home consumption of home and foreign goods, total consumption 
and real exchange rate respectively. G and Tdenote the autonomous per-capita level of 
public spending on home goods and of per-capita lump-sum taxes. Y and Y denote the 
actual and full-employment per-capita level of output, % and Jt* the actual and trend or 
core rate of inflation in production price, the rate of inflation in consumption price, r 
and i the (growth-corrected) real and nominal rate of interest, and 0 denotes the rate of 
growth in the nominal money supply.
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________________________ Figure 3.1.1_________________
3.1.1) b  = rD+(G-YGD)-(T+YTD)-(0+Y,D)M, D(0) = 0
3.1.2) F = rF + Y -  CD -  eCM -  (G -  YGD), F(0) = 0
3.1.3) W = rW + Y - ( T  + yTD )-C , W(0) = M0
3.1.4) n = <KY — Y)+n'
3.1.5) re'=^(7cc -Jt') = ^ [n + a(e /e )-7i']
Aji'(0) = 4oAc(0)
3.1.6) E(e/e) = r-r*  = i-J t-i*  + n#, e(0) free
3
3.1.7) CD =a,C, CM = a 2C/e, M = a 3C/i, a (^0, X a i =1
i-i
3.1.8) C sC D+eCM + iM = «)(Y -f -Y TD)+e2W -« ,r
3.1.9) Y = Cd + (G -y 0I»+Cm
W g M+D + F________________________________________
Equation 3.2.2) shows that interest payments on external debt, or net receipts 
from external assets, plus the balance of trade are equal to the increase in the wealth of 
the nation. Net holdings of foreign assets are the excess of private sector agents holdings 
of bonds over government debt, that is F=B-D. Equilibrium in the world bond market 
gives B+eB*=D+D*, which implies F*=-F/e. Integration of 3.2.2.) and application of the 
country's solvency condition gives the country's intertemporal budget constraint:
3.2.2a) - F ( t )  = eF*(t) = f [C M  -e (s )C M(s)]e x p (-f  r(v)dv)ds
which says that the current net foreign debt must be paid off by the discounted value of 
the stream of future surpluses in the balance of trade. In addition, we need a rule for 
where bonds are held initially: to simplify matters, it will assumed that initially neither 
country holds any foreign assets and therefore F(0)=0.
Equation (3.1.3) shows that saving gives rise to an accumulation of financial 
assets. Equation (3.1.4) is an augmented Phillips curve, where equation (3.1.5) shows 
that core inflation adapts sluggishly to CPI inflation. Under Cobb-Douglas preferences 
CPI inflation equals PPI inflation plus the share of imports in total expenditures, 
a= a2/(a j+ 02), times the rate of depreciation of the real exchange rate. Equation (3.1.6) 
is the uncovered interest parity condition. Equation (3.1.7) shows how total consumption 
is divided between the demand for home goods, foreign goods and cash. There is
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assumed to be a domestic bias in consumption (01JXX2). The assumption of Cobb- 
Douglas preferences leads to unit elasticity of imports with respect to the real exchange 
rate and to unit semi-elasticity of money demand with respect to the nominal interest 
rate. Equation (3.1.8) gives the consumption-saving function. A rationale is provided, for 
example, by the aggregate life-cycle consumption function when there is a positive birth 
rate, due to either positive population growth, n, or a non zero probability of death, 
(e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, chapter 3; Buiter, 1988):
3.1.10) C(t) = (8 +n){w(t)+j^[Y^(s)-'If(s)]exp[-Ji,(rle(v)+n+^)dv]ds}
where 5 denotes the pure rate of time preference and the second term in the curly brackets 
denotes human wealth. The term Yte denotes the expected value of Y(s) conditional on 
the information available at time t, and similarly for the other variables. The linearity of 
the consumption function arises from a unit elasticity of intertemporal substitution 44. 
One can easily verify that a first order Taylor series expansion yields :
< , < • , . .  «>.(*11 mde,s =i2M5±Ji>2ffi)
1 r(t) + n + n 2 r(0) + n + |i.
Equation (3.1.9) gives the condition for equilibrium in the home goods market. Finally, 
equations (3.1.1)-(3.1.3) and the wealth identity give the growth in the real money 
balances:
3.1.11) M = (0-n)M; M(0) = M0
In the appendix of this chapter, impact multipliers for fiscal policy and steady- 
state multipliers which depends heavily on assets dynamics, are derived; in addition a 
number of policy experiments are described.
3.2. Optimal policy, debt financing and stability
Equation (3.1.1) describes the dynamics of the government debt, which will be explosive 
unless stabilising rules for taxes, seigniorage revenues and public spending are in force 
(e.g. if yg + yT + y,M > r). In other words, when the government debt gets out of hand,
public spending is cut, total taxes are raised, and seigniorage revenues are raised. In the
44 A positive birth rate which drives a wedge between the discount rate used to calculate human wealth 
(see (12)) and the discount rate used to calculate government debt (see(10)) is one reason why 
Ricardian debt neutrality breaks down. An alternative reason is that households have fixed
expectations (^ (s)^ !), Yct(s)=Y(t), T®t(s)=T(t)).
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absence of these stabilising rales, government debt is a predetermined, but forward- 
looking variable:
3.2.1) D(t) = J]”[e(s)M (s)+T(s)-G(s)]exp(-£r(v)dv)ds
Ruling out Ponzi games enforces solvency and implies that the current 
government debt plus the discounted value of the stream of future public spending has to 
be financed by the discounted value of the stream of future taxes and seigniorage 
revenues 45.
In the policy analysis of this model, presented in the appendix to this chapter, I 
show that in order to ensure the dynamic stability of the model, two different 
assumptions must be made concerning the financing of the debt. A policy rule which 
gradually increases taxes or seigniorage, or decreases public expenditure, has been 
introduced in the model in order to avoid the explosion of debt. Alternatively, it is 
assumed that a future fiscal or monetary accommodation is required in the absence of a 
gradual policy rule.
Alternatively, if we abandon the hypothesis of a fixed policy rule to ensure debt 
convergence, we must assume that the policy-maker cares about the debt. In other words, 
the level of debt has must enter the loss function, and the weight given to it must be 
relatively high enough in order to obtain stability. The reason for that is easily 
understood: without an explicit consideration of debt in the loss function, no policy 
feedback between debt and policy instrument(s) will emerge. Let us consider here a 
simple loss function of the type:
3.2.3) W = I e - p,f [ p 1(7t - J td)2+P2( y - y d)2+PJ(D -D d)2]dt
In order to obtain the dynamic stability of the model it is necessary to impose 
that is different from zero and sufficiently high. Note that, other things remaining 
equal, the minimum value of p3 ensuring debt stability is an increasing function of the 
discount rate. A high discount rate creates the temptation to transfer the debt service 
towards the future, and if adequate weight is not given to the debt in the welfare function, 
it may easily follow an explosive path.
45 An alternative to a feedback rule for stabilising the government debt is a structural 
adjustment. For example, a permanent increase in government spending can, given that 6=0,
after a time x, be financed by a permanent increase in taxes equal to AT = AG exp[j^r(s)ds] > AG.
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33. Benefit of monetary and fiscal policy coordination
Before examining the desirability of international economic policy coordination in this 
new framework, it is advisable to underline the main differences between the present 
model and the model considered by Miller, Salmon and Sutherland. The two models are 
different in many respects. The most important, regards our present concerns, is the 
presence of the debt dynamics. Since we explicitly consider the intertemporal budget 
constraint, the main role of the public debt dynamic is to allow for a smoother time 
distribution of the policy response to initial shocks. This option was not available in the 
simple model presented in the previous chapters, and in that framework the best policy 
reaction would be the most rapid policy reaction. On the other hand, when it is possible 
to accumulate and decumulate the stock of public and foreign debt, a richer choice of 
possible time profiles of policy reactions is is available.
Given the size of the model, an analytical solution is not possible: as before, 
therefore, I perform numeric simulations. Table 3.3.1. gives the initial conditions and the 
parameter values used in the simulation:
____________________________Table 33.1___________________________
Initial conditions r(0)=0.035 M(0)=9.93 CM(0)=0.183
Parameters d,=0.76 $ ,= 0 .76  fl,=0.76 q>=0.10
_______________________a, =0.45 a ,  =0.20 =0.35 C=0.10
33.1. Coordination of monetary policy
In this section I assume that the only available policy instrument is the rate of growth of 
money. In other words, this scenario can be interpreted as a situation in which the 
monetary authority settles monetary policy while fiscal policy is treated as fixed. It is 
assumed in particular that there is no fiscal authority which assumes responsibility for 
stabilizing public debt. Consequently, the stability and the viability of the system hinge 
critically on the behaviour of the monetary authority. The inclusion of the term (D-D**)2 
in the loss function 3.2.3) is therefore a simple way to capture two ideas. First, the 
amount of debt that government can accumulate is not unbounded. Second, the monetary 
authorities are aware of this fact.
In what follows I assume that the initial shock is analogous to that analysed by 
Miller and Salmon; that is, an increase in inflation determined by accumulated past
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excess demand 46. Table 3.3.2. summarises the main result; I have assumed that the 
weights given to the policy parameters are the following: pj = 1, p2 = 1 and P3=0.007.1 
claim that policy makers give the same weight to deviation of inflation and income from 
the equilibrium, while giving a smaller weight to debt stabilisation. With regard to the 
initial shocks, the case is considered in which the distribution of the shocks between 
countries is not symmetric: the domestic country faces a double inflation shock. (Z(0)=2 
and Z*(0)= 1). The table sets out the values of the reaction coefficients. With every kind 
of policies, the rate of growth of money tends to depend negatively on the accumulated 
past excess demand; however, the lack of adequate fiscal responsibility and the weight 
given to debt stabilisation in the loss function impose a positive relationship between the 
policy instrument and the level of public debt However, the values of the reaction 
coefficients vary with the solutions adopted. The dimension and the sign of the reaction 
coefficients prompts an important consideration: the money growth rate will no longer be 
a monotonic function. The impact effect of the inflation shock is to induce a monetary 
contraction, but subsequently when inflation decreases and debt increases, monetary 
policy becomes expansionary.
Table 3.3.2.
Reaction coefficients Welfare losses Gains from
coordination
Time inconsistent D Z D* Z*
Nash 0.130 -0.831 -0.002 -0.539 26.427
Coop 0.129 -1.201 -0.147 -1.222 26.301 0.447%
lime consistent
Nash 0.133 -0.775 -0.002 -0.479 26.550
Coop 0.130 -1.203 -0.016 -1.112 26.403 0.554%
As before, the full optimal policy is time inconsistent: the difference between the 
time consistent and the full optimal policy, however, is not large. Figure 3.3.1 shows the 
path of the shadow price of the exchange rate: as regards the domestic country, the 
shadow price on exchange rate turns negative, after t=0 , meaning that an increase in 
exchange rate will reduce welfare losses. Therefore, from the point of view of the 
domestic policy maker, the original plan in this first stage is too contractionary, since a 
currency depreciation will increase welfare. Moreover, after the first period, the shadow 
price turns positive meaning that in this second period a tighter monetary policy would
46 In order to do this, added to the model is a new state variable Z = <p(y -  y ) which enters the 
core inflation equation.
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increase welfare. This behaviour appears more comprehensible when one inspects figure
3.3.2. which shows the path of the money growth under the time consistent solution. The 
upsurge of inflation calls for a monetary contraction; the monetary contraction, in turn, 
causes an accumulation of public debt that requires a monetary creation in order to raise 
the seigniorage revenue. Therefore, while in a first period the optimal policy requires a 
money contraction, in a second period monetary growth must expend in order to ensure 
debt stability. Similar considerations hold for the path of the exchange rate (figure
3.3.l.b.). In the short run, the exchange rate appreciates as a result of the monetary 
contraction: it causes an accumulation of foreign debt which leads in the long run to a 
depreciation of the real exchange rate in order to create the external deficit able to reduce 
the debt of the foreign country.
The particular time profile of the optimal policy has two important 
consequences. Time consistent solutions are characterised by smaller reaction 
coefficients: in this case, the optimal policy will be the result of the interplay between the 
activity of economic agents in forecasting the value of non-predetermined variable, ac­
counting for the incentive of the policy-maker to renege and the activity of policy-makers 
to maximise welfare taking this private behaviour into account. Therefore the time 
consistent optimal policy will imply a lower initial money contraction and a less 
pronounced money creation thereafter, in other words, a smaller policy reaction. 
Secondly, it is evident that with such a time profile the bias induced by the lack of 
credibility of the policy maker will be not as conspicuous as it is in the Miller and 
Salmon model.
When these remarks are taken into account, the main result of the superiority of 
cooperation over decentralised policies, also in the case in which time consistent 
solutions are considered, becomes rather more comprehensible. From an economic point 
of view, it is the debt dynamics that engenders this result. Figure 3.3.3. which shows the 
behaviour of debt, evidences that a more pronounced use of the buffer role of public debt 
allows cooperative policy makers to force a sharper initial money contraction.
Important support for this idea is provided by figure 3.3.4., which shows that the 
gains from coordination tend to decrease with the increase in the weight given to the 
stabilisation of debt. The higher the weight on debt stabilisation, the less marked is the 
initial monetary contraction: therefore less gains can be extracted by coordinating 
monetary policies. Figure 3.3.5. and 3.3.6. show the behaviour of debt and money growth
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when a weight of 0.07 is assigned to the debt stabilisation objective: clearly in this case 
less flexibility of debt clearly brings about less flexibility of money supply.
One of consequences of the assumption that fiscal authority does not assume 
responsibility for the stabilisation of public debt is the paradox known as unpleasant 
monetarist arithmetic 47. Sargent and Wallace (1981) argue that a monetary contraction 
implemented in order to reduce inflation can yield the perverse result of an immediate 
increase in inflation. This result derives from the'impossibility of coordinating fiscal and 
monetary policy and on the assumption that the fiscal authorities move "first” in the 
policy game. In this case, in fact, a decrease in the seigniorage induced by a decrease in 
the rate of growth of money cannot be compensated for by an increase in tax or by a 
decrease in public expenditure. It goes without saying that, in this case, a tight monetary 
policy now must involve a policy of loose money later, either via a gradual policy or via 
a future monetisation of the debt, in order prevent an explosive path of public debt 4S. 
Figures 3.3.7. and figure 3.3.8. show the path of core and consumer price inflation in the 
domestic economy under Nash policy. Since private agents expect a future monetisation 
of the debt, the disinflation policy has a perverse effect in the short run, as Sargent and 
Wallace suggest. Inflation, in fact, increases on impact and begins to decrease only after 
more than ten periods.
33.3.2 Monetary coordination with fiscal responsibility 
In this section, I relax the hypothesis that the fiscal authority does not care about debt 
stabilisation. I distinguish two different cases. Firstly, we introduce a policy rule into the 
model which links tax level to the level of public debt (T=yD), therefore setting P3=0 in 
the loss function. In this case, it is assumed that the only aim of the fiscal authority is to 
stabilise the level of public debt, while the monetary authority is concerned with the 
stabilisation of real income and core inflation. Secondly, we assume that there is only one 
policy maker that can manage two different instruments, money supply and tax level, to 
stabilize all three targets. I am mainly interested in verifying whether the result in favour 
of cooperation is confirmed in the case in which the assumption of fiscal irresponsibility 
is relaxed.
47 See also the discussion in the appendix to this chapter in section 3.A.3.I.
48 In Sargent and Wallace, however, the monetary authorities are assumed not to be aware that a 
bound on governmental debt exists. Therefore they act to reduce inflation today without 
considering the fact that this policy may cause more inflation in the future when that limit is 
close enough. I instead assume that the authorities internalise the constraint and consequently act 
from the very beginning of their planning horizon.
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Table 3 .33
Reaction coefficients of monetary 
policy
Welfare losses Gains from 
coordination
Tax rule (tt^O-IS) D Z D* Z*
Nash 0.067 •16.81 0.041 7.674 8.8122
Coop 
Tax and monetary 
policy
0.084 -14.31 0.067 1.495 8.3504 5.240%
Nash 0.138 -1.413 0.002 L053 1.611
Coop 0.138 -1.399 0.002 1.039 1.606 0.317%
Table 3.3.3 summarises the main results. In order to simplify the presentation, it 
is restricted to time consistent solutions.
With a sufficiently high value of 7, the stability of public debt is ensured. In this 
case, quite obviously, the reaction coefficient on debt will be lower than in the case in 
which monetary policy has to ensure debt stability. The positive relation between money 
supply and debt along the optimal path, still present in this case, is due to the fact thatthe 
money supply has to increase to reduce the deflationary effect of tax increase 49. It is 
evident, on the other hand, that the reaction coefficients on the Z, the inflation 
displacement, is now far higher than in the case in which fiscal irresponsibility was 
assumed. As far as the main point of our inquiry is concerned, also in this case the 
superiority of the coordinated response is obtained. As a matter of fact, gains from 
coordination are now higher than before. As before, however, the gains from 
coordination tend to decrease with the increase in the value of yp. Finally, one observes 
that the welfare costs, both under Nash and cooperative solutions, are lower than when 
fiscal responsibility was assumed. This result admits to two different explanations: first, 
there are now two instruments available for the same initial shock; second, the deviation 
of the debt variable from equilibrium is no longer computed as a welfare cost.
The last rows of the table 3.3.3. report the reaction coefficients and the welfare 
outcomes when it is assumed that the policy authority has two instruments available: 
both monetary policy and tax policy. Welfare losses in this case are far lower than before: 
there are now two instruments available for the optimal policy. Also in this case, the 
cooperative policy yields a better outcome by allowing a less reactive policy reaction by 
both countries. It is worth observing that the monetary reactions on Z are now lower than 
before because a antinflationary role is played by the tax instrument as well.
^  It is worth noting that when the value of Yp is high enough this indirect effect is rather 
important and the reaction coefficient may be higher than in the case of fiscal irresponsibility.
73
A model with current account dynamics and intertemporal budged constraints
I observe in conclusion to this section that the result of benefits accruing from 
coordination does not depend on the hypothesis of a lack of fiscal responsibility on the 
part of the fiscal authorities.
33J33. The productivity of coordination
In previous sections I have shown that cooperation pays even if initial shocks are 
asymmetrically distributed and time consistent policies are considered. It is therefore of 
interest to analyze the reason for this result. Note first that the bias induced by the lack of 
credibility of policy makers appears more substantial in the case of Nash policy than in 
the cooperative case, as testified also by the finding that gains from coordination are 
higher when time consistent policy is considered. As a matter of fact, the bias induced by 
the lack of credibility can be measured at 0.46% in the case of Nash policy and at 0.38% 
in the case of the cooperative solution. This result is in contradiction with Rogoff result. 
In his model, as in that by Miller and Salmon, policy makers have the incentive to inflate 
in order to reduce unemployment. While in the non cooperative equilibrium this 
incentive is restrained by its effect on the exchange rate • the exchange rate will 
depreciate and inflation will increase - in the cooperative equilibrium the exchange rate is 
unaffected so that each policy maker has a greater incentive to inflate. Rational and 
forward looking private agents will foresee this higher incentive, and therefore the 
inflation bias will be greater under cooperation. When considering time consistent 
solutions, the higher credibility bias will imply a more lethargic policy response under 
cooperation which will lead to higher welfare losses.
In the model presented in this section, on the contrary, the path of exchange rate 
is not longer monotonic. It must initially appreciate in response to the initial monetary 
contraction. The appreciation in turn creates an accumulation of external debt. Therefore 
in the longer run the exchange rate must depreciate in order to create a current account 
surplus able to repay the accumulated external debt. It is likely that the a coordinated 
response will reduce the extent of the necessary depreciation in the long run which 
reduces the incentive to renege on the announced policy in the long run. In other words, 
the incentive to renege, and therefore the bias deriving from the lack of cooperation, 
displays a form of path dependence: the internalisation of policy externalities arising 
under cooperation will reduce the credibility bias in the long run.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, this result does not depend on the distribution of 
initial shocks; gains from coordination decrease very slightly when initial shocks become 
more and more asymmetrically distributed.
3.4 Coordination of fiscal policy
In this last section, the issue of fiscal policy coordination is analyzed. This issue has not 
received as much attention in the literature as. the associated question of monetary 
coordination. This can be justified on the grounds that the determination of fiscal policy 
is a more complex process; it is often argued that it already requires the cooperation of 
more than one domestic institution, for example both government and parliament. On the 
other hand, the issue has recently gained in more importance because there are numerous 
countries with problems of debt stability, but also because the problem of fiscal 
coordination and of fiscal federalism has been posed and analysed within the context of 
designing a European monetary union.
In what follows I ignore all the above-cited difficulties in determining the fiscal 
stance and focus on the existence of gains from cooperation when considering fiscal 
policy. There are two main channels of international trasmission of fiscal policy: one is 
changes in the terms of trade; the other is in the net tax return available to international 
mobile capital in different localities (Frenkel and Razin, 1987 and Frenkel, Razin and 
Sadka, 1991 contain a complete theoretical discussion of both issue respectively). In this 
section, however, I concentrate on the second channel since the model I employed is not 
suitable to study the first channel of interdependence 50.
I assume that the policy makers have two different instruments: tax level and 
government expenditure, and three targets: the stabilisation of real income and core 
inflation and the stabilisation of debt according to the loss function 3.2.3. In this 
instance, it appears more interesting to treat the case in which our countries display an 
outstanding level of public debt, although the stock of debt is not symmetrically 
distributed and the domestic country is far more indebted than the foreign one ^I. We 
will compute the optimal policy response to this initial shock.
50 ^  survey of tax competition and cooperation can be found in Persson and Tabellini, 1995
51 In particular I assume that the initial value of the real debt is 10 in the domestic economy and 
3 in foreign economy.
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tax instrument expenditure instrument 










0.658 -0.803 0.037 -0.600 0.150 -1.923 0.096 -1.000 








-0.774 0.037 -0.590 0.148 -1.891 0.095 -1.012 
-0.786-0.046-0.559 0.141 -1.887 0.085 -1.016
1.473
1.4662 0.464%
Table 3.4.1 summarises the main results. The first thing that warrants attention is 
that the difference between full optimal and time consistent policy is very slight. Figure
3.4.1. shows the path of the shadow price on exchange rate. The domestic policy maker 
playing Nash would find it useful to induce a exchange rate depreciation, somewhat 
reducing the tax increase in the short run; successively, however, a long lasting, although 
moderate, incentive for an appreciation emerges. The net effect is likely to be small. 
Figure 3.4.2 compares the path of shadow price in the case of fiscal and monetary policy: 
in the case of fiscal policy the incentive to renege is lower than in the case of the 
monetary policy
The analysis of the reaction coefficients prompts some interesting remarks. The 
optimal assignment of instruments to targets would seem to be that of assigning the tax 
level to control debt accumulation and public expenditure to control the real income and, 
partially, the core inflation. This result is not surprising since it confirms the 
conventional view of economic policy theory: in assigning instruments to targets, each 
instrument should be assigned to the target which it will more powerfully affect. Figure 
3.4.3. shows the path of domestic debt when different policy instruments - tax increase, 
expenditure decrease and money creation • are used; it is evident that the tax policy is 
much more effective in stabilising debt than public expenditure and money creation. Also 
the explanation of the superiority of the cooperative solution can be understood by 
looking at the reaction coefficients: coordination allows a more powerful use of the tax 
increase in order to reduce debt more rapidly and of expenditure reduction in order to 
control core inflation. Figure 3.4.4 shows the path of tax and expenditure in the case of 
Nash solution: both jump upward in order to reduce debt without destabilizing output and 
core inflation. Soon afterwards, both start to decrease; in the long run approach zero from 
the negative quadrant in order to create a moderate public deficit able to absorb the
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governmental surplus created by the short run policy. The paths of domestic real income 
and core inflation are shown in figure 3.4.5 and figure 3.4.6. This two figures accredit the 
result of the superiority of cooperation: in this case, in fact, domestic real income and 
core inflation are closer to their equilibrium values.
3 i. Concluding remarks
In this chapter I have analyzed the issue of. the desirability of cooperation when 
considering a more sophisticated and richer model: the principal innovation is the explicit 
consideration of the external and governmental budged constraints. These constraints 
determine in turn a less simplistic design of the optimal policies. In this framework I 
have shown that the inflation bias induced by the lack of reputation of the policy maker 
may be greater under non cooperative equilibrium than under cooperative equilibrium.
Undeniably, however, one of the mayor weaknesses of our analysis is the fact 
that we have used a specific, although rather standard, model which has been solved with 
the help of numerical simulation. Therefore, although a general rejection of the Rogoff 
paradox cannot be justified, it seems to me that a more careful attention should be posed 
to the analysis of cooperation using the time consistent policies in a context in which 
























































































































































































3.A.1 Impact multipliers for fiscal policy
This section considers the implementation effects of changes in fiscal policy. These 
implementation multipliers ignore the announcement or "news" effects arising from 
initial jumps in the real exchange rate 52.
For the sake of brevity, we I will not present here all the implementation 
multipliers in detail 53. Interestingly enough, most of them correspond to the standard 
Mundell-Fleming multipliers. We will instead concentrate on the two of them that appear 
most interesting.
An increase in government spending is a locomotive policy 
3.A .,)
dG 2 U *  i f )
where:
1 + OC3G3 /  M
and
i f  m l - ( a ,  - a 2 ) « , +  t ( a 3 * ' '  >  A -
1 + 013^3 / M
This is quite distinct from the traditional Mundell-Fleming result, because the 
implementation effects do not take account of changes in the exchange rate. If the LM- 
curve slopes upwards, fiscal expansion induces an immediate expectation of a
dr**
depreciation of the real exchange rate (—=■ > 0). The appreciation of the exchange rate
dG
associated with the "news" effect occurring on impact further reinforces, through the 
increase in net imports, the locomotive aspects of fiscal expansion.
Finally, the "news'* effects of an initial jump iin the real exchange rate are
A model with current account dynamics and intertemporal budged constraints_________
52 It is convenient to solve the linearized short run IS-LM framework for Y and r in terms of G.T, and 
e(0), given D, F and M, in terms of global averages and differences (cf., Aoki, 1981).
53 These can be found in a longer and previous version of the this paper; see Bosco (1991b).
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3 A  2 ) d y d  _  2 Cm  + ^ a ( a l ~  a 2 1 +  <*3^3 /  M ] 1
de(0 ) Ad > 0
i  a i  \ dfd _ ^ [ a 3 ^ i /M -< P lC M + f(a1- a 2)d 1- l ] o ^  „
3 A 3 ) de(0 ) ~ ^ 3* 3 /M)Ad---------------> 0
Equation 3.A.2.) shows that the jump (an appreciation) in the real exchange rate 
reinforces the locomotive effect, but reduces the own multiplier effect of a fiscal 
expansion: i.e. it channels part of the expansion effect towards the foreign country. 
Equation 3.A.3.) is interesting, because it shows that overshooting of the real exchange 
rate is no longer the necessary consequence of a monetary disinflation. In other words, 
even if an interest rate differentia] in favour of the home country corresponds to the 
expected depreciation of the real exchange rate, the real exchange rate will depreciate
de(0 )
(rather than appreciate) on impact when (—= -  > 0) is positive (negative). This does not
dG
occur in more ad-hoc open-economy models (e.g. Buiter and Miller, 1982).
3.A.2 Steady-state multipliers for fiscal and monetary policy
In the long-run, output is at its full-employment level, inflation is determined by 
monetary growth and real interest rates are equalized throughout the world. The 
long-run multipliers evaluated around a zero inflation, zero debt, symmetric steady state 
can be easily found. We present here an intuitive graphical analysis (see figures 3.A.1 
and 3.A.2).
The upper right quadrant of the figure shows the goods market equilibrium 
conditions for both countries. In the case of domestic economy (GME locus) it is 
downward sloping because a depreciation of the real exchange rate boosts foreign 
demand for home goods, and the resulting excess of demand for home goods is to be 
choked off by a fall in the world real rate of interest. The opposite is the case of the 
foreign economy (GME* locus). The upper left quadrant gives the relation (WW locus) 
showing that the real wealth depends positively - coeteris paribus - on the real rate of 
interest. In the lower quadrant the locus CC is drawn. The total real consumption, other 
things remaining constant, is correlated positively with real wealth. Since countries are 
perfectly symmetric, these latter relations are the same for both economies. It is worth 
noting that all the relations also depend on the tax level: i.e. a change in the tax level will 
cause a shift in the curves.
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The simplest case to analyse is that when a fiscal expansion is financed with an 
increase in seigniorage (figure 3.A.1). This shifts the GME locus to the left, while the 
other curves are not affected, so that the real exchange rate appreciates and the real 
interest falls. The result is a symmetric fall in home and foreign wealth and, typically, 
private consumption. Since foreign expenditure on domestic goods also falls, while 
foreign export must increase, there will be a foreign trade surplus and thus a home trade 
deficit so there is less than 100% crowding out of private consumption. It follows that 
there must be an accumulation of net foreign assets in order to finance the steady state 
trade deficit.
In the case where a balanced-budget fiscal expansion (see figure 3.A.2) is 
considered, the question is less straightforward, since all curves shift with changes in 
taxes. GME shifts towards the left, but obviously less than in the previous case, but now 
also GME* shifts towards the right. Given our assumption about the preference for own 
goods i.e. a]XX2> the net effect will be an appreciation of the real exchange rate and a 
fall in the real interest rate although to a lesser extent than in the case where the increase 
in government spending is financed with money. The effect on wealth and consumption 
will no longer be symmetric because now the domestic curves describing wealth and 
consumption equilibrium will shift as shown in figure 3.A.2, while the foreign ones will 
not change. That means a greater steady-state reduction in consumption for the domestic 
economy, while foreign consumption decreases less than in the former case.
Finally, it is worth noticing that, as is quite common in this kind of model, 
monetary policy has no real effects in the long run. The only effect will be to a 
redistribution in the composition of real wealth: a higher level of the money stock and a 
lower level of domestic debt.
3.A3. Policy experiments
Table 3.A.I. shows the value of the parameters and the initial conditions used in the 
numerical simulations. The package used to run these simulations was the PS REM 
developed by Markink and Van der Ploeg (1989). The eigenvalues evaluated at steady 
state are also present in table 3.A.I. It is evident that the saddlepoint property is satisfied, 
since we have just one forward looking variable in our model, i.e. the real exchange rate.
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Table 3.A.1
Initial conditions r(0)=0.035 M(0)=9.93 CM(0)=0.183
Parameters d, =0.76 d, =0.76 d, =0.76 a, =0.45
a2 =0.20 a3 =0.35 <p=0.10 Ç=0.10
initial values r(0)=0.035 M(0)=9.93 CM(0)=0.183
Real part of eigenvalues -0.065 -0.065 -0.057 -0.057
-0.032 -0.032 -0.018 0.035
3.A.3.I. Monetary disinflation and unpleasant monetarist arithmetic
Sargent and Wallace (1981) argue that a monetary contraction implemented in 
order to reduce inflation, can yield the perverse result of an immediate increase in 
inflation. In this section we analyse the effect of a policy of monetary disinflation. First 
of all we examine the effect of a monetary contraction in the case where the 
announcement of a future fiscal adjustment is believed by the private agents. Then we 
turn to examine the case where agents forecast a future monetisation of the debt and 
evaluate the Sargent-Wallace argument.
Table 3.A.2a. shows the first scenario. A 10% decrease in the rate of growth of 
money is financed by a tax increase after twenty periods S4. A strong real appreciation of 
the domestic currency is obtained. This brings about a sharp redistribution of world 
demand in favour of the foreign country: domestic income and domestic consumption 
significantly fall while foreign income and foreign consumption increase. In the long-run, 
a real depreciation of the domestic currency is necessary to restore equilibrium in the 
goods market: a decrease in after-tax income entails an increase in export. Income and 
consumption in the domestic economy start increasing after the initial fall. But they fall 
sharply again when the fiscal adjustment comes into play. The disinflation measure is 
effective since the consumers' price significantly falls on impact. Then it increases until 
the moment at which the fiscal contraction takes places.
Table 3.A.2b concerns the case where a future fiscal adjustment is not credible, 
even if preannounced. Private agents expect a future monetisation of the accumulated 
debt. Note that a completely similar policy measure, i.e. a money contraction of 10%, has 
now completely different effects. First of all the own and spill-over effects are now 
generally smaller than before. This is due to the fact that only the timing i.e. the 
distribution over time, of the monetary policy has changed. Nevertheless, we may
54 Rom eq(10) we obtain thatATilOJs-expJjn* r(s)dsjA0(O)M(O)
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conclude that in this model monetary policy is effective in the short-run even in its 
mildest form of a postponement of money creation. A significant appreciation of the 
domestic currency is substituted by a light depreciation of the currency. Private agents, in 
fact, discount a future increase in money creation. This causes a redistribution of the 
world demand in favour of the domestic economy: domestic income and domestic 
consumption increase while the consumption and income of the foreign country decrease. 
This is just the impact effect, however. Income and consumption start soon to decrease in 
both countries, although to a lesser extent than in the former case. The disinflation policy 
has perverse effects, as Sargent and Wallace suggest. Consumer prices, in fact, increase 
on impact and continue increasing up to the long run value. A higher steady state rate of 
inflation is the only long-run effect of such a policy along with a redistribution of wealth 
between the stock of debt and the real stock of money.
3.A.3.2. A decrease in taxation 
Table 3.A.3a shows the effects of a cut in the domestic tax receipts when a policy rule "a* 
la Reagan" is used to stabilize the growth of the domestic debt, i.e. the tax cut precedes 
the reduction in government expenditure. The impact effects are those expected. The 
increase in after-tax income boosts domestic consumption. This short-run effect is 
positively, although less powerfully, transmitted to the foreign economy. Domestic and 
foreign inflation increase. A slight real depreciation of the domestic currency takes place. 
Domestic debt starts to accumulate, since the initial measure causes a budget deficit. This 
brings about a gradual reduction in government spending caused by the policy rale 
adopted to stabilize debt. Despite the initial depreciation of the currency, the initial 
positive income effect leads to a deficit on the current account followed by an increase in 
the foreign debt.
The long-run effect of this policy will be to induce a long term increase of 
consumption, although much of this increase has been brought about by a greater 
consumption of money balances caused by a higher real exchange rate. As far as goods 
consumption is concerned, the consumption of domestic goods increases at the expense 
of foreign goods. The new steady state level of the foreign debt shows that the foreign 
economy becomes a rentier economy, in the sense that it benefits from the initial cut in 
taxes. A final depreciation is needed in order to determine a current account surplus able 
to pay the interest on the foreign debt stock.
Table 3.A.3b shows the case where the same initial cut in the tax receipts comes 
along with a policy rule that links the increase in debt with the increase in taxes. The
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impact effect is very similar to the previous case. Soon after the dynamic pattern appears 
to be significantly different, apart from the dynamic path of domestic debt, which is 
independent of the mle used. The positive effect on real income last more periods than in 
the case where a rule on government spending is used.
The effect on consumption is more interesting. Since the burden of debt 
stabilization is now on taxes, the gradual increase in taxation brings about a gradual 
reduction of consumption. It is worth noting that this causes a less significant 
deterioration in the current account of the balance of payments. In this second scenario, 
then, the accumulation of foreign debt is significantly less, and, consequently, a less final 
depreciation of the real exchange rate is needed. The transfer of wealth in favour of the 
foreign country is much less significant in size than in the previous case.
3A3 3  A fiscal expansion 
As is well known, the effect of an increase of public spending depends crucially on the 
way in which such an increase is financed (Buiter, 1986) 55. In this section we will show 
that the effect of an increase in public spending financed by issuing government debt, can 
be very different both on impact and in the long nin, according to the way in which 
private agents expect the policy-maker to stabilize the debt We will compare two 
different scenarios: in the first we assume that private agents believe that the growing 
debt will be stabilized in the future by a fiscal adjustment - an increase in taxation; in the 
second we will assume that private agents expect the debt to be monetized in the future 
S6. The effect of the same initial measure is dramatically different in the two cases.
Table 3.A.4a (fiscal adjustment) and table 3.A.4b (monetary adjustment) depict 
the two different scenarios. In both cases domestic income and consumption increase on 
impact along with the inflation rate. The completely different behaviour of the real 
exchange rate on impact brings about a different transmission of the impact effect to the 
foreign country. In the former case the expectation of a fiscal adjustment determines a 
real appreciation of the domestic currency that in turn, directs part of the increase in the 
world demand towards foreign goods; in the latter case the expectation of an increase in
55 An increase in the provision of public goods can be financed in three different ways: by a current 
increase of taxation - balanced budget fiscal expansion -, by an increase in the rate of growth of money
- i.e. by seigniorage -, or by public debt In this latter case, however, in a model in which the 
intertemporal budget constraints of the government and of the private sector is explicitly taken into 
account a policy rule that stabilizes the debt has to be introduced.
56 A complete discussion of the effects of a fiscal expansion in this kind of model can be found in 
Bosco, (1991a).
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the rate of money creation causes a depreciation of the domestic currency, leading to the 
beggar-thy-neighbour effect of a domestic fiscal expansion 57.
As far as the dynamic effects are concerned, it goes without saying that the path 
of debt accumulation does not depend on the nature of the adjustment but rather on its 
timing: the later the adjustment is implemented, the higher the size of the new steady 
state debt stock will be. It is worth noting that foreign debt in the domestic country rises 
fast in the first case, because it is driven by initial appreciation and by the income effect. 
In the case where a monetary adjustment is expected, on the other hand, the accumulation 
of foreign debt is less rapid in the short run and throws back in the long run. It is evident 
in this second case, that the inflation rate, which in the short-nin overshoots the new long 
run equilibrium, ends up with a positive value - just equal to the new rate of growth of 
nominal money.
Figure 3.A.3a and 3.A.3b show the different behaviour of the real exchange rate 
following a fiscal expansion: if a future fiscal adjustment is expected, a slight real 
appreciation on impact is followed by a further appreciation; after the fiscal adjustment a 
moderate gradual depreciation is needed (figure 3.A.3a). On the other hand if a monetary 
future adjustment is expected, the exchange rate depreciates on impact, and gradually 
starts to appreciate toward a new steady state value (figure 3.A.3b). Thus a fiscal 
expansion can be followed by a real depreciation of the exchange rate, even if the money 
supply has not changed, if fiscal authorities are not expected to adjust fiscal policy in the 
future (Galli and Masera, 1988).
The lesson to be drawn from this exercise, if any, is that, in the presence of a 
large public sector deficit, merely changing the expectations of future measure of 
stabilization of debt can have sharp effects on the domestic and foreign variables, and 
especially on the exchange rate.
57 Since fiscal policy was found to be a locomotive policy, if we consider the impact multipliers (see 
(18)) which neglect the "news” effects, this means that these latlers are strong enough to more than 
offset such a positive effect
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Table 3.A.2a
0 3 19 20 oc
Domestic economy
D 0 3.14 26.79 28.76 28.76
M 0 1.74 -185 -1.87 1.79
Y -0.85 -0.68 0.37 -1.10 0
C -1.18 -0.64 1.16 -1.65 -U 7
cm 0J2 0.29 0.25 -0.31 -0.57
n' -0.09 -0.07 0.01 -0.13 -0.1
r 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.09 0.04
Foreign economy
0 -4.63 -17.11 -17.52 -0.98
Y• 0.85 0.64 -0.03 -1.09 0
C* 1.18 0.56 -0.64 —0.25 1,27
cz -0 J 2 -0J0 -0.15 -0 J 6 0.57
**• 0.09 0.07 0.02 -0.07 0
r* -0.12 -0.10 0.00 0.06 0.04
World economy
t -2.86 -2.14 -0.12 -0.07 1.64
F 0 -0.41 -7.32 -3.93 -23.76
Table 3.A.2b
0 3 19 20 GO
Domestic economy
D 0 3.1410 36.796 28.76 28.76
M 0 -2.9377 —21.336 -22.87 -28.76
Y 0.0010 -0.0244 0.287 0J1 0
C 0.0010 -0.0499 0.436 0.48 0
Cm -0.0004 -0.0132 0.013 0.01 0
** 0.0001 0.0002 0.062 0.07 0.10
r -0.0002 0.0075 0.037 004 0
Foreign economy
0 0.0534 1.350 1.42 0
r * -0.0010 -0.0244 0.052 0.06 0
c* -0.0014 -0.0258 0.066 0.10 0
a 0.0004 -0.0019 0.091 010 0
I* * -0.0001 -0.0060 -0017 -0.02 0
f* 00002 0.0023 0.006 001 0
World economy
€ 0.0035 0.0165 0378 0.40 0
F 0 0.0139 0244 025 0
95
A model with current account dynamics and intertemporal budged constraints
Table 3.A.3a
0 3 20 oc
Domestic economy
D 0 0.27 1.11 1.53
M 0 -0.17 0.52 1.23
Y 0.08 0.02 -0.05 0
C 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.18
cm 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.02
0.79 0.48 -0.64 0
r
Foreign economy
-0.26 0 0.30 0.21
M* 0 -0.17 -0.19 -0.04
Ym 0 0.03 -0.01 0
C• 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.05
Cl 0.01 0.01 - 0.01 0.07
**• OSO 0.33 -051 0
r* -0 3 3 -0.26 0.30 0.21
World economy
€ 0.20 0.71 10.17 31.24
F 0 -0.04 -0 2 0 -1.00
Percentage deviations (expect r, r*, x* x** and e, for which it is 
100 tones the absolute deviation).
Table 3.A.3a
0 3 20 00
Domestic economy
D 0 0.27 1.11 1J3
M 0 -0.05 -0.95 -0.71
Y 0.07 0.05 -0.02 0
C 0.14 0.11 -0.04 -0.30
Cm 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.20
** 0.78 0.79 -0.01 0
r —0.25 -0.31 0.19 0.13
Foreign economy
M* 0 -0.23 -0.46 -0.02
y * 0 0.27 -0.03 0
C* 0.05 0.04 -0.04 0.03
cs 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.02
0.51 0J0 -0 1 8 0
f* -0.34 -0.31 0.20 0.13
World economy
e 0.01 0.17 -0.25 4.42
F 0 -0.05 -0.26 -0.64
Percentage deviations (expect r, r*. x* and c, for which it it 
100 times the absolute deviation).
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Table 3.A.4a
0 3 20 cc
Domestic economy
D 0 0.55 189 2.89
M 0 -1.18 —4.39 -2.62
Y 0.22 0.16 -0.15 0
C 0.22 0.14 -0.41 -0.21
cm 0.04 0.04 -0.06 -0.02
ire 1.91 224 -0.07 0
r -1.38 -1.58 0.01 0.20
Foreign economy 
M* 0 -0.50 -1.81 -0.04
Y• 0.08 0.06 -0.15 0
C* 0.08 0.05 -021 0.05
cz 0.02 0.01 -0.07 0.01Jt** 1.09 1.37 -0.07 0
r* -0.53 -0.75 0.55 0.20
World economy
€ -0.17 -4.42 -13.73 -9.12
F 0 -0.15 -0.71 -1.00
Percentage deviations (expect r, r*, x4 x** and for which it is 
100 times the absolute deviation).
Table 3.A.4b
0 3 20 00
Domestic economy
p 0 035 189 ¿.8V
M 0 -1.92 —639 -5.69
Y 030 021 -0.01 0
c 034 0.17 -0.20 -0.08
cm 0.01 0.01 -0.02. 0.03
** 185 2.96 1.95 103
r -169 -149 -038 -029
Foreign economy 
M * 0 0.24 0.10 0.06
V* -0.01 0.02 -aoi 0
c-
a
-0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.08
0.05 0.03 -ao2 -007
0.14 0.65 0.10 0
r* -0.77 0.16 -0.07
-029
World economy
28.76 13.44 -8.84 -25.64€
F 0 -0.06 0.12
1.42p  ____________— U .U O __________ V - » *  ___________
Percentage deviations (expert r. r*. k* «*• and e, for which it is 
100 times the absolute deviation).
97
Part II. Policy coordination in a European
Perspective
Exchange rate system and policy coordination: evidence from the EMS
4. Exchange rate system and policy coordination: the European 
experience
When the European countries decided to start the process of real and financial market 
integration, they were faced by what became known as the problem of the inconsistent 
quartet. As Padoa Schioppa clearly pointed out, one cannot simultaneously have free real 
goods circulation, financial integration, fixed exchange rates and independent monetary 
policies. Two different solutions of the problem were available:
- centralising the monetary policy making either via strict coordination among national 
central banks or via the creation of a common European central bank assigned with 
responsibility for monetary policy,
- arranging an asymmetric fixed exchange rate system in which one country chooses the 
monetary policy while the others keep their nominal exchange rates fixed.
The Delors report first, and the Maastricht Treaty later, solved the problem by 
postponing the accomplishment of the first scenario to a sufficiently far future, and 
adopted the second solution as the short run solution to the problem. Therefore the hard 
EMS was presented as the best possible route to European monetary integration. It is now 
generally accepted that this choice was much more due to political opposition than to 
economic optimality.
Nevertheless, there is some theoretical underpinning to this choice. First of all, it 
has been widely argued that the fixed exchange rate system can be seen as a surrogate for 
full and explicit cooperation of monetary policy (Hughes Hallet, Holtham and 
Hutson, 1989) and can replicate the effects of the more thorough-going coordination of 
monetary policies. This potentiality was already noticed by Oudiz and Sachs in their 
seminal paper on policy coordination. Under flexible exchange rates there is the 
temptation to use monetary and fiscal policy to move the exchange rate in a beggar-thy- 
neighbour manner; assuming symmetry among countries, as far as economic structure 
and policy objectives are concerned, this results in excessive deflation or inflation 
depending on whether there is a tendency towards competitive appreciation or 
depreciation. The use of the fixed rate arrangement as a system to avoid the competitive 
use of the exchange rate seems of particular importance in the case of the European 
countries which decide to complete and to defend the internal integrated market.
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Secondly, the targeting of the exchange rate can be seen as an objective per se, in the case 
in which the exchange rate may be subject to excess volatility and or speculative bubbles; 
these may be undesirable in themselves, if policy makers care about exchange rate 
stability, or may cause resource misallocation.
Therefore exchange rate targeting as a surrogate for more a explicit cooperation 
appears to be an appealing proposal since it allows saving on transaction costs, 
information costs, and reduces political difficulties implied by full cooperation.
This part of the thesis will explore this proposal principally with respect to the 
European environment. I shall follows two different lines of enquiry: this chapter, treats 
the issue from a historical perspective by analysing the record of the EMS in order to 
verify whether the European fixed rate arrangement worked well enough as surrogate for 
a more complete form of cooperation and as a viable route towards monetary unification. 
In chapter S, instead, the topic will be analysed theoretically by using a three country 
version of the model proposed in chapter 2.
4.1. The rise and the fall of the European Monetary System
In September 1992 the European monetary system was hit by serious crisis. Two leading 
members of the Community, Italy and Great Britain, were forced to withdraw from the 
system. A number of weak currencies, like the Spanish peseta and the Irish pound, were 
repeatedly devalued. The crisis came after a relatively long period of stability and when 
progress towards monetary union seemed definitively under way. The periods of 
turbulence that preceded and followed the crisis did not involve only the weak currencies, 
witnessed by the repeated speculative attacks on the French franc, apparently one of the 
strongest of the European currencies. To many observers, the crisis of the EMS appeared 
to be a crisis of the system as a whole, albeit aggravated by the marked weakness of 
certain currencies. This view was validated when the system failed to overcome the 
second major crisis in the summer of 1993: the width of the bands of oscillation 
dramatically increaseed from ±2.25% to ±15%. It is self-evident that with the new band 
width what remains of the EMS can hardly be defined as a fixed exchange rates system.
There is no doubt, therefore, that analysis of the elements which permitted the 
rise, and of the factors that caused the fall, of the European monetary system is important 
for several reasons, and it appears to be crucial if the route towards European monetary 
Union is to be redrawn. It is interesting to analyse whether the system was deviced and 
actually worked as a surrogate for more strict policy coordination among European
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countries or whether, on the contrary, the lack of adequate coordination of monetary and 
fiscal policy among European countries was one of the most important factors inducing 
the crisis.
Answering the question requires analysis of the principal characteristics of the 
EMS. Since its creation, however, the system has undergone substantial changes. Initially 
it was a system of fixed, but cooperatively adjustable, exchange rates, explicitly designed 
to be symmetric and flexible and intended to combine the advantages of a cooperative 
response to possible external shocks with the advantages deriving from a certain amount 
of monetary independence. This early period was characterised by frequent realignments, 
while large inflation differentials also imposed frequent readjustments. In the next period, 
from 1986 onwards, the system abandoned all pretence to symmetry and was marked by 
its stability; realignments became increasingly rare until they ceased altogether between 
1987 and the onset of the crisis in 1992 (if one excludes the technical, so to speak, 
devaluation of the lira following the narrowing of its fluctuation bands in 1990).
With a certain amount of approximation, we may say that in the first phase the 
system was not significantly different from a "crawling peg" system, in the second phase 
it came more closely to resemble one with fixed exchange rates.
In what follows I will concentrate on the economic rationale for belonging to the 
EMS as it was in its golden age: namely, a system with full capital mobility, with 
increasing financial integration, highly asymmetric "almost completely fixed" exchange 
rates, in which Germany decided monetary policy for the whole system and the other 
countries commited themselves to maintaining the parity of their currencies against the 
mark.
4.2. Advantages of the EMS
Four principal arguments have been advanced in justification of the EMS.
(i) it is an instrument which reduces uncertainty over exchange rates and
therefore encourages infra-community trade;
(ii) it is a surrogate for more complete and explicit coordination of monetary
policies;
(iii) it is an instrument with which to achieve greater inflationary discipline;
(iv) it is the obligatory path towards monetary union.
To these can be added a fifth argument, one more specifically political in 
character and which the system's founders certainly had in mmd: the EMS favours the
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greater integration and unity of the European countries. Political considerations also seem 
to have been the basis for the decision by the weaker countries, like Italy, to join: 
exclusion from the currency agreement was frequently perceived as exclusion from the 
process of European integration and, implicitly, as exclusion from the future share-out of 
the advantages from this integration combined with progressive economic and political 
marginalization. Pointing this out is important for the following two reasons. Firstly, this 
attitude seems to be resurfacing now that the step towards further monetary integration 
seems near at hand. Secondly, Britain's experience shows that its belated membership of 
the EMS did not prevent it from folly reaping the advantages of Community integration.
The four arguments set out above are not mutually exclusive, except for (ii) and
(iii). They represent the chief interpretations of the EMS; interpretations which are often 
in conflict with each other because they are two different and opposing ways of resolving 
the problem known as the 'paradigm of n degrees of freedom'. * In a particular currency 
area, there can be one and one only monetary authority. Therefore, either political and 
economic independence is granted to only one country (Great Britain during the period of 
the Gold Standard, die United States during the Bretton Woods period) thus giving rise 
to a hegemonic system, or the responsibility for monetary policy is divided equally 
among the countries in the union, giving rise to a cooperative system.
This is not the place for examination of the above arguments one by one, or for 
extensive analysis of the debate between the advocates of the disciplinary and 
cooperative interpretations of the EMS. The reader is referred to a number of recent 
publications for detailed treatment of the topic 2. I shall instead seek to assess how far 
these arguments exert a positive influence on the decision to rejoin the EMS.
4.2.1. Exchange rate uncertainty and infra-community trade
Numerous empirical studies have confirmed that the EMS has brought significant 
reductions in uncertainty over exchange rates among member countries •*. Still 
controversial, however, is the question of whether this important outcome has been 
achieved at the cost of increased uncertainty over other variables, for instance short-term 
interest rates (Artis and Taylor 1988, Rogoff 1985a).
1 If n countries join a currency union, in which exchange rates are fixed, only n-1 parities can be 
predetermined and there is a degree of freedom in fixing the common monetary policy.
2 See, for example, De Grauwe 1992, Fraiianni and von Hagen 1992, Gross and Thygesen 1992.
3 See Fratianni and von Hagen 1990a, Rogoff 1985a, Artis and Taylor 1988, Weber 1990
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More relevant to the present purposes is Fratianni and von Hagen's (1990b) 
finding that there is a trade-off between uncertainty about exchange rates within the EMS 
and uncertainty about exchange rates among currencies internal and external to it. 
Obviously, the importance of this phenomenon depends on the share of infra-community 
trade of each individual economy. According to Fratianni and van Hagen, reduced 
uncertainty over infra-EMS exchange rates has been accompanied by increased 
uncertainty over the dollar, yen and sterling exchange rates. This result squares with the 
observation that the variance in the effective exchange rate has not changed for the EMS 
countries (Ungerer et al. 1986).
The extent to which reduced uncertainty over exchange rates among the EMS 
member countries has stimulated infra-community trade is, to say the least, ambiguous. 
Inspection of the figures in Table 4.2.1 seems to suggest a perverse and negative effect. 
The fall in export shares within the EMS, however, can be partially explained by the 
lower rate of growth achieved by the European countries compared with the other 
industrialised countries.
Table 4.2.1.
Relative shares of EMS exports in percentages
Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Holland EMS
1976 79.3 34.3 66.3 57.5 64.3 76.0 64.1
1978 77,3 40.3 65.2 55.6 62.6 76.6 63.1
1980 74.8 42.8 64.8 55.8 62.8 77.0 63.3
1982 72.5 41.6 61.4 54.5 59.3 74.8 60.9
1984 70.3 37.0 58.0 50.3 54.6 72.9 57.3
1986 72.5 39.3 58.1 48.2 55.6 71.5 56.4
1988 74.9 49.8 61.6 54.3 57.5 75.3 59.9
1990 75.9 52.1 62.8 54.5 58.6 77.3 61.4
1991 76.0 54.1 63.6 55.0 59.4 76.9 n.a
Note: relative shares are given by the ratio between exports to EMS countries and total exports. 
______ Source: Fratianni and van Hagen 1990b updated with EUROSTAT figures.________
4.22. The EMS and the credibility of monetary policy
The interpretation of the EMS as an instrument with which to apply inflationary 
discipline on errant member countries acquired increasing plausibility during the 1980s 
(Giavazzi and Pagano 1988, Giavazzi and Giovannini 1987,1988,1989).
The basic idea stems from Barro and Gordon's (1983) model: a positive level of 
equilibrium inflation comes about when the central bank is unable to make credible 
commitment to a policy of zero inflation. Because the rate of inflation depends directly
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on the preferences of the policy maker, Rogoff (1985b) proposes the appointment of a 
"conservative" central banker, i.e. a governor with strong anti-inflationary preferences, as 
an effective anti-inflationary measure. Countries with low credibility may, by 
undertaking to fix their parities to the mark, delegate their monetary policy to the 
Bundesbank, which under this arrangement assumes the role of conservative governor.
For an explanation of this kind to be coherent, the following hypotheses must be 
confirmed:
(a) the credibility lacking on the side of monetary policy must be present on that 
of exchange policy;
(b) the fixed exchange rate agreement must be advantageous to the member 
countries;
(c) inflation must be entirely the result of the monetary authority's inability to 
commit itself to optimal policies;
(d) the system must operate asymmetrically: Germany decides monetary policy 
for the entire area, and each country fixes its parity with the mark.
4 1 1 1  The credibility of the exchange rate arrangement 
Even if Barro and Gordon's model is accepted, one must still explain why fixing the 
exchange rate is a policy capable of achieving the credibility that a policy of fixing 
monetary policy instead lacks. The reason cannot be the fact that the exchange rate is a 
variable which is more easily observed and monitored, because Barro and Gordon's 
model presupposes that also the quantity of money, or other possible indicators of 
monetary policy, are perfectly known to private agents. The explanation must lie 
externally to the model and must postulate that devaluation incurs costs of a political 
nature which balance out the incentive of the monetary authority to devalue 
unexpectedly. These costs may be justified by the fact that (a) devaluation is usually 
perceived as a failure of government policy, and (b) the entire community regards 
devaluation as a blow to the country's international prestige.
4.2.2.2 The advantages of the exchange rate arrangement 
Even if the exchange rate policy is taken for granted, the economic convenience for both 
the high inflation country, say Italy, and the low inflation country, say Germany, of 
adhering to a rigid exchange rate agreement does not follow automatically. Under the 
hypothesis that Germany does not change its policy after the agreement, the advantages 
for Italy are assured: it obtains an inflation rate lower than it could achieve with flexible
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rates, and without costs in terms of lower output 4. This hypothesis, however, is 
untenable in Barro and Gordon's model: the exchange rate agreement alters the trade-off 
between inflation and output perceived by the German policy-maker by diminishing the 
costs in terms of inflation of an unannounced increase in the money supply. The Bank of 
Italy follows the Bundesbank’s monetary policy and therefore "imports” part of the 
inflation generated by German monetary expansion Which means that the rate of 
inflation of the whole system is higher than Germany's would be in a regime of flexible 
exchange rates. This outcome raises two problems: the advantage to Italy is no longer 
guaranteed, but now depends on the parameters of the model;'* the disadvantage to 
Germany is, instead, unequivocal. One has to explain, therefore, why Germany should 
decide to adhere to an exchange agreement of this kind with Italy. Once again the 
explanation, if one exists, lies externally to the model.**
From what has been said, it appears that the theoretical justification for the EMS 
as an instrument with which to achieve otherwise impossible monetary discipline is 
incomplete and unsatisfactory. Of course, this does not mean that the EMS has not 
played a part in reducing and converging the inflation rates of the member countries. In 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of this role of the EMS, analysis of the empirical 
results is required.
Figure 4.2.1 compares the average trend of inflation in the countries that belong 
to the EMS with those of the principal countries that do not. Whereas in the first phase of 
the EMS, the performance of the EMS countries was clearly inferior to that of the non- 
EMS ones, from 1987 onwards the average inflation rate of the EMS countries was lower 
than that of the non-EMS ones. At first sight, therefore, these figures seem to confirm the 
view that the EMS operates as a disciplinary instrument. In the second phase of the EMS, 
in fact, when the fixing of parities gained credibility, this mechanism came into 
operation. Some remarks, however, are in order.
4 This does not explain the advantageousness to Germany of this arrangement. See below, however.
5 It has been shown that the greater the integration between the two countries, the less Italy benefits 
from participating in a fixed exchange regime.
6 It has been proposed, for example, that Germany draws advantage, in terms of trade, from the 
tendency of other currencies to be overvalued in real terms with respect to the mark. (Melitz 1988 and 
Giavazzi and Pagano 1988). Although not without a certain validity, this explanation has two 
consequences which should be stressed. Fust, it presupposes that the Italian inflation rate is slow in 
converging with the German rate, and this contradicts the base hypotheses of Barro and Gordon s 
model, and in any case it only holds for the period of adjustment. Second, it confers chronic instability 
on the system by hypothesising persistent trade imbalances.
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Figure 4.2.1.
Appreciable disinflation and the downwards convergence of inflation rates are 
not features exclusive to the countries belonging to the EMS 7  Although, therefore, a 
reduction in inflation more or less comparable to that achieved by the EMS countries was 
also obtained by non-EMS countries in Europe - Great Britain and Spain for example - 
the disciplinary approach can still be defended by arguing that the costs of disinflation 
have been lower in the EMS countries. The studies so far carried out in this regard, 
however, fail to support this thesis. Giavazzi and Spa venta (1989) and Dombusch (1988) 
have calculated "sacrifice ratios" inside and outside the EMS without finding significant
g
differences between the two blocks of countries. De Grauwe (1990) has used a "misery 
index" - unemployment plus inflation - as a measurement of the cost of disinflation. This 
index has always been higher in the EMS countries than in certain OECD countries, both
7 Two important factors account for this widespread process. Fust, all countries, belonging to the EMS 
or otherwise, were affected during the 1980s by the same inflation-reducing shocks. Second, these 
years were marked by a general change in both the politico-social equilibria that restricted the growth 
of labour costs and in the attitudes of the economic policy authorities, which became increasingly less 
willing to sustain the economy by expanding internal demand.
8 The 'sacrifice ratio' is the ratio between the amount of unemployment accumulated since a base year 
and the total reduction in inflation.
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before and after 1979, and, more interestingly, it increased after 1980 in the EMS 
countries.
4-2-23 The "excess of credibility" hypothesis 
Should inflation prove to have causes which differ at least partially from the monetary 
authorities lack of credibility, a fixed exchange rate policy would have higher costs in 
real terms and lower advantages in terms of inflation. In this case, in fact, the inflationary 
differential would tend to persist, thereby creating a tendency towards the revaluation of 
the real exchange rate; and the inflation differential would, moreover, weaken the 
credibility of the commitment to exchange stability.
Figure 4.2.2
Figure 4.2.2. shows the differential between the inflation rates of Italy and 
Germany. The tendency for the differential to diminish is obvious; it slows noticeably 
after 1987 and reverses direction in 1990. This pattern contradicts the theory, given that it
9 According to De Grauwe, this result can be explained by the slower process of disinflation in the 
EMS countries. Countries outside the EMS mostly resorted to shock therapy which provoked a shaip 
but short-lived recession. In the EMS countries, however, disinflation was more gradual and extended 
the economic costs over a longer tiroe-span. Only by assuming a high degree of policy 
shortsightedness among the EMS countries, i.e. a high intertemporal discount rate, can one maintain 
that the costs of disinflation have been lower in the EMS countries.
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was precisely in this latter period that the nominal exchange rate between the lira and the 
mark remained stable. This testifies to the credibility acquired by the fluctuation band 
and indicates that the EMS as an instrument of monetary discipline should function 
better. The persistence of an inflationary differential seems to show that Italian inflation 
is caused by factors other than the ability of the Italian authorities to pursue credible anti- 
inflationary policies. Should this be confirmed, on the one hand the costs in terms of 
output of a disinflation policy based on fixed exchange rates would increase, because of 
the continuous revaluation of the exchange rate; on the other, the system would be 
balanced on a knife-edge. In fact, as soon as the market realised that the inflation 
differential was destined to persist, provoking excessive costs in terms of 
competitiveness and payments imbalances for the economy with the higher inflation, 
expectations of devaluation would intensify and the central parity would no longer be 
defensible.
The following explanation of the persistence of an inflation differential has been 
proposed. When central parities gain credibility, and expectations of the devaluation of 
the currencies of the countries with high inflation are therefore reduced to the minimum, 
nominal interest rates rapidly converge, while real rates tend to be lower in the higher- 
inflation countries: an effect in itself perverse and which, by stimulating demand in the 
high-inflation countries, would slow down the reduction of the inflationary differential. 
In the recent past, Alan Walters (1986) has cited this perverse effect to advise against 
English participation in the EMS. A similar argument has been subsequently advanced 
by several writers (Giavazzi and Spaventa 1990, and Bini Smaghi and Micossi 1990) and 
labelled the 'paradox of excessive credibility'. The crucial point in this argument is that 
the impact of credible commitment on exchange rate stability is greater on the financial 
markets than on the commodities and labour ones, where expectations are revised more 
slowly. However, should anyone seek empirical confirmation for these hypotheses, they 
will find it difficult to come by: although it is undeniable that demand in real terms has 
grown more in Italy than in Germany - a result which confirms the hypothesis - real 
interest rates tended to increase in both absolute terms and relative to Germany's during 
the years of Italy's membership of the EMS, and this contradicts the hypothesis.^ The 
further observation concerning the persistence of a high differential in nominal long-term 
rates is difficult to reconcile with the hypothesis of excessive credibility.
10 The recent empirical study by Artis (1992) confirms this scepticism.
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4-2.2.4 The German dominance hypothesis 
For the interpretative hypothesis of the EMS as an instrument of monetary discipline to 
be coherent, it is necessary for the European monetary system to function in a perfectly 
asymmetric manner. Germany fixes monetary policy for the entire area and the other 
countries fix their currencies according to the marie. This has been called the German 
Dominance Hypothesis (GDH).
The empirical evidence so far available (Fratianni and von Hagen 1990a, Cohen 
and Wyplosz 1989, Weber 1990, among others), however, rejects this hypothesis. The 
position of the Bundesbank in the EMS seems better described as one of long-term 
independence, not of dominance (Fratianni and von Hagen 1992).
This result should be interpreted with care, since at first sight it may appear 
contradictory. The paradigm of the n degrees of freedom entails that the independence of 
the German monetary authority must inevitably be accompanied by the dependence of 
the other central banks. This contradiction, however, is only apparent if one remembers 
the two release valves that the system frequently used until the 1990s: the realignment of 
exchange rates, and the restriction of capital movements by means of administrative 
controls. These two mechanisms ensured that German independence did not 
automatically turn into dominance. This, however, obliges us to conclude that in a 
situation in which these two release valves were definitively closed, German hegemony 
would effectively come about.
However, the stability of a system of fixed exchange rates under German 
dominance, in which monetary policy was determined exclusively by the Bundesbank, 
and in which inflation differentials tended to persist, would be rather low, unless one 
assumes that one of the aims of the Bundesbank was to guarantee the stability of the 
system by refraining from policies which would undermine its stability. In this case, 
however, the interpretative model would no longer be the one based on German 
dominance and would instead become a system based on cooperation among monetary 
policies.
4 , The persistence of an inflationary differential: an alternative explanation 
The persistence of an inflationary differential comes much less as a surprise if one 
abandons the rather simplistic hypothesis of the existence of one sole good - a hypothesis 
that has been overworked in the most recent models of international finance. If, instead, 
one also considers goods that are not internationally tradable, the rate of inflation of one
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country may remain higher than that of another - even in the presence of fixed nominal 
exchange rates - if the relative price of non-tradable goods persistently rises.
The price level is equal to a weighed average of the price of tradable goods (pT), 
which the fixed exchange rate equalises, and of non-tradable goods (p^T):
p,= ® p! + ( 1 ^
Dividing both members by the price of tradable goods, we obtain:
n nvr
-^ r  = £D + (l-CD)-^r
Pi P,
It is obvious that in order for the rate of inflation in a country to be higher than that in
p,
another country (so that — increases over time), the relative price of non-tradable,
P,
NT
-4=-, must increase in a persistent manner. Figure 4.2.3. shows that this increase in the 
P.
relative price of non-tradable has, in fact, been the main force working against the 
convergence of Italian inflation towards the German and French rates. This figure shows 
the ratio between the value added prices in the service sector and in the industrial sector: 
whereas this increases in Italy, it tends to decrease in both Germany and France.
It is therefore evident that, far from being entirely due to the monetary 
authorities' lack of credibility, Italian inflation also stems from structural factors 
sustaining the endogenous component of inflation. Exhaustive treatment of these 
mechanisms would be beyond the purview of this paper (see Barca and Visco 1992 and 
Visco 1992). It is clear, however, that the low rate of productivity growth in services, 
combined with an adjustment of the levels of wages growth to those obtaining in 
industrial sectors, where productivity growth has been higher, is a major cause of the 
increase in the relative price of services.
The most important consequence of the persistence of inflationary differentials 
concerns the stability of the system and the credibility of the central parities. Given the 
entirely free movement of capital, the credibility of the central parities appears to be 
crucial for the stability of the system. However, in the presence of permanent inflationary 
differentials, this credibility rapidly disappears due to costs in terms of lost 
competitiveness for the country with the highest inflation, and due to the trade 
disequilibria that derive from it.
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Figure 4.2.3.
Growth differentials between value added prices of services and of goods:
(1985 prices = 1)
____Ita ly ,____ Germany, .„„France
Source: Visco (1992) fig. 7
4.2JL6. The EMS as an instrument of inflationary discipline 
Theoretical analysis and empirical evidence seem to agree in stressing that the EMS, at 
least until the mid-1980s, was unable to perform the role of an instrument of inflationary 
discipline that the theory advocated. The countries belonging to the EMS did not show a 
disinflationary process significantly different from that of countries outside the 
agreement; they did not sustain significantly lower costs (indeed some studies maintain 
the contrary); the German dominance hypothesis, necessary for the coherence of the 
theory, was rejected by econometric studies; the underlying theoretical model appeared 
weak and unable to explain the phenomenon. When subsequent financial liberalisation 
and the rejection of the realignment instrument rendered this interpretative model 
theoretically viable, the EMS displayed high instability because of the persistence of the 
inflationary differential.
Of course, this does not mean that the exchange rate system played no role in the 
disinflation process. Certainly, on the one hand the political superstructure of the EMS 
and its functioning mechanism with, on the other, the short-term stabilising role that the
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fluctuation bands can fulfil when parities are credible, enabled Italy to pursue a policy of 
a strong lira which otherwise would probably have been impossible. Membership of the 
EMS and the refusal to undertake compensatory devaluations of the inflationary 
differential broke the inflation/deflation spiral that typified the decade 197S-85. The 
external constraint imposed by the EMS, moreover, provided the Italian government with 
justification for its unpopular policies and rendered it less susceptible to demands for 
compensatory policies by the social partners. However, the most important reasons for 
the disinflation process in Italy lie elsewhere. Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989) have 
stressed that certain politico-social events, such as the 1984 referendum on the wage- 
indexing system ("scala mobile"), had a much more marked effect on expectations of 
inflation caused by membership of the EMS.
The consequences of the argument so far can be summarised as follows. If one 
entirely accepts the credibility hypothesis, then a "hard" EMS, i.e. one with practically 
immutable parities, becomes essential to maximise the benefits of belonging to the EMS. 
If, instead, one assumes a somewhat less critical attitude towards the credibility 
hypothesis, then also a "soft" EMS, one which does not dispense with the realignment 
instrument, may provide valuable assistance in the struggle against inflation. While the 
former option raises serious problems of stability and rigidity, the latter appears relatively 
more stable and certainly more flexible.
4 2 J . The EMS as the obligatory path to monetary union
The European monetary system has been often described as a necessary component in the
transition phase towards more complete monetary union. The costs of belonging to an
exchange arrangement, therefore, must be assessed not only in terms of the advantages of
the EMS in itself, but also and principally in terms of the future advantages of monetary
union. Of course, this assertion only makes sense if one considers the present system to
12be a credible path towards complete monetary union.
The Treaty of Maastricht, which in part endorses and in part modifies the 
celebrated Delors Report (1989), describes the three phases required to achieve monetary
11 Note that this statement raises doubts over the theory that holds that inflation results from a lack of 
credibility: limiting the wage index-linking in the models used by theoreticians of this school should 
have the opposite result, given that it positively adjusts the trade-off perceived by the policy-maker 
between inflation and employment.
121 shall not go into the debate on the advantages and disadvantages of monetary union, taking it as 
granted (with a goodly dose of optimism) that a monetary union with a single currency brings net 
advantages.
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union. The first phase, by now concluded, involves complete financial liberalisation 
among the countries of the Community. The third phase involves the birth of monetary 
union; that is, it stipulates that exchange rates become irrevocably fixed, although what 
the actual features of this union should be, whether national currencies are to remain or 
whether they are to be superseded by a single European currency, is not made clear. The 
second phase comprises the crucial period of transition towards monetary union, and it 
warrants closer examination.
There are two possible paths to monetary union. The more rapid path, based on
shock therapy, envisages the rapid realisation of monetary union; most of the monetary
14unions in history have followed this path. The monetary unification which recently 
took place in Germany came about suddenly and, technically, with success. ^
The path chosen by the EEC countries with the Maastricht Treaty, though, is that 
of a slow and gradual approach; a path which raises two rather important problems.
In the absence of close coordination of economic policies, and with the 
persistence of full political and economic autonomy, each national government will be 
induced to pursue policies apparently incompatible with the objective of the monetary 
stability of the future union. In other words, there will be an incentive for each country to 
present itself on unification day with an inflation rate, a public deficit and a stock of 
public debt standing higher than the average of the other countries, so that it can off-load 
part of the adjustment costs on its European partners. To overcome this obstacle, the 
treaty envisages that passage to union will not be automatic, but that it will instead be 
conditional on the satisfaction of certain convergence criteria.^ The cuirency constraint 
imposed by the EMS. with its narrow fluctuation bands may, first, make it easier to 
achieve these objectives, both directly in the case of the inflation rate convergence, and 
indirectly by the restrictions it would impose on fiscal authorities. Second, it represents,
13 From a strictly theoretical point of view, the recipe is simple. On a specified day the citizens of the 
European countries convert their national currencies into, say, ECUs at a specific rate of exchange. 
Thereafter the ECU is the sole currency of the Community. The European Central Bank becomes the 
issuing institution and the authority of monetary policy.
14 Information on monetary unification in Germany and Italy can be found in Holtfrench 1989 and 
Sannucci 1989.
15 On German monetary union see Kalmbach 1992 and Wills 1991.
16 A country can join the EMU only if: (i) its rate of inflation is no more than 1.5% higher than the 
average of the lowest three rates of inflation among the EMS countries; (ii) its long-term interest rate 
must be no mote than 2% higher than the average rate of the three countries with lowest inflation; (iii) 
it must not have devalued in the three years leading up to the union; (iv) its public deficit must not 
exceed 3% of its GDP, (v) its public debt must not exceed 60% of its GDP.
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within the logic of the treaty, the ideal environment for a gradual approach to monetary 
union.
The following proposition seems to underlie this position: the European
countries do not exhibit real and profound divergences and disequilibria, neither
internally nor among themselves, and the only source of turbulence and instability is their 
17national governments. The best policy in this case is to limit to the maximum the 
discretionary powers of the economic policy-malcers, by constraining their action to that 
of an external institution which enjoys full autonomy: while the exchange agreement 
constrains the monetary authorities, the non-entry clauses constrain the fiscal policy­
makers. Only from this point of view can the reversal of the means-end nexus underlying 
the Maastricht Treaty be understood: it is not monetary union that enables disequilibria 
and disparities to be overcome and induces convergence of macroeconomics indicators; 
rather it is the convergence of these indicators that makes monetary union possible.
The other problem concerns the intrinsic instability contained in the Treaty in 
itself (Eichengreen and Wyplosz, 1993). One of the convergence criteria required of 
countries qualifying for EMU is that they maintain exchange rate stability (defined as 
keeping their currencies within their EMS fluctuation bands without severe tensions for a 
minimum of two years prior to the outset of the monetary union). A speculative attack 
forcing a devaluation that prevents a country from satisfying this requirement might, by 
eliminating the lure of the EMU membership, induce its government to abandon the 
current policy regime. Since the country, once driven out of the EMS, might no longer 
qualify for EMU, it would have no incentive to continue pursuing the policies of 
austerity necessary to gain entry. A speculative attack, then, can prove self-fulfilling. The 
theoretical underpinning of this explanation is the literature on balance of payment crisis 
which uses the notion of self-fulfilling speculative attacks and multiple equilibria 
(Obstfeld, 1986).
These considerations lead to the conclusion that a "hard" EMS - that is, one with 
narrow bands, without frequent realignments, and hegemonic (i.e. in which monetary 
policy is decided by the Bundesbank for the purpose of internal equilibrium) - does not 
seem a viable route towards monetary union. The sacrifice of an economy which decides
17 Of course, such a hypothesis fits well with the above-mentioned Barro and Gordon model, where the 
main cause of inflation is not economic but political: namely, the lack of institutional instruments with 
which to tie the hands of future governments.
114
Exchange rate system and policy coordination: evidence from the EMS
to sustain the high costs of EMS membership by counting on the future benefits of a 
monetary union appears, in the light of the above, a sacrifice most likely to be in vain.18
The question arises, at this point, as to why the authorities of the EEC countries 
should have chosen an uncertain and risky route to monetary union. The answer can only 
be political in nature, and as such lies beyond the scope of this analysis. Nevertheless, 
mention must be made of the fact that a gradual approach allows postponement of the 
crucial political decision, just as political responsibility for the failure of the process can 
be shifted onto non-fulfilment of the non-entry clauses.
43..4. The EMS as a cooperative instrument
There is no doubt that at the moment of its creation, the EMS was conceived as a 
surrogate for more explicit cooperation over monetary policy. This is evident not only 
when one reads the documents and declarations that led to the birth of the EMS, but also 
when one analyses the initial features of the system. These were designed to ensure the 
more efficient absorption of shocks exogenous to the economy of the European countries: 
a cooperative policy eliminates recourse to beggar-thy-neighbour exchange policies, 
whether devaluationary (to improve the trade balance) or revaluationary (to blunt 
inflation by exporting it).
The fixing of the exchange rate is, from this point of view, a specific form of 
coordination among monetary policies with the advantages that it is easy to monitor, 
discourages the forms of cheating possible in cooperative regimes, and does not entail the 
costs of frequent renegotiations of common policy. By contrast, it has the disadvantage 
of being sub-optimal with respect to a complete form of coordination. How distant this 
surrogate is from the original depends, of course, on the nature of the external shocks that 
affect the system and the amount of interdependence among the national economies. 
Major asymmetric shocks affecting economies with a low amount of interdependence 
require that adjustment of the exchange rate must be an important ingredient of optimal 
policy, whereas symmetric shocks affecting closely integrated countries may be 
effectively dealt with without altering the parity.
The advantage of the cooperative interpretation of the EMS is that it explains 
Germany's participation in the exchange arrangement: the desire to build a system that
18 The conclusion may be different if, instead of a hard and hegemonic EMS, one considers an EMS 
with broader and cooperatively managed bands of fluctuation.
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can provide a common European response to an American monetary policy often viewed 
as highly unstable.
It should be remembered that this interpretation of the EMS does not entail that 
the system must function symmetrically. Even a system operating in an asymmetric 
manner can be more beneficial, both to the countries which peg their parities to the mark 
and to Germany, than one in which there are decentralised monetary policies and flexible 
exchange rates. The German central bank, however, cannot operate with complete 
independence, given that the shocks affecting the other member countries will affect, 
directly or indirectly, Germany as well. This explanation therefore seems more 
compatible with the empirical results that indicate a less than perfect asymmetry.
Within this framework, a crisis of the system arises when asymmetric shocks 
(German unification, for example) make alteration of the parity rate essential for correct 
readjustment, particularly as regards those countries, like Italy, which are not yet closely 
integrated with the German economy.
4.3. The costs of the EMS
The costs of membership of a fixed exchange rate arrangement essentially take the form 
of a loss of monetary independence and of the inability to use the exchange rate 
instrument. Therefore, in order to assess the costs of membership of the EMS we must 
specify the degree of exchange rate rigidity and the degree of monetary independence. I 
have already mentioned on several occasions that the EMS has passed through two 
stages: in the first, the possibility of frequent realignments and the existence of controls 
on capital movements meant that membership of the system had not completely 
compromised monetary independence; in the second, instead, commitment to non­
realignment and the free circulation of capital almost entirely eliminated monetary
19autonomy. The costs of EMS membership should therefore be judged according to the 
model of the EMS considered.
4.3.1 The exchange rate
When two countries are hit by asymmetric shocks - for example, a shift in international 
demand - the optimal solution may be to change the exchange rate. This use of the 
exchange rate instrument is justified in cases where there is a rigidity of prices and wages
19 Note that their loss of monetary independence should not be considered a cost for all the countries 
concerned. If inflation is engendered by the monetary authorities' lack of credibility, the the loss of 
independence to a more credible external institution is a positive development.
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and low mobility of the production factors. If, in fact, prices and wages adjust 
immediately, a movement in relative prices will come about such as to balance out the 
demand effect and prevent it from affecting income and employment. Otherwise there 
may be a shift in manpower away from the country with falling demand towards the one 
with rising demand. Conversely, in the case where prices and wages are not flexible and 
the workforce has low mobility, a variation in the exchange rate may resolve the problem 
created by the initial shock.
There are, however, other policies which can be used in place of the exchange
rate, notably, the fiscal instrument. Fiscal administration can be employed to transfer
resources from the country which has benefited from the shift in consumer demand to the
country which has paid the price of it. This, though, presupposes the existence of a
federal fiscal system or of a coordination of fiscal policies between the two countries. In
fact, it is the existence of a federal fiscal system which distinguishes the case of two
countries joined in currency union from that of two different regions of the same national
state (Sachs and Saia-i-Martin 1991; Eichengreen 1990). Sachs and Sala-i-Martin, for
example, maintain that the American federal tax system responds appreciably to regional
shocks by offsetting them to around 35 per cent by means of lower tax revenues and
20greater transfer. There is no such mechanism at the moment in Europe, and the plan to 
accompany monetary unification with an expansion of the Community budget has been 
shelved. A currency union which cannot count on the shock-absorber function of a 
relatively wide-ranging fiscal apparatus, therefore, does not seem an efficient solution.
We have so far taken it for granted that varying the nominal exchange rate is an 
effective measure. Indeed it is, but only as a first approximation and only in the short 
term. As regards the long term, it is necessary to establish whether a variation in the 
nominal exchange rate is able permanently to alter the real exchange rate. In the above 
case, in which a country experiences a drop in demand for its products, in the short term 
nominal devaluation of the exchange rate corrects the negative shock, but in the long 
term it causes an increase in domestic inflation which counterbalances the first positive 
effect. The rapidity and importance of this counter-effect depends on the degree of the 
wage index-linking and the extent of the economy's openness. The more open the 
economy and the greater wage index-linking of the country which has devalued, the more 
rapidly will the positive effect of the devaluation fade.
20 von Hagen (1992) has reported different results.
117
Exchange rate system and policy coordination: evidence from the EMS
The cost of belonging to a currency union in terms of the loss of the exchange 
rate instrument depends on the openness of the economy concerned: the less open the 
economy, the more it stands to lose by joining a monetary union.
Table 4.3.1 shows that there are wide differences among the degrees of openness 
of the EEC countries. In particular, Italy's openness compared with the other European 
nations is rather low, and it will therefore have to pay a very high cost should it decide to 
join a system of fixed exchange rates with the other European countries. If one also 
remembers that Italy recently abolished its system of automatic wage index-linking, one 
may conclude that Italy would incur a very high cost from losing exchange rate 
flexibility.
Table 4.3.1
Intra-community exports by EEC 












Fonte: EC Commission (1990)
4.3.2 The inflation rate
A system of rigid exchange rates presupposes that the inflation differential is very close 
to zero. We have already examined the possible consequences of a situation of slowly- 
converging inflation rates for the systemic stability and the economic competitiveness of 
a higher-inflation country. This section will briefly deal with the economic convenience 
for two structurally different countries to have the same rate of inflation.
When it was believed that there was a long-term trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment, the inflation rate was made to depend on the slope of the Phillips curve 
and on the preferences of economic policy-makers. In this case it was perfectly possible 
for two countries to have different desired inflation rates, and there was no rational
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reason for forcing the differential down to zero 21 Now that faith in a long-term stable 
Phillips curve has crumbled, and the thesis of its long-term verticality is widely accepted, 
no reasonable defence of the thesis of monetary independence can be advanced, and the 
objective of a convergence of inflation rates towards the long-term minimum is 
accordingly difficult to criticise. However, this does not mean that, in the short period, an 
individual country is prevented from choosing its own convergence path towards the 
minimum of inflation. Short-term trade-offs may differ for the two countries, and this 
may justify their adoption of different short-term policies and different inflation-reducing 
strategies. Membership of a fixed exchange rate system, therefore, presupposes 
acceptance not only of a long-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment, but 
also of the convergence path towards monetary stability. The economic convenience of 
this choice, which cannot be established a priori, should be assessed by setting the 
advantages in terms of greater credibility against the possible costs arising from the 
choice of a convergence path other than that desired. For example, when the inflation 
differential is particularly high - which means that expectations of inflation are high and 
sluggish - the advantages, in terms of credibility, of belonging to a fixed exchange rate 
system for the country with higher inflation are considerable; indeed, probably higher 
than those of a loss of monetary autonomy in the short run.
The modem theory of optimal public finance suggests another reason why 
inflation rates may reasonably diverge (Fischer 1982; Grilli 1989). A government will 
draw on different sources of fiscal revenue in order equalise their marginal cost. If the 
marginal cost of fiscal revenue is greater than zero, as is likely, then seigniorage too can 
be used as an instrument of fiscal revenue. Two countries with different structures of 
fiscal administration may have different levels of seigniorage and therefore different 
levels of inflation.
A country like Italy, which has a backward tax system with widespread evasion, 
pays the price of a lower-than-optimal level of seigniorage in order to join a fixed 
exchange rate arrangement.
21 The possibility of autonomously fixing the inflation rale was one of the principal reasons why during 
the Bretton Woods period many monetarists were in favour of a flexible exchange rale regime which 
guaranteed maximum monetary independence.
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4.4. Costs and benefits compared
The European monetary system, in the form that it has taken in recent years, is a system 
with "almost completely" fixed exchange rates operating asymmetrically, in which 
Germany establishes monetary policy for the entire area and the other countries peg their 
currencies to the mark. Dominance-based international monetary systems work as long as 
the dominant country provides the public good that justifies its role. During the 1980s, 
Germany performed this task by supplying the credibility of its anti-inflationary 
monetary policy as the public good. In the 1990s, however, the general macroeconomic 
picture has changed, the high inflation rates of many European countries have 
disappeared, and the public good provided by the Bundesbank has diminished in value.
The above sections have analysed the costs and benefits of a system with 
"almost" completely fixed exchange rates. The benefits are mainly the possibility of 
anchoring monetary policy to German monetary policy; the costs derive from the loss of 
exchange rate flexibility and of autonomous monetary policy. There is an obvious 
contradiction here. For the benefits to emerge there must be credible commitment to 
exchange rate stability, which means that there is a credible renunciation of exchange rate 
variation. The rigidity of the exchange rate necessary to create this credibility, however, 
raises the costs of belonging to the system. Both costs and benefits tend to increase with 
an increase in the degree of rigidity of the exchange rate.
This does not apply to all countries in the same way, however. In some 
countries, the loss of monetary autonomy is not a high cost, both because they have 
economic policy objectives very similar to Germany's and because they have economies 
very open to Germany's, so that a variation in the nominal exchange rate has entirely 
temporary effects.
Taking the case of Italy, it is possible to draw interesting comparisons between 
two Jtalys. The first Italy, that of the early 1980s, is characterised by robust inflation - 
inflation kept high, amongst other things, by strong inflationary expectations - by a high 
level of real wage indexation, and by a somewhat low stock of public debt. The first of 
these features indicates that the advantages to be gained from anchoring Italian monetary 
policy to German policy are high in terms of the stabilisation of inflationary expectations. 
The second feature indicates that the possible advantages deriving from varying the 
exchange rate, in terms of altering the relative prices of domestically produced goods, are 
extremely short-lived > given that the wage increases induced by index-linking push up 
domestic production costs. Finally, the third feature enables flexible use to be made of
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the interest rate to stabilise the exchange rate, particularly during periods of tension on 
the foreign currency markets.
The other Italy, that of the 1990s, is characterised by a slight inflationary 
differential which has persisted despite a credible exchange rate arrangement - a 
differential apparently caused by, so to speak, structural factors by a very low degree 
of real wage indexation, by increasingly weak and less combative trade unions, and by an 
enormous stock of public debt, consisting mostly‘of short-tenn securities. In this case, 
whereas the advantages of an exchange rate arrangement appear to be modest, and may 
even turn into costs when the persistent differential undermines the competitiveness of 
Italian exports, the exchange rate instrument appears to be highly effective, given the 
rigidity of nominal wages. The high stock of public debt, moreover, renders the use of 
the interest rate to stabilise the exchange rate in moments of crisis rather inflexible and/or 
very costly.
Whereas for the first Italy the advantages of the exchange rate system are 
presumably greater than the costs, for the second Italy the order of preferences is 
reversed: the loss of monetary independence, especially in the presence of a highly 
restrictive policy by the leader country, seems to be anything but off-set by the modest 
advantage of greater credibility.
4.5 The Future of the EMS
The new EMS failed to overcome the second important crisis occurred in the 
summer of 1993: the width of the bands of oscillation dramatically increased going from 
±2.25% to ±15%. It is self-evident that with the new bands width what remains of the 
EMS can hardly defined as a fixed exchange rates system. There are different economic 
explanations for this, each of them containing a grain of truth; yet the most important 
reasons seems the power of speculation in the international foreign exchange market.
The technical reason for the strength of speculative attacks rests on the lack of 
any form of capital controls, which makes the scale of official reserves ridiculously small 
in comparison with the huge amount of capital available for speculative movements. In 
this framework, the interest rate instrument appears much more effective against 
speculative attacks. Raising the interest rate, however, is not a costless policy, given its 
effect on the production level, on public finance and on the stability »of the financial 
structure. It is not by chance that the first two countries which were forced to leave the 
system were the ones which because of its the high level of the outstanding public debt.
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Italy, and because its role in the international capital markets, Great Britain, were 
particularly reluctant to use the interest rate instrument.
The reasons prompting the speculative attacks are various and they play different 
roles in the different countries involved in the crisis. The first reason is that a realignment 
was delayed because of the misguided belief that a hard EMS had achieved enough 
credibility to sustain existing parities until full convergence had occurred. Therefore 
some countries, manly Italy, had accumulated inflation differential and their currencies 
had become overvalued. Most countries were then hit by the asymmetric shock of 
German monetary and political union. A response to this disturbance should have been a 
real appreciation of the Deutschmark (a fall in prices and costs in other EMS countries 
relative to those prevailing in Germany). Some EMS countries, and mainly France, 
denied Germany the option of revaluing its currency and therefore rendered necessary 
either a burst of inflation in Germany and stable prices elsewhere, or a stable price in 
Germany and a burst of deflation elsewhere. A third and simpler option was to devalue 
the other European countries' currencies. According to this interpretation, the crisis was a 
way of forcing reluctant governments to accept the exchange rate correction. The third 
explanation of the crisis hinges on public opposition to the Maastricht Treaty which was 
fuelled by the worsening of general economic conditions. In this view, the markets 
simply anticipated the abandonment of the too tight policies required by the Maastricht 
Treaty. Lastly, the Maastricht Treaty in itself could have had a destabilizing role, as was 
already been discussed before.
Concluding, brief examination of the implications of the analysis for the future 
of the EMS may be of interest. There are two ways forward, if one excludes the 
possibility of rapid achievement of monetary union.
In the first scenario, the system tries to survive with the existing large band of 
oscillations as it waits for better times 22. Larger oscillation bands discourage, at least 
partially, speculative attacks, as the experience of the EMS has amply shown 23. In
22 A problem of legal interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty is important at this stage: do the new 
oscillation bands satisfy the cited exchange rate criterion of the Maastracth Treaty ? In other words 
could they be interpreted as normal oscillation bands?
23 Suffice to notice what happened in the first years of the EMS: the Franch franc which fluctuated in"a 
narrow band was under the attacks of speculation much more than the Italian lira which enjoyed a 
larger band. Were the central parity to be change and the band large enough, the change can take place 
withoud discrete jumps in the value of the excahnge rate which represent the best source of the profit 
for speculators.
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addition they ensure a certain degree of monetary policy autonomy, at least in the short 
period 24 . The main criticism of this option regards the difficulty of ensuring the 
European single market when the nominal exchange rate can vary around the 30% 
without any intervention by Central Banks. Moreover, they exacerbate credibility 
problems. In a period of international recession a strong incentive to run a beggar thy 
neighbour policy may emerge via competitive devaluations.
The view that the excessive variability of exchange rates can jeopardise the 
economic union and the single market has prompted some authors to suggest a rapid 
return to narrower bands. The turbulence in the foreign exchange market, however, and 
the strength of speculation in absence of capital controls makes this option hardly 
sustainable. To overcome this obstacle and to provide the monetary authority with a 
minimum of autonomy in conducting monetary policy, some authors (Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz, 1992) have re-proposed Tobin's idea of putting "sand" in the wheels of the 
foreign exchange markets. What they suggest is not a revival of administrative control - 
no longer possible under the provision of the Maastricht Treaty and the Single European 
Act - but rather an explicit or implicit tax - via non-interest-bearing deposit requirements 
- on foreign exchange transactions. Both measures work by raising the cost of cross- 
border capital flows and they penalise short-term capital movements more heavily than 
longer-term investments. They could support weak currencies in the short-term, and but 
it would take time to organise orderly realignments in the case of persistent disequilibria 
without jeopardising the overall stability of the system.
In my opinion, however, both proposals miss the main point which needs to be 
clarified if the project of the European monetary union is to be revitalised: the problem of 
conduct of the monetary policy within the area. This ambiguity remain unresolved 
because both options leave some autonomy to the national monetary authorities. This 
prooblem was implicitly solved during the years of the new EMS through the asymmetric 
nature of the system, where the Bundesbank set the monetary policy for the entire area 
and other countries defended the parities of their exchange rate. Interpretations of the 
EMS as a disciplinary device provide the theoretical anchor for this political choice.
The analysis proposed in the previous sections shows that the asymmetric 
management of economic policy is justified neither on theoretical grounds nor on
24 The recent paper of Svensson (1992) provides a therotical support to this argument.
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empirical ones. Moreover, the asymmetric management of the monetary policy seems to 
be one of the main reason for the development of the crisis.
This leads to the conclusion that the EMS structural crisis can be solved only by 
an institutional innovation process which leads to the creation of a European Central 
Bank which assumes control of monetary policy in the entire area. The cooperative 
management of monetary policy for the whole of the European Community, entrusted to 
a European Central Bank, would increase the advantages of participating in the 
agreement, in terms of increased efficiency in the absorption of exogenous shocks to the 
European economy, and could ensure greater stability for the system. The same outcome, 
however, could also be obtained, while maintaining the present structure, if the leader 
country, Germany, took it upon itself to conduct a monetary policy able to minimise 
tensions within the currency area. This would probably incur a cost for German 
compared with the present situation. The threat of a return to decentralised policies which 
would induce the breakdown of the exchange rate agreement might provide the necessary 
incentive for Germany to cooperate.
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5. Coalition and cooperation in a three country model
In this chapter I analyse the case of a three country world. This analysis appears 
interesting for several reasons. First of all, it is important to see how the central issue of 
the benefit from cooperation is affected by increasing the number of players involved in 
the game. Secondly, we can use this framework to investigate different equilibrium 
solutions, such as different types of partial cooperation between a subset of players. 
Lastly, we can use this framework to address questions such as coordination on the rules 
of the games: in other words we may address questions regarding the role played by 
exchange rate arrangements.
______________ Figure 5.1.1.______________
1) yrr = - Yirrr + ^ici + S2c2 +TUyc +Tteyus
2) ¡rr = <Piy rr + °ici +<^¿2 +7trr
3) tijt =£<PiZrr + £ ° ic i + 5°2C2
4) ¿rr = yrr
1')  yG = _ Y2rG ~&3ci +S4C2 + 1l3yrr + 1l4yus
2') io  =<P2yG +<y4C3 +,CG
3') n G = 5<p2zG -  403C4 + S04C3
4 ') z G = y G
1") yus =-Y3rus - 5^C2 + 6^C3 + Tl5yrr +neyc
2") ¡us =<l>3yus - 0 5^2 ~ a 6^3 + n US
3 ')  Jtus =^<PlZuS - ^ 5 C2 “ ^ 6^3
O  ¿ u s = yus
5 )E (c ,) = rr r - r 0
6 )E (c2 ) = Tn- — rus
7)E(Cy) = r0 ~ rus
The basic features of the model are the same as those of the model presented in 
the chapter 2, once the third country is accounted for. In what follows, it is assumed that 
in the world there are two European countries (say Italy and Germany) and an extra- 
European country (say United Sates). Therefore the model proposed in chapter 2 has been 
modified in the manner shown in figure 5.1.1.1 relax the hypothesis of perfect symmetry 
employed in previous chapters by assuming that the two European countries are more
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integrated with each other, On j = T|3 > = tj4 = ti5 = r|6, 5, = 63 > 62 = 64 = 65 = 86
and O j =  0 3  >  0 2  =  0 4  = 0 5  =  O g 5 i)  than they are with to the United States.
We have now three different exchange rates. Only two of them are independent; 
we can write, in fact, c 3 = c 2 — c, - Therefore the equations regarding Germany and the
United States can be rewritten by eliminating one of the exchange rates. This gives rise to 
the model presented in figure S. 1.2.
__________________Figure 5.1.2._________________
1 ) Yg ~ ~ (5j + $4)c, + 64Cj + %yIT + Tj4y0S
2 ') iG = «Ptfc -  (03 + O4>¿1 + O4C2 + *G
3') *c = $92*0 -  S(<*3 + <*4>C| + ^ o4c2
^ ) ¿g = yG
 ^ ) yus= —Y3rus "^ 6^ci — "*"^6 )c2 ^^syrr ^^uyG
2  )  i y s  =  US ^ 6 ^ 2  J ^ 6  )®3 ^  ^U S
3") ft us = £<PiZus + ^ 6c2 -5 « J s + o«)c2
4 ) ¿ u s = yus
As in the previous chapter I shall assume that the three countries' policy makers 
care about both real income and for core inflation, displaying the following welfare 
functions:
wrr = J7"[Prr7CrT2 + yrr2]* wg = f*[PGnG2 + yG2]* w us = J, [Pus*us2 + yus2]
In what follows I restrict the analysis to time consistent solutions. The case of 
the full optimal but time inconsistent solution, although important from other points of 
view, is of no interest as regards the question of the benefit from cooperation is 
concerned. It has been already stressed that the perverse result of the counter-productivity 
of cooperation emerges when the advantages from cooperation represented by the 
internalisation of externality effects are overcompensated by the disadvantages 
represented by the worsening of the credibility bias.
The way in which we compute the time consistent solution has been clarified in 
previous chapters. I briefly recall that the core of the solution is to impose a new 
constraint on the policy-maker's optimisation problem - the non-predetermined variables 
must follow a path obtained as a linear combination of the state variables. In the
58 Specifically we setT)j = ^ 3 =  1/3,112 = 114 =115 = 116=1/4, 8 j = 63 =1/2, 6 2 = 84  = 85 = 8 5  =  
0.45 ,0 ] = 03 1/10 and 02 = 04 = 0 5 ® Og = 0.085
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framework presented in figure 5.1.2. We have three state variables and two non 
predetermined variables: therefore the time consistent constraints would be:

















.0 2. 02 2
G
_Z US _
As before, the values of 0s are obtained iteratively and are the result of the 
interplay between the activities of economic agents in forecasting the value of the non- 
predetermined variables, accounting for the incentive of the policy-maker to renege and 
the activity of policy-makers in maximising welfare taking this private behaviour into 
account.
5.1 Benefit from cooperation in a three country world
There are no reasons, on a priori grounds, to expect that the welfare ranking of 
cooperation and Nash behaviour would be reversed with respect to that obtained in the 
two country case. On the contrary, we would except the negative gains from cooperation 
to increase in a three country framework, for two reasons: on the one hand, it has been 
argued that the size of the policy externalities tends to decrease with an increase in the 
number of interdependent countries, on the other hand, the credibility bias may increase, 
since there are now two exchange rates and therefore two forward-looking variables.
Figure 5.13
The results of the simulations confirm this first intuition: as far as the time 
consistent solution is concerned, the question of benefit from cooperation is still closely
127
Coalition and cooperation in a three country model
tied to the dimension and the distribution of initial shocks; as a measure of the former I 
will use the global average of initial inflation rates, and as measure of the latter their 
standard deviation: both are shown in table 5.1.1a. one notes immediately that 
cooperation is more likely to be productive, the higher the average shock and the lower 
the standard deviation of initial inflation rates. Moreover, table 5.1.1b shows the 
distribution of welfare losses among countries. Figure 5.1.3 plots the gains from 
cooperation against the coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by the 
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9 0 0 3 4.2 3.958 3.974 -0.40%
7 1 1 3 2.8 2.594 2.601 -0.25%
5 3 1 3 1.8 1.868 1.870 -0.07%
4 3 2 3 0.82 1.594 1.593 0.03%
3 3 3 3 0 1.501 1.500 0.06%
Table 5.1.1b
Initial shocks Loss from closed loop Nash Loss from Coop
Zrr zg Zus Italy Germany US Italy Germany US
9 0 0 11.832 0.022 0.018 11.837 0.027 0.023
7 1 1 7.303 0.246 0.236 7.321 0.247 0.237
5 3 1 3.861 1.509 0.236 3.865 1.508 0.237
4 3 2 2.548 1.508 0.725 2.549 1.507 0.724
3 3 3 1.507 1.507 1.488 1.506 1.506 1.486
Furthermore, there exists a value of the coefficient such as to switch the welfare 
ranking between productivity and counterproductvity of cooperation. With the value of 
parameters considered here, we find that the critical value of the coefficient of variation 
is about 0.29. This means that, in order for the cooperative solution to be attractive, the 
average shock must be at least three and a half times greater than the standard deviation 
of initial inflation shocks. Note how this critical value changes when some of the 
parameters of the model are altered. It can be easily shown that it increases when the 
value of 5 increases and decreases when o  increases. While 8 • that is, the effect on 
output on a change in the exchange rate - measures the advantage in terms of output of a 
depreciation, or the costs of an appreciation, a  measures the effects of a change in the
59 In this case I have assumed that our three countries are perfectly symmetric in order to prevent 
the allocation of shocks among countries from affecting the welfare results.
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exchange rate on core inflation - the price effect of a depreciation. Moreover, both 
represent an indirect measure of the external effects. The higher 5 is and the lower c  is 
the less effective a decentralised policy becomes and the greater the inefficiency of Nash 
policies. Therefore the cooperative solution gains in appeal.
In order to simplify the comparison with the Miller and Salmon two country 
model, I begin with the case in which the initial shock is represented by an inflation 
upsurge in Italy (Zjy(0)=10), while in Germany and US inflation remains at zero.
Table 5.1.2 shows the main findings. As was to be expected, the Nash closed 
loop solution provides a welfare outcome superior to the cooperative solution. As in the 
two country case the time consistent constraint calls for a less rapid Italian monetary 
contraction, while Germany and Unites States implement a more rapid policy response. It 
brings about a more rapid response in the case of symmetric shocks but a slower response 
in the case of asymmetric shocks. Since in this case the inflation shock impinges solely 
on Italian economy, the cooperative solution is sub-optimal.
Table 5.1.2
Closed-Ioop Nash_______Co-operative____ European Co-operative
Roots -0.961 -0.869 -0.867 -1.000 -0.824 -0.823 -0.978 -0.872 -0.822
Riccad coefficients:
e 11 e 12 ®I3 -0.649 0.649 0 -0.623 0.623 0 -0.622 0.622 0
®2I ®22 ®23 -0-666 -0.017 0.730 -0.639 -0.017 0.706 -0.659 -0.036 0.729
Reaction coefficients:
Pi 1 Pl2 Pl3 0.649 0.086 0.105 0.627 0.115 0.131 0.634 0.122 0.106
P21 P22 P23 0.086 0.649 0.105 0.115 0.627 0.715 0.122 0.634 0.106
P31 P32 P33 0.071 0.071 0.737 0.102 0.102 0.714 0.068 0.068 0.736
Initial values:
2nr zi is 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0
ynr ya  yns -9.004 -0321 -0.292 -8.832 -0.607 -OJ579 -8.887 -0.661 -0.293
*rr *c> *ijs 8.785 0.634 0-581 8.834 0.608 0.557 8.817 0.591 0.591
rTT rr, rns 6.498 0.864 0.707 6.273 1.151 1.027 6.348 1.227 0.681
Cl -6.488 -6.225 -6.225
c? -6.662 -6.390 -6.590
c-* -0.174 -0.165 -0.365
Welfare loss:
Wrr wn wIIS; 14.61 0.027 0.0231 14.68 0.0235
Average 4.887 4.907 4.901
Gains from coordination -0.04% -0.02%
5.1.1 The case for coalitions: European coordination
As has already been pointed out, one of the advantage of using a three country model is 
that enables the analysis of the case in which only two countries are involved in
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cooperation. In other words, I can assume that two countries form a coalition against the 
third one. Since we have assumed that there are two European countries and an extra- 
European country in our framework, we can interpret the case in which the two most 
integrated countries cooperate which is the case of monetary cooperation among 
European countries 60.
In this section, therefore, I assume that together with the already described Nash 
and cooperative policies we also have a case, which I call European cooperation, in 
which there is cooperation within Europe and competition between Europe and the rest of 
the world. The coalition is attractive because it allows the internalisation of the 
externalities that European countries impose on each other. This entails the assumption 
that there is a common monetary authority in Europe, something like the European 
Central Bank, which sets monetary policy so as to maximise the weighted average of the 
two welfare functions:
w ^ W r r K l ^ W c
On the other hand, this European institution does not cooperate with the American 
monetary institution: a Nash closed loop equilibrium will prevail in this case. By 
considering a cooperative-Nash equilibrium, we allow the US policy maker to react to the 
European coalition decision.
The first question warranting attention is the existence of a benefit from 
European cooperation. In other words, the intention is to investigate the conditions under 
which the formation of a coalition between the Italy and Germany will be beneficial. The 
question can be evaluated from two different points of view. The first one is global: are 
there situations in which the formation of such a coalition can improve the world welfare 
as a whole compared to the case in which each policy maker acts individually as a Nash 
player? The second point of view restricts the analysis to European countries: in this 
case, it is of some interest to see whether the formation of a European coalition makes 
European countries better off than in the Nash case 61.
With regard to the first question, there are situations in which the 
implementation of European cooperation is the best possible time consistent solution for 
the entire world. Once again the welfare ranking of the different solution concepts will
60 We assume that binding agreements are possible.
61 Note that this solution concept does not need the agreement of all the players. It is in fact 
sufficient that the two European countries decide to run a joint policy.
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depend on the distribution of shocks among countries. In order to analyse this, I assume
that the entire world is hit by an world-average inflation shock equal to 3.333.
Table 5.1.3a
Initia] shocks Average Standard European Loss Loss Loss








1 1 8 3.333 14 0 33306 33377 33307
2 2 6 3.333 8 0 2.3334 2.3346 23333
5.5 3 1.5 3.333 8 2 .5 ' ' 2.2283 2.2295 22277
6 2 2 3.333 8 4 23404 2.3424 2.3416
3 3 4 3.333 2 0 1.8823 1.8809 1.8817
Table 5.13b
Initial shocks Loss from Loss from Loss from
___________________ Nash_____________Coop___________Euro-coop
Zrr ZG ZlJS Italy Germany US Italy Germany US Italy Germany US
1 1 8 0.2583 0.2583 9.475 0.260 0.260 9.493 0.2581 0.2581 9.476
2 2 6 0.763 0.763 5.473 0.763 0.763 5.479 0.762 0.762 5.474
5.5 3 1.5 4.678 1343 0.464 4.683 1.541 0.464 4.679 1.539 0.465
6 2 2 5.508 0.765 0.748 5.516 0.764 0.747 5.513 0.763 0.749
3 3 4 1.541 1.541 2.565 1.534 1.534 2.563 1.538 1.538 2.566
Table 5.1.3a and table 5.1.3b report the welfare yields - in aggregate terms and at 
national level respectively - when different national distributions of the shock are 
assumed. When the initial shocks are strongly asymmetrically distributed between 
Europe and USA - first row of the table - the Nash response is to be preferred. In this 
case, in fact, the necessary adjustment of the exchange rate is such as to determine an 
high credibility bias. However, were the initial distribution of shocks to be somewhat less 
asymmetrical - second row of the table - European cooperation would emerge as the best 
policy reaction for the entire world. The fact that the initial inflation shock is the same in 
European economies means that the European exchange rate need not change. Thus the 
credibility bias do not dramatically emerge, while the externalities within Europe are 
internalised. However, the distribution of gains from coordination among countries is 
unfair Italy and Germany improve their welfare while the United States impairs it. It is 
important to stress that this does not render European cooperation not achievable because 
the explicit participation of the United States is not required.
The third and fourth row of the table show, moreover, that in evaluating 
European cooperation, the infra-European distribution of shocks is important. The initial 
shocks, however, need not be equal across the European economies to render European
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cooperation profitable for the entire world (third row)62. When the initial shocks of Italy 
and Germany are markedly different, in fact, their exchange rate needs to be adjusted; 
then the credibility bias would emerges. Finally, when the degree of symmetry is 
sufficiently high, as in the last row of the table, full cooperation is to be preferred since it 
is able to capture the entire benefit of the internalisation of external effects without 
paying too much in terms of credibility. In this case, European cooperation is still to be 
preferred to the Nash policy.
The reason for the optimality of European cooperation is clearer on inspection of 
table S. 1.2. The reaction coefficients show that, when an European cooperation is 
implemented, the two European countries react, on average, more to shocks than in the 
Nash case, while the reaction of the USA is slightly inferior. Therefore, as long as the 
distribution of shocks is not too asymmetric, European cooperation ensures a more rapid 
return to equilibrium. With regard to the full cooperation, it is evident that European 
countries react less to a USA inflation shock, but they react more as far their own 
inflation shocks are concerned. The Riccali coefficients show that European cooperation 
and full cooperation are equally constrained by the time consistency of the policy with 
respect to the infra-European exchange rate, but much less constrained with respect to die 
extra-European exchange rate. This explains why, once shocks are significantly 
symmetric, full cooperation regains its optimality.
An interesting feature of the European cooperation solution is that it does not 
need the agreement of the three countries to be implemented: it is actually sufficient that 
Italy and Germany agree to cooperate. Therefore the viability of this coalition should be 
evaluated by comparing the average welfare of the two European countries: they will 
decide to cooperate if the welfare costs under European cooperation are less than the 
welfare costs under decentralised policies. Obviously enough, this case is rather similar 
to the standard two country model: gains from coordination emerge the higher the 
average shock and the lower the difference between European countries. Inflation shock 
hitting the United States can be interpreted as a symmetric shock. Figure 5.1.4 plots the 
gains from European coordination when distinct European inflation rate differentials are 
considered: it shows that European coalition will fail, i.e. the gains from European 
coordination are negative, when European countries are hit by asymmetric shocks, as is
62 In this case, however, an incentive problem would emerge: cooperation is not desirable from 
the point of Italian policy maker.
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the case in the tails of the curves, and it is beneficial when shocks are more 
symmetrically distributed between European economies. Moreover the figure shows that 
the curves shift upward when the inflation shocks of the third country increases. This 
means that the higher the US inflation shocks, the more likely it is that European
cooperation will be beneficial.______________________________________ _
Figure 5.1.4
In conclusion to this section I compare my findings with those of Miller and 
Salmon (1985 and 1989) and Canzoneri and Henderson (1991). In common with the 
latter, I have obtained the result that cooperation between two of the three policy makers 
may be counter-productive. As in Miller and Salmon, although they use a two country 
model, the crucial role in determining the counter-productivity of cooperation is played 
by the distribution of initial shocks. However, it is worth pointing out two important and 
new conclusions to be drawn from the analysis.
First, there are situations in which cooperative behaviour between European 
countries improves aggregate world welfare. These situations are characterised by the 
existence of an asymmetrical distribution of shocks among the three countries which 
renders full cooperation unattractive, and of more symmetrical infra-European 
distribution of shocks. It cannot be denied that this appears to be the most relevant case 
from an empirical point of view. European economies more closely resemble each other, 
as far as economic structure and institutional environment is concerned, than they do the 
United States.
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Secondly, the European coalition is more likely to be beneficial if a marked 
disturbance originates from outside Europe. This seems to confirm the conventional idea 
that the highly integrated and fairly similar European economies have a stronger 
incentive to cooperate between each other when the disturbances deriving from outside 
are relevant and/or when the economic policy pursued by the rest of the world is 
markedly different from the European one.
5.2 Policy coordination and exchange rate targeting
It has been generally argued that an agreement for the stabilisation of the exchange rate 
can be seen as a surrogate for a more explicit form of cooperation. Therefore in this 
section I shall analyse the case in which an agreement on the stabilisation of the 
exchange rate is reached between the two European countries. I shall compare this 
solution both with a situation in which the infra-European exchange rate is free to float 
and economic policies are pursued in a decentralised way and with a cooperative 
solution, either with or without an explicit target on the exchange rate.
In order to replicate a situation in which the exchange rate is not completely free 
to move we will assume that the European welfare function are as follows:
Wjr = J^fPrr^n-2 + Yit2 + Pn*2]» = ^ "[Pg7^ 2 + yG2 + Poe2j
European policies are constrained by the weight given to the stabilisation of the 
nominal exchange rate: it goes without saying that the exchange rate agreement need not 
to work symmetrically, since we can identify a situation in which:
PeQ=0 and Pejy *0 .
In this case, the burden of stabilising of the exchange rate falls exclusively on the 
Italian monetary authority. The weight given to the exchange rate target represents the 
degree of commitment to exchange rate management. Note that if we assume that P*= «*>, 
this signifies that the exchange rate is completely fixed. In what follows I assign to pe a 
high although finite value in order to preserve the dynamics of the model. In other words, 
we may say that the weight assigned to the exchange rate target gives us an inverse 
measure of the width of the target zone.
Since the intention is to depict a close as similar as possible to events in Europe 
during the eighties, I shall assume that the German Monetary Authority shows a higher 
attitude against inflation and less inherited inflation than its Italian counterpart. In fact, I 
shall simulate a situation in which the major inflation shock comes from the United
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States: Zit(0)=2, Zg(0)=l and Zus(0)=5 and in which {$q=2 and Prr=Pus= -^ Tables 5.2.1 
and 5.2.2. summarise the welfare results.
Table 5.2.1.
Flexible exchange rate
output inflation exchange total
costs costs rate costs costs
Italy -
Nash 0.3321 0.3851 0.0965 0.7173
Coop 0.3570 0.3593 0.0978 0.7164
Eurcop 0.3371 0.3803 0.0997 0.7173
Germany
Nash 0.1413 0.0968 0.0965 0.3351
Coop 0.1629 0.0858 0.0978 0.3346
Euro-coop 0.1484 0.0928 0.0997 0.3340
United States
Nash 1.8982 1.8893 0.0965 3.7875
Coop 1.9008 1.8897 0.0978 3.7906
Euro-coop 1.8979 1.8899 0.0997 3.7879
Average costs Nash Coop Euro-coop
World average costs 1.6133 1.6139 1.6131
European average costs 0.5262 0.5255 0.5256
Table 5 2 2
Managed float
output inflation exchange total
costs costs rate costs costs*
Italy
Nash 0.5714 0.2223 0.0129 0.7937
Simmetrie Nash 0.4792 0.2664 0.0082 0.7456
Coop 0.5496 0.2309 0.0023 0.7822
Eurcop 0.5223 0.2458 0.0023 0.7681
Germany
Nash 0.1398 0.1015 0.0129 0.3430
Symmetric Nash 0.0875 0.1462 0.0082 0.3801
Coop 0.0850 0.1437 0.0023 0.3792
Euro-coop 0.0837 0.1548 0.0023 0.3934
United States
Nash 1.8937 1.8976 3.7913
Symmetric Nash 1.8977 1.8921 3.7900
Coop 1.9027 1.8903 3.8009
Euro-coop 1.8977 1.8930 3.7907
World average costs Nash Symmetric Coop Euro-
Nash coop
with ex. rate 1.6859 1.6934 1.6593 1.6586
without ex.rate 1.6429 1.6388 1.6543 1.6588
Europ. aver, costs 0.5683 0.5628 0.5807 0.5807
•This computation does not consider the cost of exchange rate
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As noted in the previous section, this scenario suggests that European 
cooperation is the best aggregate response to the initial shocks; see last row of table 
5.2.1. I wish to verify whether agreement on the exchange rate arrangement between 
European countries can be a surrogate for a more explicit form of cooperation. I 
distinguish two different kinds of Nash equilibrium; in the asymmetric case I assume that 
the exchange rate agreement works asymmetrically, since the Italian monetary entirely 
authority bears the entire burden of controlling the exchange rate - we assume P 'jfslO  - 
while the German monetary authority is free to set the monetary policy neglecting the 
effect on the exchange rate (PeQ=0); instead, in the symmetric case I assume that both 
countries equally share the burden of controlling the exchange rate (PeiT=PeQ=10).
Obviously, the deviation of the intra-European nominal exchange rate from the 
target value is strongly reduced in the case in which the nominal exchange rate is taken as 
one of policy targets. Figure 5.2.1 compares the path of the nominal exchange rate under 
managed exchange rate, symmetric and asymmetric Nash and cooperative solutions, and 
free float. Interestingly this effect is far more important when a cooperative solution is 
implemented. This is due to the fact that when a cooperative policy is run, the nominal 
exchange rate becomes a common target. A powerful effect on the exchange rate path is 
obtained when a symmetric Nash equilibrium is considered as well.
On the other hand, figure 5.2.2 shows that the stabilisation of the infra-European 
exchange rate is obtained at the expense of increased variability in the extra-European 
nominal exchange rate. This a result shared with many if not all the theoretical models of 
exchange rate determination which predict that the volatility reduced with the help of a 
managed exchange rate system is simply transferred to other economic loci. 63
Many of the effects of introducing the nominal exchange rate in the welfare 
function are well known and already described by the literature on the EMS: by 
managing the exchange rate, the Italian monetary authority acquires some of the 
antinflationary attitude of the German authority, although at the expense of higher output 
cost, while the German policy maker is forced to accept higher inflation costs. Figure
5.2.3. shows the path of core inflations under free float and managed exchange rate
63 A recent empirical study suggests on the contrary that exchange rate volatility is not in fact 
transferred to some other part of the economy and simply seems to vanish (Flood and Rose, 
1993). This supports the view that current models of exchange rate behaviour are far from being 
satisfactory.
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solutions. As predicted by the literature on credibility, unilateral asymmetric pegging is 
the scenario that allows a more marked reduction of core inflation.
Evidently if we assume that the exchange rate is just an intermediate target and 
therefore neglect it in computing the welfare losses, the symmetric Nash solution 
emerges as the preferable solution concept in this scenario, as regards world welfare and 
European welfare.
Two important results deserve particular mention. First, the comparison between 
symmetric and asymmetric exchange rate agreements under Nash solution shows that the 
lack of symmetry brings about higher costs. This is straightforward in the case in which 
the loss involved in the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its equilibrium value 
is considered, since the stabilisation of the exchange rate is far more efficacious when 
controlled by both countries. Moreover, even if we consider the exchange rate as an 
intermediate target and do not consider it explicit in the welfare calculation, we still have 
the superiority of the symmetric decentralised policies. The choice between symmetric 
and asymmetric intervention in the foreign exchange market, however, is not neutral with 
respect to the distribution of the cost between Italy and Germany. Obviously enough, in 
the case of symmetric intervention rule, the share of adjustment beard by Germany is 
larger than in the case in which the asymmetric exchange rate arrangement is 
implemented. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that while the literature on the EMS 
has accustomed us to view asymmetry as a positive value, our analysis points to the 
opposite conclusion, in that it shows that relinquishing symmetry reduces the 
effectiveness of monetary policies and brings about higher aggregate costs
Moreover, the mild form of cooperation represented by the cooperation on the 
rules of the game can be seen as a very imperfect surrogate for explicit cooperation 
between European countries. It leads to a higher welfare costs both for Italy and 
Germany, also in the case in which exchange rate is just an intermediate target. The 
reason is simple: the objective of limiting the range of the nominal exchange rate calls for 
a less active use of the policy instrument, thereby increasing the adjustment costs. Figure 
5.2.4 shows the path of Italian interest rate under free float and managed exchange rate 
solutions.
64 It cannot denied, however, that the comparison is not completely correct, since in our 
scenario, also the German monetary authority lacks credibility but is less prone to inflation 
preferences.
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5.2.1 Optimal Exchange rate targeting
While the previous section replicate a situation in which there was a strong commitment 
to an exchange rate stabilisation, in this section I try to answer the following question: 
how vigourously should countries pursue the exchange rate target? Is it possible to 
identify an optimal degree of exchange rate stabilisation, that is, an optimal weight 
assigned to exchange rate stabilisation in the welfare function of the participating 
countries? This question has its mirror image in the question of the widths of the target 
zones for exchange rates. The greater the weight assigned to exchange rate in the policy 
maker's objective function, the narrower will be the implied target zone. In addition, it is 
of some interest to see how this optimal targeting will change when the initial conditions 















3 1 2 1 2 1 0.0 0.74761 0.86457 1.41129
3 I 2 1 2 1 0.3 0.75116 0.65632 1.40748
3 1 2 1 3 1 0.0 0.69753 0.71447 1.41201
3 1 2 1 3 1 0.4 0.63277 0.63278 1.40920
6 1 2 1 2 1 0.0 6.14415 5.97529 12.1194
6 1 2 1 2 1 0.2 6.52852 5.56049 12.0890
The case I consider is that of an unilateral targeting. In this case there is no need 
for an explicit exchange rate arrangement between the two European countries; it is 
sufficient for one of the two countries to assign a positive weight to exchange rate 
stabilisation in its objective function. Let us assume that the Italian authority is willing to 
do so. Table 5.2.3 shows the optimal degree of pegging, in terms of Italian aggregate 
welfare losses under different frameworks 65. The first thing to note is that the optimal 
weight on the nominal exchange rate is not too high with respect to the weights on the 
other targets 66. As is evident from the table, the effect of the pegging is to reduce 
inflation costs at the expense of the output cost: nonetheless, it is convenient in terms of 
aggregate welfare. The outcome is analogous to that created by a change in policy 
preference which assigns a greater weight to the antinflationary policy: the main
65 I maintain that German authority displays greater aversion to inflation than the Italian and 
American ones, (Jg=2 an^ Pn^PuS5^ -
66 This is true, obviously, when one assumes that median voter preferences are equal to that of 
the policy maker.
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difference is that the change in policy preference is obtained implicitly by assuming the 
exchange rate as an intermediate target. This appears to be a more viable solution 
whenever the policy maker does not posses sufficient policy strength to impose the 
change in policy preferences.
From another point of view, it is evident that optimal exchange rate targeting can 
be seen as one of the possible manners to solve, at least partially, the inflationary bias 
induced by the lack of credibility of the policy maker. It works by increasing the indirect 
costs of reneging. It is interesting, therefore, to compare the outcome provided by 
pegging with the outcome of the optimal time inconsistent policy and with the outcome 
provided by the other solutions proposed to reduce the time inconsistency bias. Table
5.2.4. compares the welfare costs determined by the exchange rate targeting with the time 
inconsistent full optimal policy - obtained assuming the existence of a credible pre­
commitment - and the welfare costs in the case a conservative, optimally chosen, central 
banker is appointed. Both solutions allow for a remarkable reduction in the welfare bias 
determined by the lack of credibility: the external pegging, however, displays the better 
trade-off between inflation and output costs. Therefore, the exchange rate targeting 
allows a marked reduction in the inflation bias induced by the lack of credibility. This 
way of solving the time consistent problem therefore apperas superior to the appointment 
of a conservative central banker.
Finally, we may take a rapid glance at how the optimal degree of exchange rate 
targeting varies when some of the elements of the framework are changed. Table 5.2.3. 
presents different occurrences. Looking at rows 2, 3 and 4 of table, one notes that the 
optimal degree of exchange rate targeting increases with the increase in the difference 
between the degree of andnflationary attitude of the leading country. In other words, it is 
convenient to be more closely pegged to a country with a more conservative central 
banker, or, in other words, the utility of an external constraint is higher when the 
difference in credibility, proxied by the difference in the value of ps, is high enough. The 
higher the values of (Jq , the stronger the policy reaction of the German monetary 
authority will be, and more advantages can be obtained by pegging the lira to the DM. 
This outcome is in accordance with the traditional literature on credibility, and moreover, 
appears to fit well with the empirical analysis conducted in the previous chapter.
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Table 5.2.4
Policy Italian Italian Italian
implemented output cost inflation cost total costs
Time consistent policy 0.74761 0.86457 1.41129
Policy with precommitment 0.74480 0.65855 1.40336
Exchange rate targeting 0.75116 0.65632 1.40748
Conservative central banker 0.74615 0.66191 1.40784
Rows S and 6 of the cited table confirm an old result of international economics. 
Pegging our exchange rate is possible if our country and the leader one are not hit by 
asymmetric shocks. The optimal degree of exchange rate targeting, in fact, will decrease 
when the difference in the initial inflation levels increases. The higher the initial 
differences in the inflation rates, the lower the optimal degree of exchange rate targeting 
will be. This is also confirmed by the analysis we carried in the previous chapter, in the 
first period of the EMS when the inflation differentials were large, several realignments 
took place - that is, the ex post degree of targeting was low; in the second half of the 
eighties when the inflation differential were remarkably reduced the ex post degree of 
targeting increases. Finally in the nineties the German monetary and political union 
shock increases again the with of the exchange rate bands.
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